Problems of Communism

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Ali A. Mazrui
Thomas M. Callaghy
Richard F. Sherman
Lynn-Darrell Bender
Werner Cohn
Gary K. Bertsch

SEPTEMBER-OCTOBER 1980

Venezuela's MAS — David J. Myers

West European Communism — J. W. Friend



THE WARSAW PACT AT 25

Dale R. Herspring

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Problems of Communism

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SEPT-OCT 1980 VOL XXIX

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Cover: Soviet troops go ashore from a helicopter during Warsaw Pact maneuvers in East Germany in August-September 1980. Photo by Vioujard/Gamma-Liaison.

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IN THIS ISSUE OF

Problems of Communism

Articles

The Warsaw Pact at 25
Dale R. Herspring

In its first 25 years, the Warsaw Pact has developed into a vital if complex instrument for management of Soviet–East European political-military relations. While Moscow has tried—with considerable success—to use the Pact for its own ends, the East Europeans have attempted to use it to weaken the Soviet hold over them and have succeeded at times in forcing Moscow to make concessions, drop policies, or push ahead without Pact imprimatur.

Venezuela's MAS
David J. Myers

Since its birth in 1971, Venezuela's Movement Toward Socialism (MAS) has become the most significant electoral force on the Venezuelan left. Its "Eurocommunist"-style appeal to Venezuelan nationalism and to Iberian instincts of unity and harmony among leftists contrasts favorably in voters' eyes with the rigid sectarianism and loyalty to Moscow demonstrated by the traditional Venezuelan Communist Party. Despite its multipronged electoral strategy, though, MAS is unlikely to pass up any good chance to seize power by force.

The Roots of Autonomy in West European Communism
J.W. Friend

Firm Stalinist control over the international Communist movement began to wane with Stalin's death and subsequent desanctification under Khrushchev. Yet, European parties remained reluctant to express views independent from Moscow until the Sino-Soviet split and the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia. Today, the Soviets exercise diplomatic-style influence over Western parties, which have full autonomy but do not constantly assert it, since in practice they agree with the Soviets much of the time.

* * *

Essay-reviews

Marxist Theories, Socialist Policies, and African Realities
Ali A. Mazrui

Despite the considerable intellectual bases for African attraction to Marxism (and the considerable concrete achievements registered by Marxists on the continent in the 1970's), there are important social and economic conditions that make Africa inhospitable for Marxism. The 1980's are likely to reveal more fully the basic tensions between cultural myths and structural realities in an Africa caught up in the uncertainties of change.

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The Rise of the African State
Thomas M. Callaghy

The rise of the state to a position of central importance has been a major development in Africa in the past decade. In the domestic realm, the state has increasingly become the focus of actions and interests. In the international realm, older notions of statecraft have gained a new ascendancy. With the emergence of an African state system, interstate conflict and outside intervention have increased, and broader notions such as pan-Africanism have declined.

Marxism on the Horn of Africa
Richard F. Sherman

Since 1974, dramatic changes inside Ethiopia, Somalia, and Djibouti and international realignments have focused superpower attention on the Horn of Africa and led to the introduction to the region of non-native weaponries and ideologies. One result of the superimposition of Soviet ideology and power on local realities has been a serious gap between the rhetoric and reality of the area's so-called Marxist movements. This gap will probably persist, as nationalism and international forces shape the future of Marxism in the region.

Political Forces in Latin America
Lynn-Darrell Bender

Most Latin American countries—democratic Venezuela being the most notable exception—today are ruled by authoritarian regimes in which a dominant military is committed to the "depolitization of politics" and in which the masses exert little political influence beyond the local level. The challenge to such authoritarian regimes now comes less from old-line Marxist parties than from radical nationalists pledged to revolutionary change.

Perspectives on Communist Totalitarianism
Werner Cohn

Totalitarianism remains a useful concept for analyzing Communist systems. Recent Western works on the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe leave no doubt of its continuing relevance. Works on China, in contrast, have tended to ignore the methodological precepts developed in the study of totalitarianism. As a result, much of current Western sinology gives an implicitly favorable, but not fully reliable, picture of China.

West-East Technology Transfer
Gary K. Bertsch

The nature and endurance of technological ties between West and East are plainly problematic during a period of heightened East-West tension. However, the present low level of understanding regarding many questions related to West-East technology transfer—e.g, scientific and technological capabilities in the East, or the impact of transfers on sending and receiving countries—makes rational formulation of policy difficult in any case.

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The Warsaw Pact at 25

By Dale R. Herspring

The role of the Warsaw Pact has expanded radically during the 25 years of its existence. From a military standpoint, the Pact in 1955 was a loosely organized "socialist military coalition," created to counter "possible aggression."[1] Its East European contingents were still using weapons of World War II vintage; the nature of military coordination among the various military units was primitive at best. By 1980, however, the Pact's East European militaries could boast of modern—if not the latest—military equipment, and the Pact itself had evolved into a tightly knit military organization with a variety of high-level military bodies exercising close supervision over a multitude of military activities, including large-scale maneuvers, military research and development, and weapons acquisition.

From a political standpoint, the role of the Pact in 1955 was very limited. In fact, the Pact's highest political decision-making body, the Political Consultative Committee (PCC), met only three times during the first five years of its existence. By 1980, however, high-level political meetings sponsored by or associated with the Pact had become regular occurrences, and an elaborate mechanism for coordinating Pact positions on political questions had emerged. This mechanism permits extensive bilateral cooperation—even in the military sphere—to take place under Pact auspices.

While Moscow is clearly the dominant member of the Pact, the alliance is not a rubber-stamp organization in the hands of Soviet policymakers. Rather, it is the arena of a recurring struggle between the Soviets, who attempt to employ the Pact for their own ends, and the East Europeans (notably the Romanians), who seek to use it as a means for increasing their autonomy vis-à-vis the Kremlin. The Pact also has a secondary function for the East Europeans—as a forum in which they try to gain support from the Soviets and other East Europeans for their own favored policies. Consequently, the outcome of policy debates often serves as a barometer of overall Soviet–East European relations and, to a lesser degree, as an indicator of the degree of influence exerted by individual East European states within the Pact.

In short, the Pact has developed into a vital institution for the management of Soviet–East European political-military affairs. Indeed, despite the extensive system of bilateral treaties linking Moscow and its East European allies, the Pact has become so important that its sudden disappearance would, to paraphrase Voltaire, force Pact members to invent another structure to take its place.

The evolution of the Pact can be divided into three general periods: 1955–60, years when the Pact suffered benign neglect as an institution; 1961–68, a time of increased but unstructured activity; and 1969–80, a period of major alterations in the Pact's political-military structures. During this most recent phase, the Pact has also played an increasingly important role in the regulation of important aspects of

[1] I.I. Yakubovskiy, Ed., *Boyevoye sodruzhestvo bratskikh narodov i armiy* (The Military Commonwealth of the Fraternal Peoples and Armies), Moscow, Voyenizdat, 1975, pp. 90, 86.

Mr. Herspring is a Foreign Service Officer, US Department of State, who has written extensively on Communist military affairs. He is author of East German Civil-Military Relations: The Impact of Technology, 1949–1972, *1973, co-editor of* Civil-Military Relations in Communist Systems, *1979, and contributor of articles to various journals and symposia, including* Armed Forces and Society *and* Studies in Comparative Communism. *The author would like to thank Rudolf Perina and A. Ross Johnson for their helpful comments on an earlier version of this article.* *Opinions expressed in the article are the author's and do not necessarily reflect those of the US government.*

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Soviet–East European relations. To fully appreciate the impact of the changes of the late 1960's and mid-1970's on Soviet–East European relations, it is essential to set these changes in historical context.

The Early Years

Despite the relative inactivity of the Pact's political and military organs during the first five years of the alliance's existence, there were major efforts in the military sphere to "raise the combat capability and combat readiness" of the individual armies.[2] These undertakings appear to have been inspired primarily by a recognition on the part of the post-Stalin Soviet leadership that modern, highly technical conventional forces—East European as well as Soviet—were vital to the successful outcome of a future conflict.[3]

Essentially, Moscow decided to sacrifice quantity for quality in the manpower area and to modernize weapons systems. Thus, Soviet forces were reduced by 2,140,000 men between 1955 and 1959, and East European Pact forces were cut back by 464,000 men.[4] Vigorous efforts were also made to improve the educational qualifications of officers and noncommissioned officers. In Poland, for example, the proportion of officers with an academic degree increased from 12 percent in 1956 to 20 percent in 1962, and the proportion of officers with secondary school education rose from 30 percent in 1956 to more than 64 percent in 1961.[5]

With regard to equipment, the motorization of infantry units was pushed, new armored units were established, and tables of equipment of tactical forces were modified to permit operations under conditions of nuclear war. For example, T-54 tanks, antitank weapons, long-range artillery, and MiG-17 aircraft were introduced.[6]

[2] K. Schutzle, "The Construction and Development of the NPA into a Modern Socialist Coalition Army," *Militärwesen* ([East] Berlin), No. 1, 1976, p. 47.

[3] See Stephan Tiedtke's excellent analysis of the military factor in Pact development, in *Die Warschauer Vertragsorganisation* (The Warsaw Treaty Organization), Munich, Oldenbourg, 1978.

[4] These figures were arrived at on the basis of data in ibid., pp. 23–24, which derives from Soviet and East German sources.

[5] See Dale R. Herspring, "Technology and the Political Officer in the Polish and East German Armed Forces," *Studies in Comparative Communism* (Los Angeles, CA), Winter 1977, p. 393.

[6] Autorenkollektiv des Deutschen Instituts für Militärgeschichte, *Zeittafel zur Militärgeschichte der Deutschen Demokratischen*

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

Figure 1: Frequency of Warsaw Pact Functions, 1956-79

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

A Soviet TU-26 "Backfire B" bomber over the northern part of the German Democratic Republic during joint Warsaw Pact maneuvers in August-September 1980.

—Camera Press.

Soviet sources list only one Pact-wide military exercise during this period. However, numerous exercises did take place at the national level.[7]

In sum, although Thomas Wolfe is correct in stating that "the Soviet Union made no major effort to weld the Warsaw Pact into an integrated military alliance" during this period,[8] there were still major changes in the individual Pact armies. These changes were a prerequisite to the closer military integration which was to follow during the 1960's.

Closer Pact Integration

The year 1961 witnessed a major shift in the Pact's political-military role in Soviet-East European relations. Benign neglect of the Pact as an institution gave way to greater efforts at cooperation. In the military sphere, for instance, the Pact's defense organs began to meet on an annual basis (see Figure 1), although these meetings were not always at the highest level. While details on the agenda of such meetings are lacking, information available from Soviet and Polish sources suggests that they were primarily concerned with operational matters such as the coming year's training program.[9] Broader defense-related questions appear to have been dealt with by the PCC. For example, "conditions" in the Warsaw Pact armed forces were discussed at the 1963 PCC meeting.[10]

There was also emphasis on the upgrading of equipment and the further education of cadres. With respect to the former, MiG-21 and SU-7 aircraft as well as antitank missiles and self-propelled guns were introduced into Pact inventories. In addition, the process of replacing the older T-34 tank with the newer T-54/55 model was completed.

Republik 1949 bis 1968 (Chronological Table of Military History of the German Democratic Republic, 1949 to 1968), (East) Berlin, Deutscher Militärverlag, 1969, p. 87; and R. Wustner, "The Polish Army—30 Years in the Service of Peace and Socialism," *Militärwesen,* No. 9, 1973, p. 14.

[7] For the GDR, see *Zeittafel zur Militärgeschichte . . .*, pp. 82-152; for Poland, see Mikolaj Plikus, Ed., *Mala kronika Ludowego Wojska Polskiego, 1943-1973* (Short Chronicle of the Polish People's Army, 1943-1973), Warsaw, Wydawnictwo Ministerstwa Obrony Narodowej, 1975, pp. 324-50.

[8] Thomas W. Wolfe, *Soviet Power and Europe, 1945-1970,* Baltimore, MD, Johns Hopkins Press, 1970, p. 148.

[9] V.G. Kulikov, Ed. *Varshavskiy Dogovor—soyuz vo imya mira i sotsializma* (The Warsaw Pact—An Alliance in the Name of Peace and Socialism), Moscow, Voyennoye Izdatel'stvo, 1980, pp. 274-79; and Marian Jurek and Edward Skrzypowski, *Tarcza pokoju* (Shield of Peace), Warsaw, Wydawnictwo Ministerstwa Obrony Narodowej, 1975, pp. 338-48.

[10] N.N. Rodinov et al., *Organizatsiya Varshavskogo Dogovora, 1955-1975* (The Organization of the Warsaw Treaty, 1955-1975), Moscow, Izdatel'stvo Politicheskoy Literatury, 1975, p. 75.

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Most important, a new stress was placed on joint Pact military exercises/maneuvers. While only one exercise had been held during the 1950's, 19 took place in the 1961–68 period (see Figure 1).

The Pact likewise became more active in a political sense during this period. Although its political organs had met only four times during the first five years of its existence, they held a total of 10 meetings during 1961–68 (see Figure 1). Furthermore, these meetings were increasingly closely associated with current events. For example, the meetings of the PCC on March 28–29, 1961, and of the first secretaries of the Communist parties of the member states on August 3–5, 1961, made important statements on the Berlin question, and the 1966 and 1968 PCC meetings in Bucharest and Sofia issued statements on US "aggression in Vietnam."[11] Throughout the 1960's, the PCC and foreign minister meetings continued to focus on problems of current interest such as European security.

By the end of 1968, the Pact had become a more active political-military alliance. The Soviets found it useful not only as a means of justifying and facilitating their 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia, but also as a forum in which to float their proposal for a conference on security and cooperation in Europe. Rising Western concern over the Pact's growing military potential was likewise presumably a source of some satisfaction in Moscow.

The East Europeans, too, quickly learned how to employ the Pact for their own ends. The Romanian case is probably the best known,[12] but it was not the only one. For example, according to N. Edwina Moreton, the GDR made considerable use of the Pact during the 1960's to try to counter Bonn's attempt to expand its influence in Eastern Europe at the expense of East Berlin. By the time of the Karlovy Vary conference of European Communist parties in 1967, she reports, all the member states of the Warsaw Pact except Romania "were prepared or had been persuaded to subordinate their established interest in . . . the German question to the overall framework on that issue."[13]

[11] Ibid., pp. 97, 103.

[12] See, for example, Robin Remington's analysis in *The Warsaw Pact, Case Studies in Communist Conflict Resolution*, Cambridge, MA, MIT Press, 1971, pp. 56–93.

[13] N. Edwina Moreton, *East Germany and the Warsaw Alliance: The Politics of Détente*, Boulder, CO, Westview, 1978, p. 67.

The inaugural meeting—on December 22–23, 1969, in Moscow—of the Council of Defense Ministers of Warsaw Treaty member-states, formed in accordance with a decision of the March 1969 meeting of the Pact's Political Consultative Committee. The ministers are seated at the left, with Soviet Marshal A.A. Grechko in the center (filling his glass).

—EUPRA.

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Despite this increased reliance on the Pact by its Soviet and East European members, however, the alliance still had problems. In particular, there was no regularized procedure for bringing about closer integration, either military or political.

The Pact Comes of Age

This difficulty received heightened attention in the subsequent period, which began at the end of the 1960's. The reforms introduced in the military sphere in 1969 and in the political realm in 1976 were major steps in the process of improving and intensifying Pact unity. These reforms provided for regularized meetings of high-level Pact organs and assigned such organs more specific functions than they had had in the past.

The March 1969 PCC meeting in Budapest added three new bodies to the Pact's military structure. First, it created a Committee of Defense Ministers (CDM) as the Pact's supreme military consultative organ. The CDM appears to have taken over some of the broader policy-oriented functions previously dealt with by the PCC. As one Soviet source puts it, the CDM "works out joint recommendations and proposals for organizing the defense" of the Warsaw Pact and deals "with other questions requiring joint agreement."[14]

The Budapest meeting also established a Military Council, which appears to be subordinate to the Pact's Joint Command. This council seems to be responsible for some of the planning and quality-control functions formerly assigned to the defense ministers and chiefs of staff. For instance, in discussing the work of the Military Council, Marshal V.G. Kulikov, the current commander in chief of Pact forces, has stated that it analyzes "the results of combat and operational activities for the preceding year and determines the tasks of the armies and fleets for the coming year."[15]

The third organ that emerged as a result of the 1969 reforms—the Technical Council—does not appear to have a precursor. Not much is known about this body except that it deals with "the development and modernization of weapons and technology, the coordination of the efforts of the unified armies in the area of scientific research and experimental-design work of a defensive nature."[16] Yet the relative frequency with which it is mentioned in Soviet and East European writings on the Pact suggests that it plays an important integrative role. To quote Marshal Kulikov, "its creation speeded up the outfitting of the armies and the Warsaw Pact states with new types of weapons and equipment."[17]

As a consequence of these changes, responsibilities in the military sphere have become more differentiated. Very broad political-military issues are discussed within the PCC, whose meetings usually include defense ministers as well as foreign ministers. Specific multilateral military issues are handled within the CDM, and the Joint Command oversees the implementation of "decisions by the Communist and Workers' Parties of the [Member] States."[18] The actual planning and organizing of military activities such as "maneuvers, exercises, and war games" are carried out by the Staff of the Joint Command.[19]

Since it was established, the CDM has met annually (see Table 1). The Military Council convenes twice a year on the average—once during the spring and once toward the end of the year. There is no information on how frequently the Technical Council meets.

Another manifestation of the mounting effort at Pact integration in the military sphere after the 1969 PCC meeting was the sudden increase in Pact military maneuvers. During the first 14 years of its existence, the Pact had held only 18 exercises, but there were 21 in the period from 1969 to 1972—11 of them in 1969 alone (see Figure 1). This striking increase in military exercises appears to have been designed primarily to give Pact forces extensive training on a multilateral level, a prerequisite for efficient employment of Pact forces on a broad scale in combat. Such a conclusion is borne out by the great number of certain types of exercises largely ignored in the past (see Table 2). During 1969–71, for example, five air defense/air force exercises took place, whereas there had been only one previously. Similarly, four rear-services exercises were held between 1969 and 1974, in contrast with just one in earlier years. Moreover, while four ground forces exercises had taken place in 1965–68, the frequency of such exercises grew significantly after 1969. A total of 13 were held between 1969 and 1972.

Apparently satisfied that the groundwork for multilateral cooperation had been laid, Pact officials let the number of multilateral maneuvers drop off after

[14] K. Savinov, *Moguchiy faktor mira i stabil'nosti v mezhdunarodnykh otnosheniyakh* (A Mighty Factor of Peace and Stability in International Relations), Moscow, Mezhdunarodnyye Otnosheniya, 1980, p. 17.

[15] Kulikov, *Varshavskiy Dogovor . . .*, p. 167.

[16] Savinov, *Moguchiy faktor mira i stabil'nosti . . .*, p. 19.

[17] V. Kulikov, "A Quarter Century Guarding the Achievements of Socialism and Peace," *Voyenno-istoricheskiy zhurnal* (Moscow), No. 5, 1980, p. 26.

[18] Ibid.

[19] Ibid.

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Table 1: Frequency of Warsaw Pact Military and Political Meetings by Type, 1956–79

	Military meetings[a]			Political meetings				
Year	Defense Ministers	Chiefs of Staff or their reps.	Military Council	Political Consultative Committee	Crimean mtgs. of First Secretaries	Other mtgs. of First Secretaries	Foreign Ministers	Deputy Foreign Ministers
1956	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	—
1957	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
1958	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	—
1959	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	—
1960	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	—
1961	1	—	—	1	—	1	—	—
1962	1	—	—	1	—	—	—	—
1963	1	—	—	1	—	1	—	—
1964	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
1965	—	1	—	1	—	—	—	—
1966	—	1	—	1	—	—	1	—
1967	—	1	—	—	—	—	1	—
1968	1	—	—	1	—	—	—	—
1969	1	1	1	1	—	1	1	—
1970	1	—	2	2	—	—	1	1
1971	1	1	2	—	1	—	2	—
1972	1	—	2	1	1	—	—	—
1973	1	—	2	—	1	—	1	1
1974	1	—	2	1	—	—	—	—
1975	2	—	2	—	—	—	—	—
1976	1	—	1	1	1	—	—	—
1977	1	—	2	—	1	—	1	—
1978	1	—	2	1	1	—	1	—
1979	1	—	2	—	1	—	2	—

[a]The totals in this breakdown do not coincide exactly with those in Figure 1, for the listing here covers only the major types of military meetings. Included in the sums in Figure 1 are some miscellaneous meetings, such as those of chiefs of main political administrations.

SOURCE: V.G. Kulikov, Ed., *Varshavskiy Dogovor—soyuz vo imya mira i sotsializma* (The Warsaw Pact—An Alliance in the Name of Peace and Socialism), Moscow, Voyennoye Izdatel'stvo, 1980, pp. 272–93.

about 1972. But Pact military cooperation of a new type, which has generally been overlooked in the West, began to emerge in the mid-1970's. This consists of bilateral cooperation among East European armies, in which the Soviet Union appears to be only minimally involved. Such cooperation is particularly prevalent among the northern tier countries, i.e., Poland, the German Democratic Republic (GDR), and Czechoslovakia. For example, Polish officers attend the GDR's Friedrich Engels Military Academy, and Polish, Czechoslovakian, and East German forces train together—without the presence of Soviet military units—and use each other's facilities.[20] Such training significantly enhances the ability of these forces to operate independently of Soviet troops either in rear areas or on a separate front.

Finally, continued emphasis has been placed on updating equipment available to non-Soviet Pact forces. By the end of the 1970's, for instance, these forces were supposed to have been outfitted with such relatively modern items as advanced MiG-21 and MiG-23 aircraft, T-62 tanks, and SA-6 ground-to-air missiles.[21]

With regard to enhancing Pact unity on the political

[20]See, for example, the references to GDR-Polish military cooperation in a 1975 speech by General Heinz Hoffmann, GDR Minister of National Defense, during the visit to East Germany by General Wojciech Jaruzelski, Poland's Minister of National Defense. Published in *Zolnierz wolnosci* (Warsaw), Mar. 14, 1975. See also the Polish report of the results of the visit in ibid., Mar. 15–16, 1975. There have been numerous other references to widespread Polish-GDR military cooperation in *Zolnierz wolnosci* and *Volksarmee* ([East] Berlin), the East German military newspaper, during the last five years.

[21]*Aviation Week and Space Technology* (New York, NY), Mar. 19, 1973, cited in A. Ross Johnson, "Soviet-East European Military Relations: An Overview," in Dale R. Herspring and Ivan Volgyes, Eds., *Civil-Military Relations in Communist Systems*, Boulder, CO, Westview, 1979, p. 251.

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Table 2: Frequency of Warsaw Pact Military Exercises by Type, 1956–79[a]

Year	Type of exercise						
	Ground forces	Naval	Command staff	Air defense	Air force	Rear services	Communications
1956	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
1957	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
1958	1	—	—	—	—	—	—
1959	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
1960	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
1961	1	—	—	—	—	—	—
1962	4	—	—	—	—	—	—
1963	1	—	—	—	—	—	—
1964	1	—	1	—	—	—	—
1965	2	—	—	—	—	—	—
1966	1	1	—	—	1	—	—
1967	1	1	2	—	—	—	—
1968	—	1	3	—	—	1	1
1969	7	—	4	1	1	1	1
1970	2	—	1	1	—	—	—
1971	1	—	2	1	1	1	—
1972	3	1	2	—	—	—	—
1973	1	—	2	—	—	1	—
1974	1	—	5	—	—	1	—
1975	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
1976	1	—	—	—	—	—	—
1977	1	—	2	—	—	—	—
1978	—	—	1	—	—	—	—
1979	2	—	—	—	—	—	—

[a] The totals of military exercises in the respective years at times exceed the totals noted in Figure 1; this is because on several occasions different types of forces held joint exercises.

SOURCES: Paul Wollina, "The Strengthening of the Warsaw Military Alliance—An Expression of the Regular Process of Bringing Socialist States Together," *Militärgeschichte* ([East] Berlin), No. 2, 1980, pp. 152–53; and V.G. Kulikov, Ed., *Varshavskiy Dogovor—soyuz vo imya mira i sotsializma* (The Warsaw Pact—An Alliance in the Name of Peace and Socialism), Moscow, Voyennoye Izdatel'stvo, 1980, pp. 272–93.

side, the PCC meeting in Bucharest in November 1976 introduced a new political institution for the alliance. According to the official communique, the Pact "adopted a resolution to create an organ of the PCC—a Committee of Foreign Ministers with an associated Secretariat."[22] To be sure, a standing commission tasked with working out recommendations on foreign policy questions and an associated secretariat had existed since the first meeting of the PCC in 1956, but a Soviet source claims that these organs had not been active during the Pact's first 21 years.[23] In any event, as a result of this decision, Pact foreign ministers, who had met only once during 1972–76, began in 1977 to meet annually (see Table 1).

Little is known about the work of the Secretariat attached to the Committee of Foreign Ministers (CFM), other than that its headquarters is in Moscow, that it is staffed by representatives from the various Warsaw Pact states, and that it handles administrative matters such as arranging CFM meetings and implementing decisions taken by the latter. But it clearly provides the Pact with the continuity in the political sphere that formerly had been lacking. As for the CFM itself, assessing its value after its only slightly more than four years of existence is difficult. Nevertheless, a high-level Soviet official speaking in 1980 praised it, stating that it was helping ensure continuity and had assisted in the implementation of decisions taken by the PCC.[24]

The 1976 PCC meeting also sanctioned "consultative meetings of Warsaw Pact parliamentarians."[25]

[22] *Pravda* (Moscow), Nov. 27, 1976.

[23] Savinov, *Moguchiy faktor mira i stabil'nosti . . .*, p. 16.

[24] K.V. Rusakov, "In the Service of Peace and Socialism," *Pravda*, May 22, 1980.

[25] See the statement by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, and the USSR Council of Ministers, endorsing the Nov. 25–26 PCC meeting, in *Pravda*, Dec. 5, 1976.

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

Amphibious PT-76 tanks being loaded onto a landing craft on a lake in the southeast of the German Democratic Republic during joint Warsaw Treaty maneuvers in September 1980.

—Camera Press.

While these meetings cannot be considered a Pact institution, they have played an important propaganda role. The October 1979 meeting, for example, issued a well-publicized statement calling on Western parliamentarians to oppose NATO's plans to modernize its long-range theater nuclear forces.[26]

East European Interests

By the beginning of the 1980's, thus, the Soviets had turned the Pact into a highly integrated body capable of fielding modern conventional military forces in the vital Central European theater while at the same time able to launch large-scale propaganda campaigns. In the process, however, the Soviets had found it necessary to give in to East European policy preferences on a number of occasions. If one looks at the last three PCC meetings, for example, there have been several cases in which the Soviets have accepted language which differed—in some cases significantly—from that advocated by Soviet leaders. In other instances, they have been forced to omit mention of controversial subjects to gain unanimous Pact consent to the documents issued by the PCC.

Soviet concessions appear to have been required in two particular areas in order to achieve unanimous agreement on the text of the 1976 PCC declaration: China and relations between ruling parties. The Soviet position on the Sino-Soviet split had been laid out by Leonid Brezhnev in a speech to a CPSU plenum in October 1976. He stated that Beijing's foreign policy "has been discredited throughout the world," that Moscow nevertheless wanted better relations with the People's Republic of China (PRC), and that the USSR was convinced that "there are no problems between the PRC and the USSR which cannot be resolved in the spirit of good neighborliness."[27] This line had been repeated by Politburo member F.D. Kulakov in a speech on November 5, 1976.[28] However, the PCC document, like the Soviet-Romanian statement of November 25, 1976,[29] did not refer to China.[30] This omission suggests that Romanian opposition to inclusion of Moscow's preferred language kept it out of the PCC document.

Many of the USSR's East European allies—and Romania in particular—have long objected to Moscow's use of the term "socialist internationalism" as a catchword for Soviet preeminence within the alliance. While the Soviets were successful in getting the term into the communique issued on November 5, 1976, after Foreign Minister Andrey Gromyko's visit to Bulgaria,[31] it did not appear in the PCC document. Instead, the more neutral term favored by the Romanians and some others, "international solidarity," was employed.

The same two issues seem to have been points of contention as well at the November 22-23, 1978, PCC meeting in Moscow. Prior to the meeting, on November 4, Soviet Premier Aleksey Kosygin had criticized Beijing, while calling for a "normalization of Soviet-Chinese relations."[32] In addition, there is a report that participants at the Moscow talks were handed a statement which "implicitly opposed China by supporting Vietnam in its struggle with Cambodia."[33] But

[26] For this statement, see ibid., Oct. 18, 1979.

[27] L.I. Brezhnev, *O vneshney politike KPSS i Sovetskogo Gosudarstva. Rechi i stat'i* (Concerning the Foreign Policy of the CPSU and the Soviet State. Speeches and Articles), Moscow, Izdatel'stvo Politicheskoy Literatury, 1978, p. 570.

[28] F.D. Kulakov, "The Light of the Great October Illuminates the Path Toward Communism," *Pravda*, Nov. 6, 1976.

[29] *Pravda*, Nov. 25, 1976.

[30] For the PCC document entitled "Toward New Frontiers in International Détente, Toward Strengthening of Security and Development of Cooperation in Europe," see ibid., Nov. 27, 1976.

[31] *Pravda*, Nov. 5, 1976.

[32] A.N. Kosygin, "The Creative Force of the Great October Idea," in A.N. Kosygin, *K velikoy tseli* (Toward the Great Goal), Vol. 2, Moscow, Izdatel'stvo Politicheskoy Literatury, 1979, p. 629.

[33] David Binder, "The Challenge by the Romanians," *The New York Times*, Dec. 8, 1978.

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

Romanian Communist Party leader Nicolae Ceausescu, by flag, and Soviet Communist Party leader Leonid Brezhnev at the conclusion of a November 1976 bilateral meeting in Bucharest at which the USSR failed to win Romanian approval for formulations which Moscow wished to present to an upcoming Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee meeting the same month in the Romanian capital.

—SYGMA.

the PCC declaration said nothing whatsoever about China. This omission would appear to indicate that the Soviets could not obtain agreement on language even indirectly critical of the PRC. Like the 1976 declaration, the 1978 one employed the term "international solidarity," rather than "socialist internationalism," to describe intra-Pact relations.[34]

However, the major areas of disagreement at the 1978 meeting seem to have concerned the Middle East and the Pact's military budget. In addressing the Middle East question in a September 22, 1978, speech, Brezhnev had strongly condemned the Camp David accords, as had Gromyko in his subsequent speech of September 26 at the UN.[35] Yet the PCC document itself did not touch on the accords. That the omission was primarily due to Romanian opposition became clear on November 25 when a special statement condemning the Camp David accords and praising the Baghdad conference was published in *Pravda* with the support of all Pact members except Romania.[36]

The 1978 PCC declaration differed as well from past Soviet statements on the international situation. In a speech on October 14, 1978, Soviet Defense Minister Dimitriy Ustinov had warned of a possible return to the cold war and given heavy play to the importance of the

[34] *Deklaratsiya Gosudarstv-Uchastnikov Varshavskogo Dogovora* (Declaration of the Warsaw Treaty Member-States), Moscow, Izdatel'stvo Politicheskoy Literatury, 1978, p. 24.

[35] L.I. Brezhnev, "Speech in Baku at the Palace by the Name of V.I. Lenin at the Ceremonial Meeting Devoted to the Awarding of the Order of Lenin to the Capital of Azerbaydzhan," in L.I. Brezhnev, *Leninskim kursom* (On a Leninist Course), Vol. 7, Moscow, Izdatel'stvo Politicheskoy Literatury, 1979, p. 478; A.A. Gromyko, "Speech of A.A. Gromyko," *Pravda*, Sept. 27, 1978.

[36] "Statement of the Leaders of the Communist and Workers' Parties and Governments of the People's Republic of Bulgaria, the Hungarian People's Republic, the German Democratic Republic, the Polish People's Republic, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic," *Pravda*, Nov. 25, 1978.

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military factor in protecting the USSR and the "socialist commonwealth."[37] Yet the PCC document, while recognizing that détente faced "great difficulties," was by and large more upbeat on the subject, noting that "in general, the political atmosphere in Europe is being freed from the vestiges and prejudices of the 'cold war.' "[38]

This difference was indicative of a much more profound and evidently heated debate at the PCC over the question of how the Pact should respond to NATO's May 1978 approval of the Long-Term Defense Program. The Program called for a real increase of 3 percent in the defense budgets of NATO members in order to modernize alliance forces. Moscow had reacted by proposing a 3 percent increase in Pact military spending together with intensified Pact control over the various national armies. Ceausescu, according to press reports, not only opposed Brezhnev on both of these points but also took the unusual step of publicizing the proposal as well as his opposition in a speech in Bucharest upon his return from Moscow.[39] From the statements of support issued by some of the East European Pact members, furthermore, it is plain that both suggestions were opposed in varying degrees by others as well. Thus, while the statement from Prague called for a "further strengthening" of the Pact's "security and defensive might" in the face of threats from the West, the Poles limited their support to opposing "any weakening" of the "unity and defensive capability" of the Pact.[40] Although the Hungarians eventually came out in favor of bolstering the Pact's military capabilities, they waited more than two weeks before issuing such a statement, thereby implying that they too were less than enthusiastic about the Soviet plan.[41]

Comparing the declaration adopted by the May 1980 PCC meeting in Warsaw and the lengthy speech on the Warsaw Pact delivered a week later in Moscow by CPSU Secretary K.V. Rusakov,[42] it would appear that some of the East Europeans, who are fearful that

[37] D.F. Ustinov, "The Leading Role of the CPSU in the Building of the Soviet Armed Forces," in D.F. Ustinov, *Izbrannyye rechi i stat'i* (Selected Speeches and Articles), Moscow, Izdatel'stvo Politicheskoy Literatury, 1979, pp. 493, 496–97.

[38] *Deklaratsiya Gosudarstv-Uchastnikov Varshavskogo Dogovora.*

[39] See David A. Andelman, "Ceausescu Seeks Support of Party Against Moscow," and "Ceausescu Appeals for Socialist Unity," *The New York Times*, Nov. 30 and Dec. 2, 1978, respectively; David Binder, "The Challenge by the Romanians," loc. cit.

[40] The Czechoslovakian and Polish statements, as carried by TASS, may be found in *Pravda*, Dec. 1, 1978.

[41] For the Hungarian statement, as carried by TASS, see ibid., Dec. 8, 1978.

[42] "The Declaration of the Warsaw Pact Treaty States," *Pravda*, May 16, 1980; Rusakov, "In the Service of Peace and Socialism."

Poland's Edward Gierek, Hungary's János Kádár, and Romania's Nicolae Ceausescu joined other Warsaw Pact country party leaders in signing the communique at the end of the meeting of the Political Consultative Committee in Moscow on November 23, 1978. Their countries have resisted implementation of the expansion of Pact defense outlays "approved" in that document.

—TASS from Sovfoto.

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a further heightening of East-West tensions could weaken their own room for maneuver vis-à-vis the Soviets, persuaded Moscow to modify the tone of its language on several issues. For instance, the PCC declaration, although it criticized hegemonism, did not attack China. Rusakov, in contrast, declared that the USSR will continue to resist Beijing's "policy of aggression and hegemonism." The PCC declaration described the international situation in much less negative terms than did Rusakov. While both assessed it as "complex," Rusakov argued with considerable vigor that there were two increasingly clear contrary lines in international politics: that of NATO and that of the Warsaw Pact. Moreover, he repeated Brezhnev's March 31, 1980, warning on the need for the USSR to "keep its powder dry," in the face of the threat from the West.[43] Such elements were missing from the PCC declaration. Finally, the PCC declaration differed from Rusakov's speech in its handling of the Afghanistan question. Both called for an end to outside interference. But Rusakov went further, by sharply criticizing the United States, Pakistan, and China for their support of "armed actions against the DRA."

Living Without the Pact

Despite the problems that Pact policymakers face in constructing a common position on some issues, the alliance nonetheless is a vital cog in the conduct of Soviet–East European relations. To understand the Pact's overall importance, it might be useful to look at what the alliance's absence would mean for both the Soviets and the East Europeans.

Militarily, the primary advantage that Moscow derives from the Pact is access to East European territory for its forward-based theater forces. The USSR has deployed some 31 divisions in the area (16 armored and 15 mechanized-infantry), equipped with nuclear-capable tactical missiles (Scuds and Frogs), modern fighter aircraft (e.g., MiG-23/27's, SU-17/20's, and SU-19's), and a wide variety of tanks, artillery, and other military equipment.[44] Not only does the presence of Soviet forces in this region provide Moscow with a defensive buffer against the West, but it also gives the Kremlin a forward staging area from which to launch an offensive campaign against Western Europe. While these same ends could presumably be achieved through bilateral arrangements with the individual East European countries, such arrangements would not allow the Kremlin to employ East European armies effectively in a future conflict.

To be sure, although the East European armies—and particularly the northern tier forces—appear to have an important place in Soviet theater doctrine, their exact function in it is unclear. For example, Moscow is plainly aware that the political reliability of the East European forces remains an open question in a NATO–Warsaw Pact confrontation and that the willingness of such forces to carry out the tasks assigned to them will be influenced by a number of factors over which the Kremlin has no control.[45] This awareness may explain why the USSR has not provided its East European allies with the most modern military equipment. One source maintains that Moscow intentionally withholds the latest equipment from the normally favored Poles, East Germans, and Czechoslovakians until three or four years after it has entered the inventories of Soviet forces stationed in Central Europe.[46] The lack of the most modern equipment, taken together with the increase in bilateral East European military cooperation mentioned above, suggests that the Soviets do not see the East Europeans—with the possible exception of some special units and the East German army (although it is debatable how useful the latter would be outside the GDR)—as playing a front-line role in combination with Soviet forces. Instead, it could be argued, Moscow intends to employ East European forces primarily in a supportive role, i.e., in securing rear areas or on a peripheral front.[47]

Whatever function East European forces have in Soviet theater doctrine, however, the Kremlin's ability to deploy them in a coordinated manner in support of Soviet forces would be seriously diminished in the absence of the Pact. For one thing, both large and small multilateral maneuvers, which are a sine qua non for successful combined operations on a large scale, would be more difficult to carry out. In the end, Moscow would probably find it increasingly necessary to rely on bilateral exercises involving Soviet forces and a single East European army. Similarly, the nonexistence of institutions such as the Committee of Defense Ministers, the Military Council, the Technical Council,

[43] Brezhnev's comment was published in *Pravda*, Apr. 1, 1980.

[44] International Institute of Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance, 1979–1980*, London, 1979, pp. 10, 110–12.

[45] Dale R. Herspring and Ivan Volgyes, "Political Reliability in the Eastern European Warsaw Pact Armies," *Armed Forces and Society* (Chicago, IL), Winter 1980, pp. 270–96.

[46] M. Checinski, "Structural Causes of Soviet Arms Exports," *Osteuropa* (Stuttgart), No. 3, 1977, p. 177.

[47] See John Erickson, "The European Military Balance," in Grayson Kirk and Nils Wessell, Eds., *The Soviet Threat*, New York, NY, The Academy of Political Science, 1978, p. 115; and Johnson, "Soviet-East European Military Relations: An Overview," p. 257.

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the Joint Command, and the Staff of the Joint Armed Forces would significantly increase the problems of coordination on many matters currently handled within the Pact. These include not only relatively simple things such as weapons standardization but also more complex undertakings such as integrating communications, command, and control; setting up Pact-wide training programs; and assigning specialized tasks among Pact members. Finally, the extensive bilateral military cooperation between East European states that currently takes place under Pact auspices would be much harder to organize.

Politically, the Soviets gain a number of advantages from the Pact. First and foremost, the Pact helps legitimize Moscow's continued political-military presence in Eastern Europe as well as its policing actions to keep its East European allies in line. For example, Moscow's use of Pact forces (i.e., forces from Poland, the GDR, Hungary, and Bulgaria) in the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia may not have been important from a military standpoint, but it did serve to demonstrate that sufficient solidarity existed among Pact members to permit the mounting of a joint military operation against another Pact country which did not involve combat. (What it did not show, however, was whether the solidarity is strong enough to ensure deployment of non-Soviet Pact troops in the face of determined military opposition on the part of the country being invaded.)[48]

The Pact also provides the Kremlin with an instrumentality for enforcing ideological orthodoxy.[49] If the Pact disappeared, so would the close cooperation which exists in the political-ideological sphere under Pact auspices (e.g., frequent meetings of Central Committee Secretaries on how to deal with a variety of ideological problems). The result would probably be intensification of the already considerable problems the Kremlin confronts in maintaining political-ideological discipline in the region.

Meetings of Pact organs such as the PCC and the CFM afford forums for the announcement of Moscow's numerous "peace" initiatives. Although the USSR could undoubtedly find substitute forums, these would probably not be as useful as Pact forums have proved to be from the standpoint of awakening Western interest.

Through Pact institutions, the USSR can work out coordinated positions with its allies on important foreign policy questions. For example, *Pravda* announced on July 10, 1980, that a meeting of Warsaw Pact Deputy Foreign Ministers had taken place in Prague on July 8–9 to coordinate strategy for the November 1980 conference in Madrid to review the implementation of the Final Act of the Helsinki Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. While

[48] See Herspring and Volgyes, "Political Reliability . . . ," p. 285.

[49] See, for example, Kulikov, "A Quarter Century Guarding the Achievements of Socialism and Peace"; and Yu. S. Novopashin, *Mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya novogo tipa* (International Relations of a New Type), Moscow, Izdatel'stvo Mezhdunarodyye Otnosheniya, 1978, pp. 76–77.

Advanced Soviet military equipment filters down to Warsaw Pact forces with some delay. By the end of the 1980's, the Soviet T-72 tank was just entering the tables of equipment of East European armies, although the MiG-23 aircraft (right) was in wide use in Eastern Europe.

—Daniel Simon and J.P. Quittard/both for Gamma-Liaison.

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Erich Honecker (left), General Secretary of East Germany's Socialist Unity Party, receives members of the Committee of Foreign Ministers of the Warsaw Treaty states, in East Berlin for a meeting on December 5-6, 1979. Pact foreign ministers pictured with Honecker are: from right to left, Petur Mladenov of Bulgaria, Emil Wojtaszek of Poland, Andrey Gromyko of the USSR, Bohuslav Chnoupek of Czechoslovakia (partly obscured), Frigyes Puja of Hungary, and Stefan Andrei of Romania. (GDR Foreign Minister Oskar Fischer is not in the photo.)

—Eastfoto.

the working out of a common strategy would have been possible in the absence of a Pact-organized meeting, it would have been more difficult and more time-consuming.

Finally, there are suggestions that Moscow is using the Pact as a vehicle for assigning a division of labor among some members with regard to activities in the Third World.[50] Disbandment of the Pact would at the minimum create problems for the Kremlin in making effective use of its allies throughout the world.

Aside from depriving the USSR of these advantages, dismantlement of the Pact might have other negative effects from Moscow's perspective. It might send shock waves among the East Europeans. Indeed, many of them would probably take it as a sign that the Soviets were lessening their grip on the region. Such a conviction would encourage at least some East Europeans to try to expand their room for maneuver vis-à-vis Moscow. If things got out of control, as they did in the mid-1950's following destalinization, the Kremlin's relations with the West could be badly damaged. In addition, if the Soviets are serious in saying that the Pact would disband if NATO disbanded, then they would have to face the prospect of dealing with a possibly resurgent West Germany unencumbered by the restrictions which the NATO alliance places on it. The same might also be true with respect to the GDR, which is now under special restrictions within the Warsaw Pact. Given their deep concern about Germany and things German, the Soviets are not likely to welcome such a prospect.

For the East Europeans, the chief value of the Pact—in both political and military terms—is that it helps to diffuse Soviet pressure on them. Direct Romanian opposition to Soviet policies, often reinforced by less than enthusiastic—even passive—support for Moscow's policies within Pact councils, often results in greater room for maneuver for all of the East Europeans. For example, insofar as is known, the Soviets have not succeeded in winning Pact acceptance of either an increase in military spending or a tightening of the integration of the military command structure, as they reportedly attempted to do in 1978. Because such measures could only be introduced on a bloc-wide basis, Romania's opposition to them effectively thwarts them, but given the extent of economic problems of other East European Pact members and their aversion to total Soviet control of their national armies, they probably take considerable satisfaction in

[50] For the GDR, see "We have sent you weapons and bread," *Der Spiegel* (Hamburg), Mar. 3, 1980, pp. 42-61. For Poland, see Dale R. Herspring, "The Polish Military and the Policy Process," in Maurice D. Simon and Roger E. Kanet, Eds., *Background to Crises: Policy and Politics in Poland*, Boulder, CO, Westview, 1980.

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At the May 1980 Warsaw meeting of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Pact: front left, Pact Commander in Chief, Soviet Marshal V.G. Kulikov; front right, Soviet Marshal N.V. Ogarkov, Chief of the General Staff of the Soviet Armed Forces; rear left, Soviet Army General A.I. Gribkov, First Deputy Commander in Chief of Pact forces; and rear right, Polish General of Arms Jozef Urbanowicz, Under Secretary of State of the Polish Ministry of Defense. The fifth figure, a Soviet officer, is unidentified.

—Gamma-Liaison.

Romania's adamancy.

Furthermore, although the 1969 and 1976 reforms can be viewed as devices for increasing Moscow's control over the Pact, they may in some measure have contributed to an enhancement of East European autonomy within the Pact. Some observers, for instance, have speculated that the 1969 reforms, by designating the Pact deputy ministers of defense as deputy commanders of the alliance, resulted in a strengthening of national decision-making, at least in peacetime.[51] Others have questioned this assertion, arguing that the change had little impact on the role that the East Europeans play in Pact military decision-making, particularly in wartime.[52] Regardless of which of these contentions is correct—and I find the latter more plausible—it is still highly unlikely that the Romanians in particular would have agreed to either the 1969 or the 1976 reforms if these had meant a serious erosion of East European autonomy.

Conclusion

Looking at the situation today, it appears that the Pact will continue to be a major factor in Soviet–East European relations for some time to come. For their part, the Soviets recognize the Pact's vital importance as a device for coordinating and managing relations with their East European allies, and they show no signs of a willingness to decrease reliance on the Pact for this purpose. In fact, Moscow seems to be assigning the Pact even greater weight in dealing with other Pact members. The East Europeans, faced with the reality and proximity of Soviet power, understand that there is no practical alternative to the Pact, and as a result attempt to the degree possible to use it as a vehicle for diffusing Soviet pressure on them. Thus, suggestions that the currently existing system of bilateral treaties could serve as a substitute for the Pact are a "fiction: it is hardly conceivable how the [currently existing] integration level of the WTO (i.e., the Joint Command structure and training, the operative division of labor) could be maintained on the level of bilateral treaties."[53]

Nevertheless, there will be continued strains within the alliance as Soviet efforts to weld the Pact into a more tightly knit organization subordinate to its will clash with East European efforts to achieve greater autonomy in their relations with the Kremlin. Some of the issues upon which such strains may manifest themselves within the Pact in coming years include the extent of Pact support for Soviet policy outside Europe (e.g., in China, Afghanistan, the Middle East),[54] the possible incorporation of new members in the Pact, East European resentment at not being supplied with the latest weapons,[55] the size of Pact military budgets, Moscow's monopoloy of top military positions within the Pact,[56] and the degree of military integration within the Pact.

[51] Lawrence T. Caldwell, "The Warsaw Pact: Directions of Change," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), September–October 1975, p. 3.

[52] See Johnson, "Soviet-East European Military Relations: An Overview," p. 257.

[53] Tiedtke, *Die Warschauer Vertragsorganisation*, p. 166.

[54] General A.A. Yepishev hinted at such a possibility in discussing events in Afghanistan. He stated that "the unified strength of the countries of the Socialist Commonwealth, embodied in the Warsaw Pact, serves to reliably secure the security of the peoples constructing a new life." "V.I. Lenin on the Defense of the Socialist Fatherland," *Pravda*, Apr. 11, 1980.

[55] Johnson, "Soviet-East European Military Relations: An Overview," p. 262.

[56] The Soviets have monopolized the Pact's two top positions,

(continued on page 15)

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MI-8C helicopters of the East German National People's Army in action during the Comradeship in Arms 80 maneuvers of Warsaw Treaty forces, August 26-September 14, 1980, in the German Democratic Republic.

—Camera Press.

Writing more than 10 years ago, Roman Kolkowicz labeled the Pact an "entangling alliance" in which "the Soviet leaders seek to entangle their unwilling allies in the web of Soviet interests."[57] While there is little question that as a result of their membership in the Pact, the East Europeans have found themselves more "entangled" in supporting Soviet policies than they might have preferred, it is important not to exaggerate the extent of the USSR's hegemony within the Pact's political-military councils. Despite their unquestioned preeminence within the Pact, the Soviets, as noted above, have found it necessary to make concessions—in some cases, significant ones—in exchange for Pact support for some of their favored policies. In certain instances where they have refused to be forthcoming in meeting East European concerns (e.g., Romanian objections to criticism of China) or where they have attempted to force their allies to accept greater Pact interference in internal affairs (the 1978 effort to increase Pact control over national armies), Moscow has come out empty-handed. This is not to suggest that the East European tail wags the Soviet dog. Such evidence does indicate, however, that more careful attention to Pact affairs is in order. This is true not only because of the importance of the alliance itself as an institution, but also because the outcome of policy debates within the Pact may provide us with useful and perhaps unique insights into the nature of Soviet-East European relations.

Commander in Chief and the Chief of Staff of the Joint Armed Forces, since the formation of the alliance in 1955. The military officers who have occupied these posts include:(a) *Commander in Chief*—I.S. Konev, May 1955-June 1960; A.A. Grechko, July 1960-July 1967; I.I. Yakubovskiy, July 1967-December 1976; V.G. Kulikov, January 1977-present; (b) *Chief of Staff*—A.I. Antonov, May 1955-June 1962; P.I. Batov, October 1962-November 1965; M.I. Kasakov, November 1965-August 1968; S.M. Shtemenko, August 1968-April 1976; A.I. Gribkov, October 1976-present.

[57] R. Kolkowicz, "The Warsaw Pact: Entangling Alliance," *Survey* (London), No. 70/71, 1969, p. 101.

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Venezuela's MAS

By David J. Myers

Use of the Soviet Red Army to crush the "Prague Spring" in 1968 shocked radical leftists throughout the Third World. In Venezuela, the refusal of the traditional Communist Party (Partido Comunista Venezolano—PCV) to condemn this violation of national sovereignty caused many party members to search for ways to dissociate themselves from Moscow's international adventures. Led by Pompeyo Márquez and Teodoro Petkoff, they formed an independent Communist party called the Movement Toward Socialism (Movimiento al Socialismo—MAS). Since its appearance in 1971, MAS has become Venezuela's third political force, the only one with even a remote chance of breaking the domination over Venezuelan politics currently exercised by the Social Christians through their Committee for Independent Electoral Political Organization (Comité de Organización Política Electoral Independiente—COPEI) and by the social democratic party, Democratic Action (Acción Democrática—AD).

While MAS has tried consistently to shape its image as a radical leftist but non-Communist movement, it maintains close ties with the Italian and Spanish Communist parties.[1] Because of these ties, as well as its origins and ideology, MAS perhaps should be considered a Third World "Eurocommunist" movement. Its growing strength in Venezuela raises the possibility that those who broke with the PCV in 1971 may be blazing a path whereby radical leftists in Latin America, Africa, and Asia can emerge from the electoral limbo into which most have fallen as they have conducted political activity within the framework of traditional Moscow-oriented Communist parties.

This article focuses on how and why the Movement Toward Socialism was able to establish itself as a significant electoral force where the traditional Communist party had failed, and on the extent to which MAS's success may be a harbinger of new trends in the Third World. First, we will explore the way in which decisions by the PCV during the 1960's were often out of touch with the feelings of most Venezuelans. Next, we will consider the strategies of MAS, especially as revealed in the election campaigns of 1978 and 1979 and in the party's relationship to the incumbent administration of Luis Herrera Campíns. Finally, we will assess the broader implications of the experience of MAS for the Communist movement throughout the Third World and for politics in the Western hemisphere.

The PCV's Failings

The Venezuelan Communist Party of Gustavo and Edwardo Machado has been only marginally less inept and unimaginative electorally than traditional Communist parties elsewhere in the Third World. Historically, such parties, especially in Latin America, have been surprisingly unsuccessful at the polls. Among

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[1] In an August 1977 interview with the author, Teodoro Petkoff of MAS acknowledged that his party maintained cordial relations with the Spanish Communist Party.

During the 1978 presidential election campaign, the Italian Communist Party (PCI) sent its political consultants to Venezuela to help shape MAS's presentation to the electorate. From personal observation by the author.

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
SOLUCIONES SOCIALISTAS AL DESASTRE NACIONAL
PROGRAMA DE GOBIERNO DEL MAS Y DE SU CANDIDATO PRESIDENCIAL EL DR. JOSE VICENTE RANGEL
JOSE VICENTE
MAS
ESTA ES UNA PUBLICACION DEL MOVIMIENTO AL SOCIALISMO MAS

The 1978 Program for Government of the Movement Toward Socialism and its presidential candidate, Dr. José Vicente Rangel. The title reads: "Socialist Solutions to the National Disaster."

—Newsprint handout from the 1978 campaign.

Latin American Communist parties, only the Chilean Communist Party consistently could count on more than 10 percent of the total vote in open and free elections.[2] In Cuba, where Fidel Castro imposed communism following his legendary guerrilla campaign, the original Cuban Communist party supported General Fulgencio Batista's dictatorship until victory was almost within the insurgents' grasp. Since its appearance in the early 1930's, the PCV, too, has either been outmaneuvered by its domestic rivals or has thrown away opportunities from which it might have emerged as the spokesman for important elements in Venezuelan society.[3]

To understand the PCV's history, it is useful to examine three factors which help to explain the general lack of success that has plagued traditional Communist parties throughout the Third World. First, these parties have often behaved as if they were the agents of a foreign power. For example, the Venezuelan Communist Party's about-face to oppose the Nazis only after Adolf Hitler's invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941 convinced most Venezuelans that the party served other than national interests. This perception has persisted, and in an era when most Third World countries are struggling to reduce North American and West European influence on their domestic societies, the prospect of becoming a satellite of the Soviet Union holds little appeal.

The Communists' lack of success is also attributable to the kinds of converts they have initially tended to make. Most often they have attracted "Westernized" intellectuals who have found the Soviet model seductive as a path to socioeconomic modernization. However, the alienation of these intellectuals from their own society has inhibited attempts to convert the masses, most of whom remained highly traditional. Only where Communist movements fled their country's "Westernized" cities, and had to adapt Marxist ideology and tactics to reality among the masses, were they able to transform themselves into broadly based, popular movements. Such transformations occurred in China and Vietnam, but in both instances a protracted war against a foreign presence immeasurably assisted Communist elites in establishing legitimacy and control.

A final factor hindering traditional Communist parties in the Third World from broadening their support base relates to centralism. Opposition to rule from the capital city is an old theme in the provinces throughout Latin America, Africa, and Asia. Historically, Communist party strength has been concentrated in national administrative centers. From the perspective of provincials, therefore, Communist parties have appeared to be one more political group from the capital city seeking to dominate the periphery. Consequently, few regional leaders have felt the Communist party to be an appropriate vehicle for channeling demands or for expressing discontent.

Venezuela's traditional Communist Party, the PCV, as implied earlier, experienced most of the electoral frustrations characteristic of its relatively unsuccessful counterparts elsewhere in Latin America. As can be seen in Table 1, the high point in PCV electoral fortunes came in December 1958 when the party, bask-

[2]A useful but dated introduction to the region's Communist parties is Robert J. Alexander, *Communism in Latin America*, New Brunswick, NJ, Rutgers University Press, 1957. Also see Ronald H. McDonald, *Party Systems and Elections in Latin America*, Chicago, IL, Markham, 1971.

[3]The best history of Venezuela's Communist Party is Robert J. Alexander, *The Communist Party of Venezuela*, Stanford, CA, Hoover Institution Press, 1969.

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Table 1: The Venezuelan Communist Party in Legislative Voting, 1946–78[a]

Year	1946	1947	1958	1963[b]	1968[c]	1973	1978
Percent of the total vote	3.6	3.7	6.0	—	2.8	1.2	1.1
Total votes for MAS	50,387	43,190	160,791	—	103,368	50,228	55,068

[a] In Venezuela a single vote is cast for party legislative lists that include senators, congressmen, and state legislators. In every instance, the vote received by the PCV presidential candidate, when the party offered one, was less than that obtained by the legislative list.

[b] The PCV was illegal at the time of the 1963 elections, because of its guerrilla activities.

[c] In 1968, the party appeared on the ballot as the Advancement Union (Unión para Avanzar—UPA).

SOURCE: Calculated from official statistics of Venezuela's Supreme Electoral Council.

ing in unparalleled prestige and enjoying important support among urban intellectuals and slum dwellers for its role in the resistance that finally overthrew the military dictatorship of General Marcos Pérez Jiménez, polled 6 percent of the total votes cast in the legislative balloting. Two and a half years later, the PCV turned its back on Venezuela's fledgling democratic regime and joined with Castroite guerrillas in an abortive effort to overthrow the government of President Rómulo Betancourt (1959–64).[4] More than six years were to pass before the PCV reversed itself and rejoined the ranks of those agreeing to accept elections as the only legitimate procedure for choosing a government. Electoral returns in December 1968, less than a year after the PCV had abandoned the guerrilla struggle, shocked and dismayed its leaders. The party was reduced to a smaller percentage of the total vote than it had received in the election which preceded the 1948 military coup. And, as Table 1 illustrates, the PCV continued to lose support after 1968.

The decline in PCV fortunes is rooted in four characteristics of Venezuelan political life that PCV leaders either failed to grasp or were unable to deal with. These are: (1) a weak sense of class struggle, (2) the popularity of competitive democracy, (3) the skill of the leaders of AD and COPEI, and (4) a high level of political and economic nationalism in Venezuela, which rendered PCV links with the Soviet Union a fatal liability.

The first of these characteristics presents a problem for Communist parties in all countries boasting an Iberian political tradition. This tradition—closely linked to medieval Thomistic philosophy, which attaches great importance to maintaining intrasocietal harmony[5]—frowns upon those who would generate conflict to pursue individual or class interests.

Because Latin America's political and cultural heritage is strongly Iberian, the region's most prestigious intellects have generally written and talked about society in a manner diametrically opposed to the Marxist theory of class struggle. Since the late 19th century, the coexistence of Marxism and traditional Iberian modes of thinking has led to interesting anomalies in Latin American politics. For example, in Venezuela both Marxist and non-Marxist political parties officially describe themselves as multiclass (*polyclasista*).[6] Even the PCV claims to welcome membership by "progressive" elements of the national bourgeoisie. Entrepreneurs who have successfully competed with foreign corporations receive grudging respect.[7] (In contrast, foreign businessmen, especially ones linked with multinational corporations, are bitterly denounced as blood-sucking imperialists. No charge against the local oligarchy is considered more damaging politically than that of being allied with foreign imperialism.)

This inclination to believe that all one's countrymen, save those hopelessly corrupted by outsiders, can play a useful role in whatever social order might evolve, made PCV efforts to intensify interclass antagonism during the 1960's seem heavy-handed. In the urban slums, for example, party members found themselves isolated when they destroyed self-help projects on the grounds that government-supplied materials were mere crumbs given by the exploiters to the exploited.[8] Even worse, PCV violence against what the party called "repressive" instruments of official power—the

[4] For a comprehensive discussion of events during the Betancourt administration, see Robert J. Alexander, *The Venezuelan Democratic Revolution: A Profile of the Regime of Romulo Betancourt*, New Brunswick, NJ, Rutgers University Press, 1964.

[5] On this, see Howard J. Wiarda, "Corporatism and Development in the Iberic-Latin World: Persistent Strains and New Variations," *Review of Politics* (Notre Dame, IN), January 1974, pp. 3–33.

[6] Particularly informative along these lines is Chapter 8, "Program and Doctrine," in John D. Martz, *Acción Democrática: Evolution of a Modern Political Party in Venezuela*, Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1966.

[7] For example, leftist politicians were almost unanimous in approving of the purchase by Venezuelan entrepreneurs in 1965 of the electricity distribution system in Caracas that had been owned by American Foreign Power and Light Corporation.

[8] Talton Ray, *The Politics of the Barrios of Venezuela*, Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA, University of California Press, 1969, pp. 34–35, 105–07, and 130–36.

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police and national guard—often involved attacks by middle-class students on the upwardly mobile sons of the working poor. This incongruity aided the democratic governments in portraying themselves as the people's only true representatives.

Second, doubts by the PCV and many foreign and domestic observers in 1959 about the viability of Western-style electoral democracy in Venezuela proved ill-founded. True, throughout almost a century and a half of independence, the country had experienced only 11 months of rule by popularly elected governments. This history led PCV leaders to anticipate that Rómulo Betancourt's administration would be overthrown before he completed his constitutional term, and that the PCV would emerge even stronger from a second period in the underground resistance. Consequently, the PCV refused to join with the other major political parties in a unity government that would have had as one of its principal aims the establishing and legitimating of democratic rules of the game.[9]

However, three administrations that governed during the 1960's—the AD governments of Betancourt and of Raúl Leoni (1964–69), and the COPEI government of Rafael Caldera Rodríguez (1969–74)—proved surprisingly able and popular. Betancourt initiated an ambitious agrarian reform project, held the country together during a concerted effort by Castro-supported guerrillas to overthrow him, and handed over power after free and open balloting to his elected successor. Leoni pushed industrial development, provided access for the business community to national planning, and turned over power to the opposition when his friend and fellow party member Gonzalo Barrios suffered a narrow defeat in the December 1968 election. Caldera's Social Christian administration focused on housing, integrated most of the remaining guerrillas into the electoral process, and paved the way for nationalization of the multinational petroleum corporations. Overall, the people approved of this record. A survey conducted by John D. Martz and Enrique Baloyra in 1973 found that 74 percent of all Venezuelans were highly supportive of elections, 73 percent opposed military coups, and 77 percent believed in the right of the opposition to criticize the government.[10] PCV estimates in 1959 about the viability of electoral democracy had proved to be grossly mistaken.

The Venezuelan Communist Party also became more isolated during the 1960's because it was outmaneuvered by Democratic Action and the Social Christians. When AD's grip on the peasants began slipping in the middle 1960's, it was the Social Christians who expanded their own support base into the countryside. The Social Christians likewise engineered

[9]See Martz, op. cit., pp. 104–08.

[10]See Martz and Baloyra, *Political Attitudes in Venezuela: Societal Cleavages and Political Opinion*, Austin, TX, University of Texas Press, 1979, pp. 46–48.

A Soviet photo of the September 1972 founding congress of the New Force (Nueva Fuerza) electoral coalition, joining the Venezuelan Communist Party (PCV), the People's Electoral Movement (MEP), and the Democratic Republican Union. Despite such efforts to regain electoral favor, the PCV made a dismal showing in the 1973 legislative elections.

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Gustavo Machado, leader of the traditional Venezuelan Communist Party, pictured in 1968.

—Wide World.

major successes in organizing students and slum dwellers. AD, after sustaining three factional splits during the 1960's, used its five years in the opposition (1969–74) to rebuild much of the coalition that had allowed it to dominate electoral politics between 1946 and 1968. In effect, while PCV leaders agonized over the desirability of participating in democratic politics, AD and the Social Christians had turned their energies toward building and maintaining societal support. As the 1970's dawned, the PCV no longer had the option of challenging as a major force in the electoral process.

It was not surprising that the unbroken string of miscalculations by PCV leaders after the overthrow of General Pérez Jiménez created widespread dissatisfaction within the party during the late 1960's. However, it was the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 that magnified this dissatisfaction beyond the breaking point. Teodoro Petkoff, a young PCV leader who had distinguished himself in the resistance to General Pérez Jiménez, voiced the sentiments of many disgruntled PCV members in his widely read *Checoslovaquia: el socialismo como problema* (Czechosolovakia: Socialism as a Problem).[11] In that work, Petkoff condemned the Soviet Union's suppression of the "Prague Spring" and argued that revolutionaries in the Third World must be willing to condemn with equal vigor Moscow's imperialism and exploitation by the advanced capitalist countries.

Petkoff continued to sound the call for a truly Venezuelan version of socialism,[12] and soon found an important ally in Pompeyo Márquez, long an important figure within the PCV. Márquez had grown increasingly disillusioned at his party's subservience to the Soviet Union and at the consequences of the dominant faction's decision to join in the unsuccessful guerrilla movement.[13] Márquez and Petkoff initially attempted to reform the traditional Communist Party from within. However, it proved impossible to shake Gustavo Machado's control over the institution that he had established during the early 1930's. After much soul-searching, the PCV dissidents decided to establish a nationalistically revolutionary socialist force that would be attuned to conditions in Venezuela and the Third World in general. In January 1971, Márquez, Petkoff, and their followers organized the Movement Toward Socialism as a separate political party.[14]

Unexpectedly, this new grouping came up with roughly 5 percent of the total "small-card," or legislative, vote in the general elections of 1973, more than four times what the PCV received. The national legislative slate of MAS also outpolled the slates of all the other radical leftist political parties, some of which had been trying for years to become major vehicles of opposition to AD and the Social Christians. Nevertheless, the People's Electoral Movement (Movimiento Electoral del Pueblo—MEP—an offshoot of AD) and the Movement of the Revolutionary Left (Movimiento de la Izquierda Revolucionaria—MIR—an earlier and even more radical offshoot of AD) both continued to hold some attraction for leftist voters.[15]

[11] Caracas, Editorial Fuentes, 1969.

[12] Other important books by Petkoff include: *Socialismo para Venezuela?* (Socialism for Venezuela?), Caracas, Editorial Fuentes, 1972, and *Proceso a la izquierda* (The Leftward Movement), Barcelona, Editorial Planeta, 1976.

[13] Márquez's thinking is summarized in the chapter entitled "El Alias" in Alicia Freilich de Segal's *La Venedemocracia* (Venezuelan Democracy), Caracas, Monte Avila, 1978, pp. 137–62.

[14] Ibid., pp. 149–53.

[15] The most comprehensive account of the 1973 election is John D. Martz and Enrique Baloyra, *Electoral Mobilization and Public Opinion: The Venezuelan Campaign of 1973*, Chapel Hill, NC, University of North Carolina Press, 1976.

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

Cofounders of the Movement Toward Socialism (MAS): at left, Pompeyo Márquez, shown in 1963 shortly before his arrest with 22 other congressmen on terrorist charges; at right, Teodoro Petkoff, shown in September 1980, several months after his election as President of MAS.

—Wide World and *Bohemia* (Caracas), Sept. 15, 1980.

Capitalizing on Success

Márquez and Petkoff have proved themselves able organizers and strategists in building upon the auspicious electoral debut of MAS. While seeking to develop leftist unity on a wide variety of issues, they have never abandoned their goal of transforming MAS into the only significant electoral organization on the radical left. Furthermore, they affirmed to all who would listen that MAS eventually would displace either AD or the Social Christians as one of Venezuela's two major political parties.

MAS has boldly and tenaciously pursued a multipronged strategy since 1973. The most important elements of this strategy have been: (1) reaching out to leftists and others in the electorate who historically rejected the PCV; (2) crafting a network of organizational links with a wide variety of social groups, a policy favored by most Marxist political parties; (3) cooperating with AD and the Social Christians in arrangements of convenience that might increase party strength and gain acceptance for MAS within the electorate at large; (4) public championing of social justice and of honesty in government at every opportunity; and (5) attempting to convince those historically most hostile to the PCV—especially the Venezuelan military and North Americans—that they could live with a democratically elected MAS administration.

In attempting to gain support among leftists and those inclined toward leftist outlooks, the leaders of MAS have taken great care to cultivate an image of reasonableness, openness, and flexibility—a posture which contrasts with the strident, sectarian rigidity of

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José Vicente Rangel, an independent leftist who ran as the presidential candidate of Venezuela's Movement Toward Socialism (MAS) in 1973 and 1978.

—*Bohemia* (Caracas), May 15, 1978.

the PCV. In 1973, MAS chose as its presidential candidate José Vicente Rangel, long a noted leftist, who had never belonged to the PCV but who also chose not to become a member of MAS. Such an alignment, with minimal regard for ideological or organizational purity, has become a hallmark of MAS.[16] Prior to the 1978 presidential elections, MAS took the lead in attempting to rally radical leftists behind the idea of a single presidential standard-bearer. When this effort failed, the party ran its own candidate, again Rangel. Although Rangel did only marginally better than his 4 percent showing of 1973, MAS itself elected 11 congressmen, more than the combined total of 10 elected by all other radical leftist parties. In the process, the party garnered 6 percent of the legislative vote.

The 1973 and 1978 elections provide some basis for analyzing the sorts of social groupings that MAS has succeeded in attracting by its leftist appeals. Specifically, the author has been able to examine the percent of the vote for MAS in each of Venezuela's 642 municipalities in 1973 and in 1978 as a function of each of three independent variables: (1) the percent of the municipality's population that lives in the capital of the municipality; (2) the percent of literacy in the municipality; and (3) the percent of the municipality's population living in substandard housing. The results of feeding these variables into a multiple regression equation were striking (see Table 2). There proved to be a remarkably strong relationship between MAS voting and the percent of population living in the municipality capital (Beta equaled .43 in 1973 and .50 in 1978) and a significant link as well between MAS voting and literacy (Beta equaled .33 and .12 respectively). Since the population of municipal capitals continues to swell and literacy rates are rising, MAS can look forward in the 1980's to expanded opportunities to win over newly urbanized, newly literate voters—as it seems to have done in the 1970's.

Analysis of the 1973 and 1978 voting patterns suggests, too, that MAS has no special appeal in areas characterized by high levels of substandard housing—i.e., in poor neighborhoods. In this case, the relationship was weak (Beta equaled -.02 in 1973 and .02 in 1978). Similar analysis of the vote for the Social Christians and for Democratic Action tends to indicate that the latter retains the allegiance of the poor in most parts of Venezuela, with the former enjoying significant support in disadvantaged areas throughout the Andes. Thus, one of the most important challenges still facing MAS leaders is to expand the party's appeal among Venezuelan have-nots.

Results of the experimental 1979 elections to district municipal councils suggested further success for MAS in its efforts to broaden its leftist base. The 1979 balloting was an experiment in direct election of municipal council members. Previously, these officials had been chosen on the same ballot with the senators, congressmen, and state legislators. Consequently, municipal council races rarely figured in the electorate's decision about the party for which the single legislative vote would be cast. Councilmen, after being elected, did the bidding of those who positioned them on the party ballot. Voters had become increasingly alienated by this situation, feeling that citizens had no means of holding local officials responsible for their actions. Mindful of this growing disenchantment with local government, AD and the Social Christians opted to hold separate municipal elections in June of 1979. For these elections, as in the 1978 campaign, Petkoff and Márquez called for leftist unity in order to present a viable alternative to the Social Christians and AD. This time, however, the other leftist political parties did agree to form a single slate of candidates

[16]See John D. Martz, "The Minor Parties," in Howard Penniman, Ed., *Venezuela at the Polls*, Washington, DC, American Enterprise Institute, 1980.

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Table 2: Regression Analysis of Socioeconomic Bases of Support for the Movement Toward Socialism (MAS) in 1973 and 1978

(The dependent variable in each case is MAS's percent of the total legislative vote in the respective years)

	1973	1978
Independent variables:	(Beta weights)	
Urbanization[a]	.43	.50
Literacy[b]	.33	.12
Poverty[c]	−.02	.02
	R^2 = .42	**.30**
	constant = −.43	.44

[a] Measured as the percent of the municipality's population living in the municipality capital.

[b] Measured as the percent of literacy in the municipality's population.

[c] Measured as the percent of the municipality's population living in substandard housing.

SOURCE AND METHODOLOGY: The election data for the 642 municipalities were found in publications of the Supreme Electoral Council. The socioeconomic indicators were drawn from the 1971 Venezuelan census. For a technical and theoretical discussion of the variables used, see David J. Myers, "Urban Voting, Structural Cleavages, and Party System Evolution, The Case of Venezuela," *Comparative Politics* (Rutgers, NJ), October 1975, pp. 119–51.

for each of Venezuela's 190 council election districts.[17]

The united leftist slate polled some 3 percent more than the combined legislative slate of all radical leftist parties had in December 1978 (16.3 percent vs. 13.1 percent). More important, from the perspective of MAS, were signs that the party's strength within the Left had increased. While the author has not yet seen council-by-council returns, it was reported that in Caracas, MAS's share of the total leftist vote rose to 74 percent (it had been 56 percent in 1978).[18] Petkoff and Márquez, in the name of unity, had achieved their immediate strategic objective—domination of the political spectrum's radical Left.

Optimists in MAS interpreted the June 1979 municipal election results as evidence that the party might jump more quickly than expected to second position in Venezuelan politics. AD's share of the vote in the elections had fallen to 30 percent (compared to 40 percent in the 1978 legislative elections). In the ensuing 11 months, Democratic Action was also paralyzed by a bitter and inconclusive struggle for power between supporters of former president Carlos Andrés Pérez and party founder Rómulo Betancourt. MAS, in contrast, emerged from its May 1980 convention more united than ever. Polls taken in mid-1980 confirmed that MAS, at least in the populous central region, was running close to both of the major parties in overall popularity.[19] (Surprisingly, these polls showed that AD had recovered, to replace COPEI as the public's preferred political instrument.) For the Masistas,[20] continuation of recent trends in popular support might, by the 1983 elections, put their party within striking distance of AD and the Social Christians, parties that have dominated Venezuelan politics since 1959. Under these circumstances, MAS would be seen as a viable option for disgruntled voters.

Such favorable readings of public opinion, however, are weak reeds on which to rest long-range hopes for political success. Petkoff and Márquez have seen such "support" evaporate before.[21] Consequently, MAS has pursued other lines of its broad strategy, particularly the effort to weave organizational ties and patterns of influence with a variety of socially important groups. Since 1973, MAS has undertaken major organizing drives among workers, students, and the inhabitants of the urban slums.

The workers have by and large remained loyal to AD, with the Social Christians having an important minority following. But MAS is emerging as a force to be reckoned with in union elections. A MAS-coordinated leftist unity slate won control of the strategic steelworkers' union following elections in December 1979.[22] Subsequently, one of AD's most influential leaders, Leandro Mora, called on the Social Christians to join in developing "new strategies to stop the leftist tide from surging over the labor force."[23]

From its beginning, MAS commanded a significant following among high-school and university students. The universities, in particular, have long attracted those troubled by the unequal distribution of wealth in Venezuela and inclined to believe that the ruling Social Christians and social democrats (AD) serve the interests of domestic oligarchs and international capitalists.[24] Such circles were, at the same time,

[17] See Rafael Hernández, "A Contribution from the Grass Roots to the Unity of the Left," *SIC* (Caracas), July–August 1979, pp. 301–02.

[18] See José A. Lazcano, "Election Results," *SIC*, July–August 1979, p. 298.

[19] This was found by the respected polling firm *Datos* and in private soundings made by the individual political parties.

[20] Members of MAS are commonly referred to as "Masistas."

[21] Prior to the 1973 presidential election, public opinion polls suggested that MAS would receive at least 10 percent of the total vote. The party captured only 5 percent.

[22] *Resumen* (Caracas), December 1979.

[23] Ibid.

[24] This theme has been repeated by a host of radical leftist writers. See, for example, Moises Moleiro, *El Partido del Pueblo: Crónica de un Fraude* (The People's Party: Chronicle of a Fraud), Valencia, Vadell hermanos, 1978; and Carlos Ramires Faria, *La Democrácia Petrolera: de Rómulo Betancourt a Carlos Andrés Pérez* (Petroleum Democracy: From Rómulo Betancourt to Carlos Andrés Pérez), Caracas, El cid, 1978.

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troubled by Soviet imperialism. Therefore, the circumstances of MAS's origin and its radical socialist ideology give the party an appeal and legitimacy among Venezuela's *inteligencia* that the traditional PCV never enjoyed.

In the 1977 student elections, the Movement of the Revolutionary Left did win a string of victories in the major universities, but subsequently, MIR student officers and administrators became involved in corruption, and the national party degenerated into an alliance of convenience among two and possibly three squabbling factions.[25] Consequently, in the December 1979 elections at the prestigious Central University, MAS won more votes than any other party.[26] In an alliance of convenience with the Social Christians, it now shares control of the university. Cooperation between MAS and the Social Christians for the purpose of controlling universities and other educational institutions has become a basic fact of political life during the first years of the Herrera government.

The Social Christians and Masistas, while cooperating in the universities, are competing intensely for the support of the urban poor. President Herrera has given considerable attention to strengthening neighborhood councils (*juntas comunales*) in the slums of Caracas, Maracaibo, and other major cities. Social Christian strategists calculate that a strong network of neighborhood councils under their control can balance AD's domination of organized labor and overcome traditional COPEI weakness among the urban poor.[27] However, MAS has also given high priority to obtaining influence within these councils. During May and June of 1980, reports began to seep out of the slums suggesting that MAS was having more success than the government in gaining control of the newly strengthened councils. Information on this matter, however, remains fragmentary and impressionistic.

Willingness to cooperate with the Social Christians in the universities while competing with them among the urban poor highlights MAS's readiness to enter short-term cooperative arrangements as long as they are seen as leading to the growth of party influence and support. Arrangements of convenience between MAS and either of the two major parties are, of course, never publicly proclaimed. Evidence of behind-the-scenes cooperation between MAS and AD during the Pérez administration has yet to be documented, but



A 1979 photo of Pompeyo Márquez, then Secretary General of Venezuela's Movement Toward Socialism.

—*Bohemia* (Caracas), Nov. 25, 1979.

the Social Christians charge that AD helped to finance MAS television commercials during the 1978 presidential election campaign. One possible indication that these assertions may indeed be true is that throughout the campaign, public opinion polls indicated that voters inclining to José Vicente Rangel would support the Social Christians' Luís Herrera if forced to choose between only the candidates of the two major parties.[28] AD, on the other hand, maintains that the Herrera government has virtually turned over the Ministry of Education to MAS. While this seems unlikely because of continuing Social Christian recruitment in the high schools and universities, a significant number of Masistas have assumed middle- and upper-middle-level positions in the educational bureaucracy over the last 12 months or so. This suggests cooperation between the Herrera government and MAS in an effort to isolate AD supporters inside the educational establishment.[29]

A fourth aspect of the MAS strategy involves championing of social justice and of honesty in government.

[25] *SIC*, December 1979.

[26] Ibid.

[27] Social Christian difficulties with the urban poor were confirmed in the "epilogue" of David J. Myers, *Democratic Campaigning in Venezuela: Caldera's Victory*, Caracas, Editorial Sucre, 1973.

[28] From polling conducted by the author.

[29] From interviews during early 1980 with several former upper-middle-level officials in the Ministry of Education.

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In this area, MAS leaders cultivate the image of being more concerned about human needs and more trustworthy than leaders of either of the major political parties.

MAS repeated the first of these themes throughout the 1978 election campaign, particularly a variant suggesting that the AD and Social Christian parties have failed to bring about a just society because they have sold out to international capitalism. The MAS electoral program promised a state takeover of banking and of the economic empires of the Venezuelan oligarchy.[30] Under this program, multinational corporations would be permitted to operate if their activities could be shown to be in the national interest. Finally, small and medium-sized businesses would remain in private hands, at least initially. This restructuring of the economy was presented as a first major step toward the goal of a more equitable distribution of wealth and income.

MAS made corruption in government a major issue as well in both the 1978 national election campaign and the 1979 municipal council races. Moreover, MAS congressmen voted unanimously to hold former president Carlos Andrés Pérez responsible for administrative, political, and moral negligence in a 9-million-bolivar kickback involving the purchase during his administration of a Norwegian refrigerator ship.[31] Congress, however, found Pérez guilty only of "political" negligence, a relatively light slap on the wrist, considering everything. Márquez and Petkoff subsequently cited Pérez's escape from criminal prosecution as evidence that as long as AD and the Social Christians dominate Venezuelan politics, self-serving interests would short-circuit the people's will.[32] Such public statements suggest that Masistas continue to believe that disgust over official corruption, in addition to tensions associated with economic development and the continuing unequal distribution of wealth, will eventually produce a large number of alienated voters, and that MAS must position itself to attract them.

Finally, the party leadership, especially Teodoro Petkoff, has made a major effort to convince the Venezuelan military and selected North Americans that a MAS administration would not be incompatible with their interests. Events since World War II lead to a pessimistic assessment of Petkoff's chances of success here, but it is a measure of the man's acumen, boldness, and flexibility that he has been willing to try.

During the last seven years, Petkoff has regularly accepted invitations to discuss his views on important issues with officers attending Venezuela's Army War College at Los Chorros. While never deviating from his militant socialism, he has stressed his Venezuelan nationalism and disenchantment with Soviet foreign policy. Most recently, Petkoff circulated a statement by his party's director of international affairs condemning the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.[33]

The MAS leadership has generally attempted to be conciliatory toward individual North Americans, especially academics and professionals. In 1974, Petkoff spoke to the national Latin American Studies Association meeting in San Francisco. The following year, he toured a number of prestigious US universities, and he has returned periodically for limited speaking engagements. In addition, numerous Masista students currently are studying in the United States. Generally, their message to North Americans is the same: MAS is nationalistically Venezuelan and radically socialistic. The United States, they contend, has no legitimate cause for concern that MAS would convert Venezuela into a Soviet satellite or a Stalinist dictatorship. On the contrary, unless North Americans identify with the Venezuelan oligarchy or believe that multinational business should continue to make exorbitant profits, Masistas argue, they should actually support efforts to institute radical socialism in Venezuela. While the reaction to Masistas in the United States has been mixed, they have convinced their audiences that MAS is not merely a new incarnation of the historic Venezuelan Communist Party.

MAS Experience in Perspective

Venezuela's Movement Toward Socialism, while not yet an effective challenger for control of the government, has the potential to become one during the late 1980's. It can be argued that MAS is the most successful "Eurocommunist" movement to appear in the Third World. For this reason, it has considerable implications in a variety of contexts. Many of the conditions that Pompeyo Márquez and Teodoro Petkoff diagnosed and turned to their advantage in Venezuela are common throughout the developing countries of the planet. MAS's experience is particularly relevant with respect to the potential for the electoral success of nationalistic radical socialist or Communist

[30] The MAS *Programa de gobierno* was printed and distributed throughout Venezuela prior to the December 1978 elections.

[31] A comprehensive summary of this matter is contained in the May 18, 1980, issue of the Caracas news magazine *Zeta*.

[32] Ibid.

[33] *Radio Continente* (Caracas) broadcast of Jan. 14, 1980, as translated in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Latin America* (Washington, DC), Jan. 14, 1980, p. L/1.

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parties in the resource-rich countries of the "developing" or "Southern" nations. The MAS phenomenon also has important ramifications not only for Venezuelan politics but also with regard to the future of democracy in Venezuela and elsewhere in Latin America, given the 1973 overthrow of a constitutionally elected leftist president in Chile and the uneasiness with which Venezuela's economic and political elites view the growth of MAS influence.

The linkage between the birth of MAS and outrage at Soviet imperialism was probably crucial for the party's emergence as a major force on the Venezuelan left. This is a lesson of considerable significance to leftist movements elsewhere in the Third World, where the trend toward greater national assertiveness can be expected to become more pronounced in the 1980's. The success of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), US withdrawal from Vietnam, and Soviet difficulties in Afghanistan indicate to many in the developing countries that they are witnessing a fundamental shift in power between the industrial "North" and the "resource-rich South." It is no longer fashionable to be tied too closely to either of the superpowers. Even Cuba has discovered that its alliance with Moscow often gets in the way of Havana's efforts to exercise Third World leadership. In light of these perceptions, Communist parties that continue with a highly visible dependence on Moscow seem condemned, unless the Soviet Union should gain massive superiority over the United States, to remain isolated within their own societies.

Throughout the Third World, democratic regimes with competitive elections are the exception rather than the rule. Nevertheless, a significant number of Third World countries experience intermittent periods during which more than one political party competes for power. This situation is most prevalent in Latin America, Tropical Africa, and parts of South Asia. It is for these sometime democratic countries that the MAS experience is most relevant. In them, as in Venezuela, a basic key to the success of Eurocommunist-type movements will be the skill of party leaders in grafting the symbolism associated with class struggle to local political traditions.

In its efforts toward that end, MAS, as discussed earlier, has benefited from the external technical assistance of the Spanish and Italian Communist parties; however, it is beyond the capability of these parties to offer throughout the Third World the level of assistance that MAS has received. Evidence suggests that the Italian and Spanish Communist parties will confine their efforts to a select number of countries in Latin America and Africa where they calculate that a Eurocommunist movement has some reasonable chance of success. For example, the Brazilian Communist Party recently has emerged from the underground and seems inclined to loosen its historic ties with Moscow and adopt Eurocommunist-like positions. This has led to increasing contacts between the Spanish and Italian Communist parties and the Brazilian party.[34] Moscow, however, commands enormous resources in its global crusade to spread the Soviet version of the Marxist gospel. In countries where Moscow supports a traditionalist Communist party and where Eurocommunist elements receive little outside assistance, it will be extremely difficult for MAS-type movements to grow.

MAS's emergence as a viable political party, whether or not it comes to power, has affected Venezuela's political life in several important ways. Domestically, it ensures that the major battles of Venezuelan politics will be fought to the left on the political spectrum. Multinational corporations, to the extent that they are permitted to operate in Venezuela, will be tightly regulated by the state. Domestic entrepreneurs and landowners must live indefinitely under the threat of being taken over by the public sector, and government will continue to control the lion's share of basic industry. Furthermore, much of the revenue from petroleum will be used, as in the past, to subsidize living costs for the poor. If they did otherwise, the Social Christians and Social Democrats, given the continuance of the democratic regime, would be conceding large segments of the electorate to the MAS, with its Marxist-flavored appeal for social justice.

In foreign policy, the persistence of a viable MAS in the opposition guarantees that the government (whether Social Christian or Democratic Action) must be careful not to appear too closely allied with the United States. For MAS, as for many in the Third World, closeness to the United States is interpreted as domination by international capitalism. Any democratically elected administration will find it exceedingly difficult to build a consensus for special arrangements with Washington, such as one to develop Orinoco Tar Belt petroleum for the United States market.[35] In addition, MAS sensitivity toward and use of the "rich

[34]The supposedly reformist, or Eurocommunist, orientation of the Brazilian Communist Party (PCB) is discussed in *Latin American Regional Report–Brazil* (London), July 4, 1980. During a visit to Brazil in August–September 1980, the author confirmed in conversations with various Brazilian scholars the existence of links between the PCB and the Italian and Spanish Communist parties.

[35]Venezuela's proven oil reserves are generally considered to run between 18 and 20 billion barrels. Estimates for the untapped Orinoco tar sands, however, vary between 700 billion and 1 trillion barrels. Of this, at least 250 billion can be recovered with existing technology.

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nations/poor nations" issue suggest that democratic Venezuelan governments, at least in their dealings with the industrial "North," will seek to appear as champions of international social justice for the "South." Venezuela's comparative affluence within the "Southern" world, however, will mute use by Caracas of this theme in its dealings with other "Southern" countries.

The extent to which growing MAS influence strengthens or weakens Venezuelan democracy remains unclear. Pompeyo Márquez recently stated in a widely circulated interview that the basic error of the PCV had been to take up arms against the democratically elected Betancourt government.[36] While this implies a strong MAS commitment to electoral democracy, the party's continuing ties with the guerrillas who resumed operations in eastern Venezuela during July of 1980 causes many to wonder just how real this commitment is.[37]

Contradictory signals from MAS on this matter relate to the party's preaching of revolutionary social and economic transformation. Once effected, such transformations are almost impossible to reverse, and MAS can never be confident that should it win a presidential election, the losers would not employ force in an effort to keep it from coming to power and enacting the pledged changes. Such a use of force almost occurred in Chile when Socialist Salvador Allende's radical electoral coalition received a plurality in the 1970 presidential voting. And, in fact, less than three years later, conservatives, the middle class, and others persuaded the military to remove President Allende by force. Subsequently, those who ousted the martyred president unleashed a campaign of violence and repression that dismantled the institutions on which the radical socialists had relied to achieve their electoral victories. The new government also killed or exiled Allende's key advisers and instituted military dictatorship in one of the hemisphere's oldest and most prestigious democracies.

Indeed, events in Chile between 1970 and the present cast doubt on the long-term viability of democracy anywhere in the Third World. Neither MAS nor any other Third World radical socialist or Communist party will ever forget what happened in Chile. To such parties, those events suggest that, at best, feudal and capitalistic elites in the developing areas will support democratic rules of the game only if these procedures allow them to retain their wealth and prestige. Several conversations with Petkoff over the past six years have convinced this author that while the MAS leader sincerely prefers to fight for his ideals within a democratic framework, he is hedging his bets. Should MAS encounter a good opportunity to attain power through other than electoral procedures, the party probably would seize what would have to be considered a once-in-a-lifetime chance. A preference for coming to power over not coming to power clearly overrides any commitment to democratic rules of the game. It is, in fact, difficult to think of any revolutionary political party or movement in the Third World that has not shared this preference. However, MAS may never be confronted with such a choice.

At the same time, it is possible that as MAS gains influence within the democratic system, it may become more than ever a creature of that system, with corresponding loyalties and inhibitions. The true test for Venezuelan democracy will come—as it came in Chile—should the radical socialists capture the presidency in a free and open election.

[36] "El Alias," loc. cit., p. 151.

[37] "The Resurgence of Guerrillas in Venezuela," *Zeta*, Mar. 30, 1980, analyzes the Venezuelan guerrilla movement one year after President Luis Herrera's proclamation of amnesty. Conversations by the author with Venezuelan friends of more than a decade, whose relatives fought during the 1960's with the guerrillas, confirm continuing links between MAS and the July 1980 mini-insurgency.

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The Roots of Autonomy in West European Communism

By J.W. Friend

Recent obituary notices notwithstanding, reports of the death of Eurocommunism may be exaggerated. For if it was difficult to know what Eurocommunism was alive, it is harder yet to know what has died. Certainly, the notion that Eurocommunism was the wave of the future disappeared after the French elections of June 1979, the Spanish elections of March 1979, and the Italian elections of June 1979. All three major "Eurocommunist" parties fared poorly with the electorate, when strong showings at the polls might have propelled them to the threshold of power. Then, in January 1980, the entente among the French, Italian, and Spanish Communist parties was broken when the French Communists retreated toward Moscow.

If, as a result of these developments, the term "Eurocommunist" now loses currency, it will not be a major loss. The various phenomena which have been subsumed under the Eurocommunist label remain, but the term "Eurocommunist" has been made even more confusing by the gyrations of the French Communist Party (PCF). We may do better by avoiding a word that invites confusion of thought and using the key notion of discussions of Eurocommunism during the 1970's: "autonomy." This word implies both a willingness to use forms other than bolshevism and a dispassionate view of the identity of national party interests with those of the Soviet state. The historical antecedent of autonomy—and its apparent antonym—is the concept of Soviet "control." Recent PCF actions provide renewed impetus to reinvestigate our use of the terms and to look at the historical and causal linkages among control, autonomy, and the behavior labeled "Eurocommunism."

Such an undertaking requires a review of Communist history, for the relationships between Moscow and the national parties that prevailed in the interwar and early post-World War II years do not merely provide precedents for communism today, but also live on in the memories of the elderly mandarins who still shape Soviet policy and in Western perceptions of interparty relations. This essay cannot presume to treat all aspects of the question. It barely touches, for example, on ideology and its control functions. The intention, rather, is to trace the evolution which has taken place in the Communist movement, from ideological commitment to the Comintern, through personal loyalty to Yosif Stalin and the habit of obedience after Stalin's death, to the emergence of autonomist stirrings in the 1960's.

The discussion which follows concentrates on autonomy and control among the European parties, but makes use of evidence from the experiences of non-European parties as well. To be workable as an analytical tool, the definition of "control" must be Soviet ability to force national parties to commit actions that contradict their respective self-interests; and the definition of "autonomy" must be the ability of parties to formulate a theory or even scattered notions of self-interest and then to resist Soviet pressure and defend their self-interests as they perceive them. It should be recognized, however, that those parties distinguished by long records of compliance with Soviet wishes may be acting in perfect self-interest—unless it can be shown that they are unable to say "no" under any circumstances. Theoretically, there is no necessary link between autonomy and anti-Soviet behavior—though Western observers find this hard to believe since such

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At the left, Italian Communist Party leader Enrico Berlinguer with French Communist Party chief Georges Marchais at a May 19, 1979, Marseilles rally on the theme of "Europe of the Communists"; at the right, Marchais chats with Viktor Zagladin, Secretary of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party and First Deputy Chief of its International Department, at the April 1980 Paris Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties of Europe for Peace and Disarmament, which was boycotted by the Spanish, Italian, and several other West European Communist parties.

—Georges Gobet and Arnaud de Wildenberg/both for Gamma-Liaison.

august figures as CPSU secretaries Mikhail Suslov and Boris Ponomarëv, who have major responsibilities for dealing with non-Soviet ruling and nonruling parties respectively, are so clearly persuaded that the link is there and that it is absolute.

The Comintern and Stalinist Periods

By the 1930's, Stalin exercised absolute control over the Communist movement. This situation derived from the submission of the infant Communist parties to V.I. Lenin's famous 21 conditions formulated in 1920 for membership in the Communist International. But that submission did not result in instant Soviet control. Because the powers of the Comintern Executive Committee (ECCI) were so great, it is easy to telescope developments and lose sight of the subtle changes which took place over the years in relationships between the national parties and a Comintern bureaucracy increasingly dominated by Soviet nationals generally and finally by Stalin alone. From the beginning, at the Second Comintern Congress (1920), the ECCI was empowered to issue directives binding on all national sections (parties) and could replace a national leadership and expel members at any level. The Fifth Congress (1924) specified the implicit powers granted in 1920 by affirming that Comintern representatives could take part in meetings at any level and even urge adoption of the Executive Committee's own views where they differed from those of a national leadership.[1]

For all its powers, however, the Comintern in its early years was unable to mold a submissive international movement. It initially accepted into its ranks leaders and even whole parties that stubbornly resisted bolshevization, and after the right-wingers among them were forced out, a group of left-extremists, originally installed by Comintern President G.Ye. Zinov'yev, challenged the Leninist Center. Growing dissension in the Russian party after 1924 created new opportunities for factionalism and intrigue at all levels. The final victory of Stalin and N.I. Bukharin over the "United Opposition" of L. Trotsky, Zinov'yev, and L.B. Kamenev in 1926–27 put an end to the power of the left wing, but only Stalin's total supremacy in the Soviet party, achieved in 1929, brought complete Soviet control over policy and personnel in the International.[2]

[1] See Jane Degras, Ed., *The Communist International (1919–1943): Documents*, London, Oxford University Press, 1956–65, Vol. 1, p. 165, and Vol. 2, pp. 119–20.

[2] Leonard Schapiro, *The Communist Party of the Soviet Union*, London, Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1960, pp. 365–77; and Jules Humbert-Droz, *De Lénine à Staline* (From Lenin to Stalin), Neuchâtel, La Baconniere, 1971, pp. 319–56.

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German Communist leader Ernst Thälmann addresses a 1932 party rally in Berlin. A year later the party was in a shambles and Thälmann was in prison, never to emerge.

—FPG.

Ideological enthusiasm did not provide sufficient guarantees of obedience for Stalin, and he buttressed it with personal ties of loyalty to himself. The leading cadres of each foreign Communist party were part of a complicated Comintern machinery, but they were also in a very real sense atomized individuals, responsible primarily to Stalin, not to the current head of their own party. An example from early 1929 sufficiently illustrates the point. Jay Lovestone, Secretary-General of the Communist Party of the United States, led a delegation to Moscow to appeal a Comintern decision. Stalin overruled Lovestone, who had thought himself master of a 90 percent majority in his Central Committee. Under Comintern pressure, the majority evaporated within three months, and in June 1929 Lovestone, now backed by only 2 percent of the Central Committee, was expelled from the party.[3]

The organizational control measures which were introduced by the Comintern starting in 1924 began to take effect just as special devotion to Stalin became a factor to be reckoned with and helped promote Stalin's central role. The Comintern schools in Moscow received and trained thousands of foreign cadres in the late 1920's and early 1930's, and sent them home stamped into the mold of bolshevism and the love of Stalin. When cadres could not be brought to Moscow, the Moscow apparatus systematically collected dossiers on them. Omniscience was part of the control system.[4]

Another factor bolstering Stalin's position in the movement was that other objects of adulation were few at the beginning of the 1930's. No foreign Communist party had a chief whose prestige could rival the Soviet dictator's. Ernst Thälmann, the earliest foreign leader to be granted a personality cult of his own, was built up not as a rival, but precisely because he was Stalin's creature. And Palmiro Togliatti, though de facto leader of the Italian Communist Party (PCI), was made to suffer for his support of Bukharin in the late 1920's, and would have been pushed aside in 1931 in favor of Luigi Longo if Longo had not declined to accept Togliatti's job.[5] Maurice Thorez, put in charge of the French Communist Party (PCF) in 1931 after a period of great leadership confusion, was nevertheless surrounded by a collegium of Comintern instructors, headed by the Czechoslovak Communist Eugene Fried.[6]

In the early 1930's, the cult of Stalin to which the interwar generation of Communist cadres had surrendered itself symbolized both the unity of communism and the passion of the cadres' aspirations. It stood in glaring contrast to the grim daily political realities faced by the cadres in their own countries. But the change in Comintern tactics in 1934 from war on social fascism to promotion of the United Front provided the cadres with new slogans and campaigns, and the Spanish civil war gave them new emotional outlets. Fighting in Spain, German Communists could burn away the shame of their party's easy defeat by Adolph Hitler in 1933, and Italian Communists, who could oppose Fascism at home only with poorly distributed leaflets, found an open battleground in Spain and a base for radio broadcasts beamed at Italy.[7]

[3] Theodore Draper, *American Communism and Soviet Russia*, New York, NY, Viking Press, 1960, pp. 419–30.

[4] See Charles Tillon, *On Chantait Rouge* (Red Was the Song), Paris, Robert Laffont, 1977, pp. 138–45, for an example of the attention paid a medium-level union leader on his one trip to Moscow.

[5] Giorgio Bocca, *Palmiro Togliatti*, Bari, Laterza, 1973, pp. 216–18.

[6] Philippe Robrieux, *Maurice Thorez, vie secrète et vie politique* (Maurice Thorez, Secret and Political Lives), Paris, Fayard, 1975, pp. 144–46.

[7] Paolo Spriano, *Storia del Partito comunista italiano* (History of the Italian Communist Party), Torino, Einaudi, 1970, Vol. 3, pp. 85–90.

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Finally, after the wave of expulsions and resignations that washed away both the losers of the national and international struggles of the 1920's and the hapless guinea pigs of Stalin's early experiments in new leadership, there came a period of stability for leaders and higher cadres and of increased appeal at home—seen most spectacularly in the case of the PCF. At this point, the growth of their parties, actual combat in Spain, mobilization against the surging strength of Nazism, and hatred of the ineffectual conservative democracies sustained a vital need to believe in Stalin and communism and to disbelieve or dismiss unwelcome evidence of Stalin's terror. Having had to justify to themselves the terrible measures of collectivization and famine in the Soviet Union and the sectarianism of the social-fascism years abroad, Communists in the mid-1930's found the burden of belief easier. They seemed to be moving forward.

Obedience to Stalin became second nature to European Communists during this period, and was usually reinforced by unreasoning and passionate faith that the Soviet dictator was always right. The purges of non-Soviet Communists in the 1930's did not indicate that beneath the veneer of obedience opposition still thrived; for the purges struck at those who had opposed Stalin in the 1920's, or at loyal men who had been too friendly with his fallen enemies, or even at those like the unfortunate members of the Polish leadership, who, in addition to having these faults, were suspect in Stalin's eyes because he feared they might prove intractable in the future.[8]

Even the subtle and unemotional Palmiro Togliatti seems to have accepted the need to worship the Moloch of historical materialism. In later years, he told Lelio Basso that Stalin "had succeeded in convincing many comrades that it was necessary to kill and allow killing for the good of Russia and the movement." It is characteristic of Togliatti that his phrase leaves one unsure whether he shared this view. But for Franco Rodano, the Catholic Communist intellectual who in Togliatti's later years was one of his few intimates, there was no doubt: "Togliatti cannot be understood if one does not accept this truth—he judged Stalin as a positive force."[9]

What was true for Togliatti was truer still for thousands of lesser men. From 1929 to 1939, Stalinist obedience became both reflex and dogma for the faithful. The first real test of Stalin's control did not come until the signing of the Hitler-Stalin pact in August 1939. Although the shock was not felt equally everywhere, perhaps the tension created within the world Communist movement can best be studied by looking at the PCF, the party which after the collapse of the Communist Party of Germany (KPD) thought itself the eldest daughter of the church. A loyal Comintern apparatchik working in Paris later called the pact "a blow like those they give steers in the slaughterhouse."[10]

The rapprochement between Germany and the Soviet Union took the PCF by surprise, but once the leaders had registered what had happened, they hoped that somehow the pact would prevent the oncoming war. When war came nonetheless, they at first saw no connection between the Nazi-Soviet pact and their own commitment to the defense of France. On September 2, 1939, Communist deputies in the National Assembly voted for supplemental war credits—emulating the French Socialists of 1914. On the next day, Thorez, followed by thousands of PCF leading cadres at all levels, obeyed the call to arms of military reservists. Clearly, the PCF leadership judged the battle ahead a patriotic and just war. But on September 20, categorical new instructions arrived from Moscow. They declared that the PCF was wrong if it believed that it could defend the national interests of France while merely paying lip service to the foreign policy of the Soviet Union. The war itself was an imperialist war—like World War I—and the PCF leaders had sinned gravely in voting for war credits.

Amid confusion enhanced by the dispersal of party leaders in the mobilization, the party press, by now banned and clandestine, rallied to the new Moscow line. In response, on September 26 the National Assembly, led by old enemies on the right but with the support of the Socialist Party, declared the PCF illegal. For many Communists, the ban on the party eased rationalization of the new line, but among non-Communists only the prescient former United Front Premier Leon Blum warned publicly that attacks on the PCF would slow, not speed, the party's dissolution.

Of the 67 PCF deputies in parliament, 22, or one third of the total, refused to accept the new line. Despite numerous defections at all levels, however, the party apparatus was able to maintain a tenuous existence. The reality of Soviet control of this apparatus

[8] M.K. Dziewanowski, *A History of the Polish Communist Party*, 2nd ed., Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1976, pp. 153–54; and Robert Conquest, *The Great Terror*, rev. ed., New York, NY, Collier, 1973, p. 585. Both suggest that the dissolution of the Polish party in June 1938 was Stalin's way of avoiding future opposition to a Nazi-Soviet deal concerning Poland.

[9] Bocca, op. cit., p. 270.

[10] Giulio Ceretti, *Aux ombres des deux T, quarante ans avec Maurice Thorez et Palmiro Togliatti* (In the Shadow of the Two T's: 40 Years with Maurice Thorez and Palmiro Togliatti), Paris, Julliard, 1973, p. 196.

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was revealed by the case of party leader Thorez himself. Summoned by the Comintern to desert from the armed forces and "resume his place at the head of the party," Thorez agonized over what to do for two weeks, at first rejecting a demand that meant execration in France and total submission in Soviet exile. But Thorez had been an apparatchik since his youth and had no other livelihood. If he did not submit, he would lose his party, and thus his career. On October 4, he slipped away from his unit, toward a hideout in Belgium and exile in the USSR.[11]

The obedience of the reluctant Thorez in 1939 serves as a symbol of the perfection of Soviet control. While it is true that during the cold war Moscow's orders were obeyed just as absolutely, never was there so dramatic a reversal of the Soviet line as in 1939. Neither during nor since World War II has Moscow forced leaders and militants to renounce so quickly and completely what they had believed and desired a short time before.

Of course, the parties under total Soviet control lay in ruins—the KPD destroyed in 1933, the Czechoslovak party decimated after March 1939, and the PCF banned in late 1939. But their cadres remained, and Comintern discipline had become so synonymous with devotion to Stalin that in 1943 that most mistrustful of tyrants apparently saw no risk in abolishing the Comintern altogether. There is no doubt that there were immediate political reasons behind the dissolution, and the value of the organization for future work was not certain. Nevertheless, the powers vested in the Comintern in the 1920's—to depose leaders and direct member parties—could not formally be given to the CPSU. Stalin must have been confident that he had the situation under total control.

This is puzzling, however, For from the outset there were signs that the *Vozhd*'s confidence was not entirely justified. The Yugoslav and Chinese Communist parties resisted Stalin's advice to be conciliatory toward other political forces in their countries, and the Communist-led Greek partisans, aided by the Yugoslavs, made a grab for power not long after Stalin had indicated to Winston Churchill that Great Britain could retain 90 percent influence in Greece. Victories by the Yugoslav and Chinese Communist parties justified their disobedience in a way (and sowed the seeds of future trouble for Soviet foreign policy). But when Churchill moved to suppress the Greek partisans, Stalin did not object, despite a potentially exploitable split between British and American public opinion on the Greek situation.[12] Win or lose, those who failed to obey Stalin were left for a time to their own devices.

Josip Broz Tito addresses the opening session of the Fifth Congress of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia in June 1948, shortly after the Moscow-controlled Cominform had issued a resolution condemning the independent stance of the Yugoslav leader.

—EUPRA.

With the exception of these three cases, though, the Communist parties reborn after the war with many thousands of idealistic new recruits were docile, concerned mainly with organizing and indoctrinating the new members. The key jobs related to this task were entrusted to old Comintern hands—where possible, to those trained in Moscow. There was much talk of "national roads to socialism"; but this was merely the line promulgated from the center, and even the German Communists in East Berlin mouthed it.[13] And when Communist ministers were dismissed from the governments of France and Italy in 1947, the PCF and the PCI thought they had suffered only "a temporary setback"—perhaps because Moscow did not tell them otherwise.[14]

[11] Jacques Fauvet, *Histoire du Parti communiste français* (History of the French Communist Party), rev. ed., Paris, Fayard, 1977, pp. 221–29; and Robrieux, op. cit., pp. 245–48.

[12] Fernando Claudin, *The Communist Movement: From Comintern to Cominform*, London, Penguin Books, 1975, pp. 372–81.

[13] Wolfgang Leonhard, *Child of the Revolution*, London, Collins, 1957, pp. 347–50.

[14] This interesting point is made by Robrieux, op. cit., pp. 347–53.

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Certainly, the French and Italian Communists were taken by surprise in September 1947 when they were summoned to a meeting in Poland and denounced as fainthearts and parliamentarians by the Yugoslavs and Stalin's lieutenant A.A. Zhdanov. They had believed—because Moscow had told them so—that their cooperation in non-Communist governments was right and useful. In contrast, the new line was total opposition to American policy and bitter opposition to all of America's friends in Europe.[15] Moreover, while the Comintern had been the planning center for world revolution, it was also clear from the outset that the Cominform was to be purely a front for Soviet state interests. Despite the obvious political disadvantages of such an arrangement, the nonruling parties rallied immediately to the change of line and new organization—and engaged in self-criticism regarding their earlier behavior. In return for their complete submission to and support of Soviet policy, the nonruling parties received the implicit promise that in the fullness of time something would come out right for them.

In fact, little did. The logic of the cold war prevented the Communist parties of Western Europe from undertaking any political action at the national level. They could only await liberation by the Red Army. In the meantime, they were given new and humiliating tasks to fulfill—for example, beating the drums for purges in Eastern Europe, and praising T.D. Lysenko's quackery in science and Zhdanov's petit bourgeois bigotry in art. Of course, not all Cominform labors were onerous. The French and Italian parties, still smarting from Yugoslav criticism at the founding session of the Cominform (and, in the Italian case, resentful of Josip Broz Tito's attempts at the end of the war to chew away at Italy's eastern frontier), welcomed orders to denigrate Tito. The PCI even organized espionage and resistance nets in Yugoslavia—nets that were later wiped out by Tito's police.[16]

The Waning of Control

Yugoslav disobedience itself was possible only because of the Yugoslav party's intense consciousness of its own national identity. The party's leaders stuck together under attack, instead of dividing to make their individual surrenders to Moscow. Yet they found no emulators while Stalin lived or during the charmed sleep of the parties for three years after his death. Stalin's death had created an incipient crisis of authority, but only by rehabilitating Tito as a good Communist in 1955 did Nikita Khrushchev unintentionally legitimize national dissent.

The next year, Khrushchev sawed off another underpinning of Soviet control in the Communist movement. His secret speech at the 20th Congress of the CPSU began the profanation of the god Stalin and the humiliation of the national leaders who were Stalin's chief devotees. Communist militants, even if they had read the full revelations, could still hold to their belief in the glorious Soviet Union. But foreign leaders, their positions in potential danger, needed to know with greater precision where to attach their loyalty—to the bumbling Khrushchev, who had committed the incredible folly of admitting Stalin's crimes, or to his rivals among the old Bolsheviks. Thorez, for one, hoped that the brash first secretary would quickly be deposed,[17] and apparently tried to get Togliatti to join forces with him. The prudent Italian declined, though he too disapproved of the secret speech. Two Soviet officials had brought him a metal chest containing the text of the speech on the night it was given, and then stood guard while the PCI leader read it. Asked by his entourage what this mysterious visit had meant, Togliatti replied, "Nothing, foolishness. You know their mania for secrecy."[18] Still, after careful reflection, he rejected the temptation to oppose Khrushchev. In June, after the US Department of State had given the text of Khrushchev's speech to the world, Togliatti cautiously broached the idea of national initiative within the Communist movement, but simultaneously suggested to the Soviets means to make the criticism of Stalin more acceptable to the faithful and less damaging to the movement.[19]

The principal result of the secret speech was that non-Soviet Communist leaders ceased to direct their loyalty toward the leader of the CPSU personally, even while remaining totally loyal to the USSR and its interests. Whereas loyalty had at the outset been given to the ideas of world revolution, the Comintern, and the Soviet state, and then to Stalin and the USSR, now it attached to the USSR alone.

Devotion did not increase with the greater abstraction. Nevertheless, when riot and revolt erupted in Hungary in late 1956, the foreign parties did not waver in their reactions, despite the misgivings of many individual militants. After some minor indecision in *l'Unità*

[15] Eugenio Reale, *Avec Jacques Duclos au banc des accusés à la réunion constitutive du Kominform* (With Jacques Duclos on the Bench of the Accused at the Founding Meeting of the Cominform), Paris, Plon, 1958.

[16] Bocca, op. cit., pp. 500–06.

[17] Robrieux, op. cit., pp. 453–64.

[18] Bocca, op. cit., p. 602.

[19] Ibid., pp. 607–13.

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

Italian Communist leader Palmiro Togliatti, left, and French Communist leader Maurice Thorez differed in their reactions to Khrushchev's campaign of destalinization. Togliatti is shown at a party rally in December 1961; Thorez at the 17th Congress of the French Communist Party, in May 1964, where he was replaced by Waldeck Rochet as party president.

—Pictorial Parade.

reporting on Hungary, the PCI firmly supported the Soviet thesis that the USSR's armed intervention had put an end to "counterrevolution" and "white terror." Further, Togliatti himself weighed in heavily to counter overly objective *l'Unità* reporting on the rioting in Poland and the still more dangerous suggestion by the popular Communist union chief Giuseppe Di Vittorio that the unrest was at least partially due to injustice and bad management.[20] Other parties did not register even minor doubts about the correctness of Soviet behavior. Only a hemorrhage of disillusioned members revealed that all was not as it had been.

In fact, the reactions of the foreign Communist parties to the crises of 1956 were the results of natural reflex, not Soviet control. Freed from fear of Stalin, who could easily depose or blackmail them by favoring their rivals, the little Stalins of the foreign parties had entrenched themselves in office and made themselves the objects of an adulation which no longer had to be shared with Stalin. They possessed more prestige in their own parties than the new leader of the Soviet Union; and if they upheld the interests of the USSR, they did so because they could not conceive of a world in which their interests were not best served by the protection of Soviet power and prestige, both of which had been so unexpectedly threatened by East European upheaval.

Soviet control, meanwhile, had suffered a terrible blow. The appearance of continued control was maintained briefly as a result of the intervention of Mao Zedong. Mao pressed for a world conference of Communist parties in 1957 to shore up Soviet authority—which, however, the Chinese leader intended to use to promote his own ideas. The ensuing misunderstanding led to a brief period of fictitious unanimity. But the Soviet-Chinese relationship was breaking down, and a renewed Soviet-Yugoslav quarrel was already brewing.

As early as 1958, the Soviets found it impossible to effect the quiet removal of an entrenched leader in a minor party. Axel Larsen, the prestigious Secretary-General of the Danish Communist Party (DKP), was deemed by Moscow to have been infected by pro-Titoist revisionism. The Soviets engineered his removal during an October 1958 DKP congress attended by Soviet ideological expert Pëtr Pospelov. But the rank and file followed Larsen into his new Socialist People's Party, which in national elections two years later carried off two thirds of the votes previously received by the DKP, plus a slice of the left-wing Socialist Party vote the Communists had always

[20] Donald L.M. Blackmer, *Unity in Diversity*, Cambridge, MA, MIT Press, 1968, pp. 68–74.

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coveted. The DKP recovered slightly in subsequent elections, but never fully. Its vote today still constitutes only one sixth of the "radical" electorate which votes for groups to the left of the Social Democrats. In the Danish elections of 1979, the DKP received a bare 1.9 percent of the vote.[21] Not only had the future growth and influence of a minor party been sacrificed for the sake of firm Soviet control, but the Soviets themselves had been forced to engage in blatant manipulation to achieve their goal.

Subsequently, tampering with party leaderships would become even more difficult. The next crisis in a European party led to a defeat for Moscow and the defection of the Dutch Communist Party (CPN). Paul de Groot, the little Stalin of the CPN, had quarreled with Khrushchev as early as 1956 over destalinization. After 1961, bitterness between the two leaders intensified, and de Groot began to fear that his increasing outspokenness in international meetings would prompt the Soviets to intrigue against him. To forestall such a move, de Groot struck first. All contacts with fraternal Communist parties were forbidden; all contact with Soviet diplomats in the Netherlands was ruled out; and all travel to the East was disallowed. Of course, if the other leaders of his party had been strongly loyal to Moscow, the barriers de Groot was erecting against Soviet intrigue would speedily have crumbled. As it was, one potential challenger was removed from the Executive Committee, but the bulk of the party remained loyal to de Groot.[22] Neither Soviet control mechanisms nor devotion to the USSR worked to keep this party in line.

The Relevance of Asian Defection

De Groot was doubtless encouraged in his decision to act by the problems the Soviets had begun to encounter in 1960 in their relations with Asian parties. Soviet-Chinese tension, at first hidden, increased steadily, and by 1964 the CPSU seemed to have lost the support of all the Asian and Pacific parties except for one wing of the Indian party, which had split into two groups of approximately equal size. Not all of the Asian parties remained in the Chinese orbit, but aside from the important exceptions of the Vietnamese party and its Indochinese satellite parties, the Communist party of Sri Lanka, the small Pakistani party, and the Communists of Bangladesh, none has resumed strong ties with Moscow either. Those Asian and Pacific parties that are not pro-Chinese are "independent."[23]



Italian Communist Party Secretary-General Enrico Berlinguer talks with Chinese Communist Party Chairman Hua Guofeng during an April 1980 visit to Beijing that mended an 18-year rupture in relations between the two parties.

—Eduardo Fornaciari/Gamma-Liaison.

How are these Asian events relevant to the European parties? First, they show that if Moscow had ever possessed real control over all parties, it had lost it by the early 1960's. With Stalin dead and desanctified, the Soviet system of control in Europe rested on loyalty to the Soviet Union but seldom to Khrushchev; on lingering fear that Stalinist methods and constraints would still work—i.e., that if a leader deviated from the Moscow line his peers and followers would abandon him and comply with Soviet wishes; and on inability in many parties to conceive of party interests different from those of the CPSU. But in Asia, China and Mao outweighed or at least neutralized Soviet prestige; Stalinist constraints did not work; and local party interests were more readily identifiable. As a result, the Soviets not only lost control of the Communist party of Asia's most industrialized country, Japan, but

[21] On Larsen, see Peter P. Rohde, "The Communist Party of Denmark," in A.F. Upton, Ed., *Communism in Scandinavia and Finland*, New York, NY, Anchor Press, 1973, pp. 26–28. For the 1979 vote, see *The Economist* (London), Oct. 27, 1979, p. 14. Also see Trond Gilberg, "Sweden, Norway, Denmark, and Iceland," in David E. Albright, Ed., *Communism and Political Systems in Western Europe*, Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1979, p. 305.

[22] A.A. de Jonge, *Het Communisme in Nederland* (Communism in the Netherlands), The Hague, Kruseman, 1972, pp. 142 ff.

[23] Wolfgang Leonhard, "A World in Disarray," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), March–April 1964, p. 21; Richard F. Staar, Ed., *Yearbook on International Communist Affairs 1979*, Stanford, CA, Hoover Institution Press, 1979.

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were unable to hold on to the two parties whose members were of European stock, those of Australia and New Zealand. Soviet attempts to stir up the rank and file against their leaders failed in Asia, and the USSR had to resort instead to the device of creating breakaway parties to maintain a pro-Soviet Communist presence.[24]

If Moscow did not possess arcane powers over the Asian—or the Dutch—parties, it is at least open to question whether it really had such powers of control elsewhere. The European parties, to be sure, were slow to formulate their own separate interests, but one can argue that their loyalty to the Moscow line now rested on perceived interest, not constraints. The PCI understood the shift in the objective situation first, and showed the other parties that one could bargain with the Soviets or even refuse them. As a consequence, a qualitative change took place—imperceptibly—in interparty relations between 1964 and 1968. When Khrushchev and then Leonid I. Brezhnev pressed for a world congress of Communist parties to condemn the Chinese, they had no success; and, while still acting within the confines of loyalty, the PCI carefully delimited Moscow's pretentions, not least effectively by publishing Togliatti's notes for a planned meeting with Khrushchev as a species of last testament. The message Togliatti had intended to deliver was clear: no centralized world organization, no world Communist conference, and no precedent-making permission to censure the Chinese, whether they had erred or not.[25] With the example of the Asian parties before them, the Western parties were beginning to differentiate their own interests from those of the CPSU.

The Czechoslovakian Crisis

By 1968, when developments in Czechoslovakia raised the possibility of the emergence of a democratic Communist state that might invite imitation in Western Europe, the readiness of the West European Communist parties to define their own interests had grown markedly. They heard threatening noises coming from Moscow with increasing concern, and in July the PCI and PCF, now acting together, obtained the support of 14 additional West European parties for a proposed conference to mediate Moscow-Prague tensions. Events soon overtook any such plans, but in reaction to the invasion of Czechoslovakia all but 6 of the 23 West European parties came out against the Soviets.[26] Most of these parties had been known for their loyalty to the Soviets and would be again. But in a crisis which they judged quite different from any up to that time, they thought it in their interest to protest the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia to the Soviet Union and the world.

After the invasion, the USSR immediately began the job of "normalizing" the situation in Czechoslovakia and reducing the opposition of the Western parties to what had been done. It was largely successful in both tasks because of its ability to use Alexander Dubcek and his Prague Spring associates as a bridge to the regime of Gustav Husak and because most of the Western parties did not want to be permanently at odds with the Soviet Union. In 1969, at a world Communist conference that the Soviets finally succeeded in convening, the vast majority of parties, including most of the Europeans, agreed that the occupation of Czechoslovakia had been "the internal affair" of the Czechoslovakian party and government. Six European parties that had condemned the invasion—the Austrians, Belgians, Danes, Finns, French, and Swiss—now fell into line and signed the conference final document. The British, Italian, Norwegian, Spanish, and Swedish parties continued to indicate reservations in various ways.[27]

The extent, or perhaps the limits, of Soviet control over the Western parties in the late 1960's is suggested by the differing experiences of three parties that had opposed the invasion, two of which ultimately fell into line and one in which Soviet tactics failed. The Austrian Communist Party (KPÖ) leadership that had criticized Soviet actions in 1968 was a mixed group of ex-dogmatists still rethinking the meaning of 1956, Stalinists who had been tempted into a brief flirtation with the latest trends in a country neighboring their own, and out-and-out opportunists. The ex-dogmatists turned revisionists were in a weak and vulnerable position because they had been unable to gain new adherents for their ideas or to win the party new strength at the polls. Therefore, when the strong Soviet influ-

[24] Paul F. Langer, "The New Posture of the CPJ," *Problems of Communism*, January–April 1971, pp. 14–24; and Eric Aarons, "Australia, An Autonomous CP," *Wiener Tagebuch* (Vienna), October 1970, pp. 18–20.

[25] The Yalta "Testament" was published in *The New York Times*, Sept. 5, 1964, and in many collections of documents. See Blackmer, op. cit., pp. 358–68, on the maneuverings over the world congress idea.

[26] See Kevin Devlin, "The New Crisis in European Communism," *Problems of Communism*, November–December 1968.

[27] See Kevin Devlin, "The Inter-Party Drama," *Problems of Communism*, July–August 1975; and William E. Griffith, "The Diplomacy of Eurocommunism," in Rudolph Tőkés, Ed., *Eurocommunism and Détente*, New York, NY, New York University Press, 1978, p. 408.

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Dolores Ibarruri, the legendary Chairman of the Communist Party of Spain, gets a warm send-off from Moscow on May 13, 1977, as she returns to her homeland after a long exile. At Ibarruri's left is B.N. Ponomarëv, Politburo Candidate Member and Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CC CPSU); at her right, M.A. Suslov, Member of the Politburo and Secretary of the CC CPSU, and V.V Zagladin, First Deputy Chief of the International Department of the CC CPSU.

—TASS from Sovfoto.

ence that dated from the Comintern period and that had been reinforced during the Soviet postwar occupation of eastern Austria was brought to bear, the KPÖ had but two choices: to become a weak, politically insignificant revisionist party out of favor in Moscow, or to go back to the relative comfort of the Soviet hearth and remain a weak, politically insignificant Stalinist party. Not surprisingly, when the moment came, the Stalinists snapped to attention, the opportunists fell into line, and the revisionists were first forced out of the leadership and then expelled from the party. The whole operation was complete by 1971.[28]

If the reimposition of control was relatively easy in a burnt-out party like the KPÖ, it seemed no more difficult with the much more imposing PCF. The agreement that the Soviets forced upon Dubcek at the end of August 1968 was termed "positive" by a PCF apparently frightened by the temerity it had shown in criticizing the Soviets, and in November 1968, a top-level PCF delegation went to Moscow and signed a communique that spoke of bilateral "sincerity and fraternal friendship." Finally, the PCF cracked down on members like Roger Garaudy, who disapproved of its stand.[29]

But if the French party ceased to make noise about Czechoslovakia, it avoided a complete realignment behind Moscow. Little use was made during the next six years of the once-asserted right to disagree, and many signs pointed to renewed subservience. As successor to the incurably ill Waldeck Rochet, the brash young apparatchik Georges Marchais had no immediate interest in quarreling with the Soviets over a lost cause like Czechoslovakia. He needed their support to reinforce his new position. Old Stalinists like Jacques Duclos, meanwhile, were quite willing to forget all about 1968. Still, a precedent for independent thinking had been set, and it was no longer axiomatic that PCF and Soviet interests were com-

[28] *Leopold Spira*, "*The Changes in the KPÖ*," *Wiener Tagebuch*, November 1971, pp. 6–9; and Franz Marek, editor's comments, untitled, in ibid., May 1970, p. 10.

[29] Fauvet, op. cit., pp. 559–62.

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Santiago Carrillo, Secretary-General of the Spanish Communist Party, pays his last respects to Josip Broz Tito at the May 8, 1980, funeral of the independent Yugoslav Communist leader. —Gamma-Liaison.

pletely congruent. By the mid-1970's, it was Moscow's new man Marchais and Moscow's longtime servant Jean Kanapa who were plotting a more independent course for the PCF.[30]

The situation was different in the Spanish Communist Party (PCE), which by the late 1960's was looking to the future and had decided to move closer to many positions of the PCI. Moscow may have thought that it would be easy to deal with a party in exile, many of whose militants lived in the USSR itself. But the aged party President Dolores Ibarruri could not be induced to oppose Secretary-General Santiago Carrillo, and when a group of senior PCE leaders loyal to Moscow declared their opposition to the party's stand on Czechoslovakia in open factional attack, they were expelled from the party. Moscow backed with funds and facilities the new splinter group they formed, but the group was disunited and failed to rally many supporters either among Spanish exiles or within Spain. After a period of tense relations and frequent bitter polemics between the CPSU and the PCE, Moscow finally signaled its abandonment of the loyalists during bilateral talks in October 1974.[31]

By backing an attempt to split the PCE, not only did the Soviets incur obloquy for trying to get rid of a legitimate party leadership; they suffered a loss of prestige as well by their inability to carry out their plan. Carrillo, now that his enemies in the PCE had exposed and discredited themselves, was free to show just how independent of the CPSU he could be. He knew he had little to fear from the Soviets. But while gleefully sticking banderillas in the Russian bull for the last six years, Carrillo has been careful to go no further than to tease the brute. He has not broken relations entirely, though PCE policy after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan may make bad relations even worse.[32]

In sum, Moscow's answer to the challenges of 1968 was first to bring the nonruling European parties into line on the Czechoslovakian question and drive out party leaders who had left themselves vulnerable. A longer-range effort to convoke a world Communist congress as a sequel to that of 1969 was intended to set a precedent by condemning the Chinese and to introduce new discipline in the movement. In 1976, this effort culminated in Pyrrhic victory at the East Berlin conference of European Communist parties. But the Soviets have not given up. In an article commemorating the 60th anniversary of the founding of the Comintern, Boris N. Ponomarëv declared that "international solidarity is closely linked with the molding of a specific international policy by the Communists, radically opposing imperialist policy."[33] Such calls for unity seem destined to go unanswered.

Control and Autonomy in the 1970's

If the suppression of the Hungarian revolution barely affected Soviet relations with West European Communist parties in the late 1950's and early 1960's, the invasion of Czechoslovakia left a heritage of deep bitterness in these relations, which carried over into the 1970's. The reason for the difference was simple. Western Communist leaders, who had seen nothing but counterrevolution in the Hungarian case, saw in the suppression of the Czechoslovakian ex-

[30] See the discussion of PCF interests by Annie Kriegel in "The French Communist Party and the Fifth Republic," in Donald L.M. Blackmer and Sidney Tarrow, Eds., *Communism in Italy and France*, Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1975.

[31] See Eusebio M. Mujal-Leon, "The Spanish Communist Party," in Tökés, op. cit., pp. 229–37 and 240–42.

[32] Kevin Devlin, "Azcárate Denounces Paris Conference," *Radio Free Europe Research* (Munich), Background Report No. 126, May 28, 1980.

[33] Boris N. Ponomarëv, "On the 60th Anniversary of the Founding of the Comintern," *Kommunist* (Moscow), No. 5, March 1979, translated in Joint Publications Research Service, *USSR Report* (Arlington, VA), No. 73578, May 31, 1979.

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periment the destruction of a model of potential usefulness to them and the assertion of a Soviet right to intervention harmful to their political, and perhaps personal, fortunes as well. In the 1960's, the West European parties had begun to become genuinely engaged in national politics, and in the 1970's several foresaw the possibility of playing major political roles in their countries—the PCI and the PCF as key members of coalition governments, the PCE as a junior partner in such a government, and the Portuguese Communist Party (PCP) as a participant in a coalition regime in a revolutionary, not an electoral context.

The Soviet task of reasserting control was more complex as a result, for while the earlier purpose of control had been merely to use the Western parties as pliant auxiliaries of Soviet foreign policy, Moscow now needed not only to prevent the domestic political concerns of the Western parties from interfering with Soviet goals, but also to preserve the capability of controlling any Communist party which might attain power in its own country in the future. The result of these not altogether compatible aims was the emergence, intended or not, of an essentially diplomatic-style relationship between Moscow and the individual West European parties. There were, to be sure, bursts of the old ideological hectoring—phrased in general terms when directed at the PCI and PCF, more specific when directed at the PCE. But at least in the short term, the main thrust was "diplomatic," in the sense that the emphasis was on compromise rather than conversion or excommunication.[34] Diplomatic compromise encouraged the autonomists of the West to back Soviet policy where their own national interests were not directly involved—in Africa, for instance, where they no doubt found it easy to applaud the transformation of an ancient feudal empire in Ethiopia into a revolutionary state. Such support provided a necessary balance to reticence regarding Soviet policy elsewhere.

In this new diplomacy, the Soviets have benefited from the availability of an elaborate apparatus created specifically to ensure control of foreign Communist parties. The International Department of the CPSU sends liaison officers protected by diplomatic passports to a large number of parties abroad.[35] In addition, a highly developed system of occasional interparty contacts provides for constant Soviet (and, frequently, East European) visits abroad and travel by senior delegations of nonruling European parties to the Soviet Union (and Eastern Europe). Finally, funding from the USSR and Eastern Europe, furnished most often by means of preferential trade agreements with Communist-party-run firms, continues to flow in large amounts not only to 100-percent-loyal parties but also to the autonomists.[36]

These special assets in the hands of the Soviet superpower bolster tradition and ideology as tools of control. Certainly, the Soviets retain great influence and do not hesitate to use it. Where it falls short of affording the control of a generation ago, the explanation can be found less in the nature of the Soviet effort than in the changed world in which the Soviets and the foreign parties now operate. For example, while the Communist parties of the Comintern and Cominform periods had few sources of income available to them other than subsidies from Moscow, today the parties can tap more varied sources of funding in vastly richer Western societies. In addition, the limited value of subsidies in producing real control is now recognized by those who have provided them in the past. All evidence—not just among Communists—suggests that as often as not subsidies produce a complex situation in which it becomes necessary for the supplier to keep up payments merely to avoid having an already unsatisfactory relationship become worse.

The Role of Autonomy Today

The principal factor responsible for the decline from Soviet control to Soviet diplomatic influence with the Western parties in the 1970's, then, was that opposition to the CPSU was no longer unthinkable. Nowadays, indeed, anyone who pleads the Soviet cause directly stands out from the majority of his national leadership. Those with pro-Soviet leanings may win many arguments, but they in all likelihood do so by couching their positions in terms of party interest, abjuring the unanswerable dogmas of proletarian internationalism. And while some pro-Soviet elements may conceivably be under Moscow's control in the fullest, traditional sense, they must nevertheless oper-

[34] On the Soviet approach to these matters, see Robert Legvold, "The Soviet Union and Western European Communism," in Tökés, op. cit., especially pp. 369–78.

[35] See Leonard Schapiro, "The International Department of the CPSU," *International Journal* (Toronto), Winter 1976–77, pp. 45–48.

[36] See Jean Montaldo, *Les Finances de PCF* (The Finances of the PCF), Paris, Albin Michel, 1977; and idem, *Les secrets de la banque soviétique en France* (The Secrets of the Soviet Bank in France), Paris, Albin Michel, 1979. On the PCI, see Michael Ledeen and Claire Sterling, "Italy's Russian Sugar Daddies," *The New Republic* (Washington, DC), Apr. 3, 1976; and Heinz Timmermann, "Problems of Party Financing of the Italian and French Communists," *Berichte des Bundesinstituts für Ostwissenschaftliche und Internationale Studien* (Köln), No. 15, 1971.

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

A meeting between a delegation of the Italian Communist Party (PCI) and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) in Moscow on October 7, 1978. Identifiable from left to right are: PCI Secretary-General Enrico Berlinguer; PCI Central Committee Member A. Tato (Berlinguer's aide); A. Rubbi, Member of the PCI Central Committee and Deputy Chief of its International Department; B.N. Ponomarëv, CPSU Secretary and Politburo Candidate Member; and M.A. Suslov, CPSU Secretary and Politburo Member.

—TASS from Sovfoto.

ate as individual members of their own parties, for exposing themselves to allegations of being part of a "Soviet faction" or even "Soviet agents" could blunt their effectiveness.

Despite the fact that in most Western parties pro-Soviet elements in recent years have found themselves on the defensive, however, the parties have most frequently used autonomy to say no to the Soviets on questions regarding the internal discipline of the Communist movement. Most parties show little interest in going beyond such matters to challenge the USSR on more substantive issues of international concern. This pattern becomes apparent if one looks at the nature of the various parties' responses to the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia; at the maneuvering preparatory to the East Berlin conference of European Communist parties in 1976; and, most recently, at the attendance record of the Paris conference of Communist parties on peace and disarmament held on April 28–29, 1980. This last meeting drew 14 West European parties as full participants. It was boycotted by seven parties. And two parties, the Belgian and the Swiss, neither of which had been a consistent protester at international Communist meetings in the past, limited themselves to sending observers.[37]

It would be unwise to conclude that parties which have recently aligned themselves with the Soviets are necessarily incapable of asserting their autonomy—or that those now flaunting their autonomy will remain forever out of the fold. We are warned from summary judgments about the faithful by the erratic behavior of the PCF in the past; the dual nature of the Finnish party, which is held together largely by the special conditions of Finnish political life; and the probability that it was the Portuguese Communists, not the Soviets, who took the initiative in pushing for revolution in Portugal in 1974–75.[38] One might even ask how pro-Soviet the staunchly pro-Soviet Cypriot party (AKEL) would remain if Moscow decided to endorse the Turkish presence in Cyprus.

The existence of autonomy clearly does not imply its

[37] See Kevin Devlin, "European Communism's Conference of Disunity," *Radio Free Europe Research*, Background Report No. 99, May 2, 1980. The Italian and Spanish parties were absent, as were the parties of Great Britain, the Netherlands, San Marino, Sweden, and Iceland. Attending were the parties of Austria, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, France, West Germany, Greece, Ireland, Luxembourg, Malta, Norway, Portugal, Turkey, and West Berlin.

[38] Legvold, loc. cit., pp. 334–35.

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constant, or even frequent, use. But why bother with subtle distinctions such as those between constantly autonomous parties, intermittently autonomous parties, and shyly autonomous parties, when center stage is occupied by large, fully autonomous parties that in practice agree with Moscow a good deal of the time? The purpose is analytic clarity. "Autonomous" in this context is not a value judgment, and the act of taking distance from Moscow is not *in and of itself* to be judged a good thing. Distinctions become important when one looks at the large and politically important Western parties, for here impatience with a very slow historical process—which for all we know may prove to be abortive—can lead to false hopes and easy disappointments. One must therefore neither deny the existence of autonomy because it has not seemed to lead anywhere, nor assume that the more vociferously assertive parties are advancing on the road to "independence" and social democracy.

The PCF's rapprochement with Moscow over the last 18 months illustrates this point. Are we to assume that the PCF, never as "Eurocommunist" as the PCI and PCE, was pulled back toward Moscow by the remaining leading strings of Soviet control? This author would argue not. The PCF had broken its close ties with Moscow so abruptly and disrespectfully as to suggest the burning of bridges: Marchais had refused to attend the 25th Congress of the CPSU, had refused to see the Soviet ambassador to France, S.V. Chervonenko, in early 1977, and had not met CPSU General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev when the Soviet leader visited Paris in June 1977. All of these demonstrative gestures were certainly intended to provide public proof of the PCF's autonomy and were in sharp contrast with the behavior of the Italian party, which has always been careful to keep its relations with Moscow on a courteous basis.[39] The Spaniards were "Italo-communist," but the French apparently were determined not to be.

Nevertheless, the forces that have pulled the PCF back toward Moscow in recent months are the same forces that have taken the PCI and PCE further from Moscow, i.e., calculations of what each party deems to be in its own interest. The French were not less autonomous because they were un-Italian. To say that they were less "Eurocommunist" is merely to introduce a nebulous term that itself has to be explained and clarified before it has meaning.

It is still not clear just what mix of motivations was at

[39] Annie Kriegel, *Eurocommunism: A New Kind of Communism?* Stanford, CA, Hoover Institution Press, 1978, pp. 47–49; and in general, her analysis of the limits of national communism, in ibid., pp. 49–53.

Negotiations between the French Communist Party (PCF) and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) on January 8, 1980, at the CPSU Central Committee headquarters. At the far right is PCF Secretary-General Georges Marchais; on the Soviet side, from left to right, Leonid I. Brezhnev, CPSU General Secretary, party secretaries M.A. Suslov and B.N. Ponomarëv; an unidentified woman; and V.V. Zagladin, First Deputy Chief of the CPSU Central Committee's International Department

—TASS from Sovfoto.

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work in 1975 when the PCF loosened its ties with the Soviets, but clearly the dominant factor was the desire to come to power in 1978 in partnership with the French Socialist Party (PS). The Soviets opposed this plan, and by September 1977, the PCF leadership had come around to the Soviet position.[40] Still, PCF-CPSU relations remained cool for a year after the first French Communist break with the Socialists, and progress was slow thereafter. The first sign of authentic rapprochement came only with Marchais's statement on November 7, 1978, that despite the existence of problems in the USSR, the overall record of the Soviet Union was "globalement positif." In January 1979, *Pravda* found a kind word for the PCF for the first time in several years. In May 1979, the PCF Congress reasserted its "globalement positif" stance, while still allowing some criticism of the Soviet Union. The return to nearly unconditional Franco-Soviet solidarity did not finally come until January 1980.[41]

It was already evident in early 1978 that the PCF had renounced the hope of coming to power with the existing PS, and that since the party had no policy alternative other than alliance with the Socialists, it would have to attempt to change both the PS itself and the terms of the PS-PCF alliance.[42] The PCF shouted at the time that the PS had turned to the right and betrayed the alliance; and since 1978, the Communists have tried to push the PS to the right by blocking any resumption of their old relationship. The PS has stubbornly refused to play the PCF game, however, and still proclaims its desire for cooperation. In January 1980, one PS leader summed up the situation as follows: "Today the Communist leaders still hope that it is we who will crack, who will abandon to them all the territory on the left. . . . the terrible test they have imposed on us must be taken to its end."[43] In this test of wills, the PCF has made its move toward Moscow with at least two principal aims: to encourage the Socialists to renounce the plan of a left coalition and seek allies to their right, and to raise the spirits and tighten the discipline of Communist militants by first drawing universal press criticism and then requiring that all party members rally in defense of the party because it is under general attack. It certainly seems that domestic political considerations rather than pressure from Moscow have been the determining factors in PCF policy.

But whatever the rationale impelling the PCF, and however autonomously the party has decided to retreat from vociferous autonomy, is it not possible that the new course will become a permanent one? Does the current situation not give the Soviets a fresh chance to cultivate and reward those elements in the PCF who did not desire a break in the first place and then to find younger apparatchiks to emulate them? No definitive answers are possible at this time. The PCF is now prepared to renounce real electoral gains until the late 1980's, and some observers think that the PCF is banking on an increase in Soviet strategic strength to make a decisive difference in French politics by that time.[44] It is true that if a significant number of PCF leaders come to decide that their own political interests coincide with Soviet interests, the party might again become truly subservient to the Soviets. But only a bold prophet would state that the erratic and opportunist PCF will hold reliably to any course over the coming years.

That party interests are calculated differently by different Western parties is evident in the fact that as such calculations have taken the PCF closer to Moscow in 1980, they have taken the PCI and PCE further away. In opposing the invasion of Afghanistan, the latter two parties have for the first time made an implicit distinction between the expansion of world socialism and the spread of Soviet power. PCI Secretary-General Enrico Berlinguer, speaking before the European Parliament in early 1980, called the invasion "a violation of the peoples' right to national independence and the free choice of their own development."[45]

It is far from certain, however, that the PCI and PCE will develop further the logic of the latest step they have taken. In pushing for the creation of a "Euro-left," the PCI is trying to rescue détente and mediate between the superpowers, while gently instructing the Soviet Union where *its* real interests lie. The PCI insists—and there is every reason to believe the party on this score—that its policy toward the USSR "is directed neither toward a break nor toward changes of hypothetical camps, but toward dialogue (*confronto*) and understanding with all the forces of peace, emancipation, and progress, with all the revolutionary and democratic forces of Europe and the world." The party

[40] Ronald Tiersky, "French Communism, Eurocommunism, and Soviet Power," in Tökés, op. cit.; and Frank L. Wilson, "The French CP's Dilemma," *Problems of Communism*, July–August 1978.

[41] See, inter alia, *L'Express* (Paris), Jan. 20, 1979; on the PCF congress, see *Preparatory Documents for the 23rd French Communist Party Congress*, No. 1405 of Joint Publications Research Service, *Translations on Western Europe*.

[42] Julius W. Friend, *The French Communist Party–Where Now?* Washington, DC, Georgetown University Center for Strategic and International Studies, April 1978, p. 16.

[43] Statement by Jean Poperen at a PS national convention held to adopt a "projet socialiste," cited in *Le Monde* (Paris), Jan. 15, 1980.

[44] Ibid.

[45] *L'Unità* (Rome), Jan. 17, 1980.

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Italian Communist Party leader Enrico Berlinguer attacks the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, in a speech at the European Parliament in Strasbourg, France, on January 16, 1980.

—Jean Muscat/Gamma-Liaison.

openly declares, "We want to extend and not reduce our relations in all directions."[46] Here, as elsewhere, PCI policy is to collect, not close allies, but the maximum number of non-enemies.

But this is not a real policy. It is rather the possible starting point for several policies. The PCI and the PCE have over the last two decades become increasingly disillusioned with the Soviet Union—a development which was accelerated by the Czechoslovakian crisis of 1968. Still, Soviet military power commands respect, and if a clever and resourceful group took over from Brezhnev and company in the USSR in the mid-1980's, it could restore Soviet prestige in the world Communist movement. Another 15 years of dull dogmatism, on the other hand, could further widen existing gulfs, especially if Moscow makes demands the more advanced autonomists cannot accept.

[46] Unsigned interview with PCI foreign affairs specialist Antonio Rubbi, *Rinascita* (Rome), Apr. 11, 1980, p. 3.

The PCI and PCE have thus given themselves a wide range of choices for the future. They have shown that they are not inalterably opposed to Western—even American—foreign policy. But neither are they very reliable supporters of that policy. The PCF under the volatile Georges Marchais can hardly be considered reliable in Moscow, and Westerners ought not to expect more reliability from the PCI and PCE. To do so would be to misunderstand the anomalous position of Communist parties in the Western political system, i.e., the fact that while autonomy means that Communist party interests may have ceased to be entirely congruent with Moscow's, an autonomous Communist party still has a philosophy that does not fit well with the Western political process.

As participants in Western parliamentarism, the Communist parties of Western Europe perforce share in its logic and trust that the parliamentary system will bring them a major share of power. So far it has not done so anywhere at the national level. For by claiming to be both pluralist and revolutionary (referring to an as yet unresolved dialectic process which is genuinely taking place), the parties also give their opponents reason to fear that the eventual synthesis the Communists adopt will more closely resemble the revolutionary antithesis than the Western pluralist thesis. And it is true that even the PCI and PCE—to say nothing of the PCF—do not wish to renounce their past, and find it politically and philosophically imprudent to foreclose the future. The revolution may be on the far horizon, but it remains at least a verbal goal. While protesting that Communist parties should be treated like all others, the Communists preserve the differences which provoke discrimination against them.

Bulking large among these differences is the special relationship each party has or has had with the Soviet Union. Although these relationships have become so varied in character that we may no longer grant ourselves the intellectual convenience of supposing that a Communist party must be firmly anchored under Moscow's thumb, neither can one deduce the opposite—that the Western parties are making linear progress toward adoption of the domestic and foreign policies of Western-style social democracy. The motions of Communist parties are not to be traced on a two-dimensional chart; they are three dimensional, and as past years have shown, they are not easily plotted.

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Books

Marxist Theories, Socialist Policies, and African Realities

By Ali A. Mazrui

HELEN DESFOSSES and JACQUES LEVESQUE, Eds. *Socialism in the Third World*. New York, NY, Praeger, 1975.

EDMUND W. CLARK. *Socialist Development and Public Investment in Tanzania 1964–1973*. Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1977.

MARINA and DAVID OTTAWAY. *Ethiopia: Empire in Revolution*. New York, NY, Africana Publishing Co., 1978.

JOHN A. MARCUM. *The Angolan Revolution: Exile Politics and Guerrilla Warfare, 1962–1976*. Cambridge, MA, MIT Press, 1978.

LADIPO ADAMOLEKUN. *Sekou Toure's Guinea*. New York, NY, Barnes and Noble, 1976.

OKWUDIBA NNOLI. *Self-Reliance and Foreign Policy in Tanzania: The Dynamics of the Diplomacy of a New State, 1961 to 1971*. New York, NY, NOK Publishers, 1978.

ISSA G. SHIVJI. *Class Struggle in Tanzania*. New York, NY, and London, Monthly Review Press, 1976.

MAHMOOD MAMDANI. *Politics and Class Formation in Uganda*. New York, NY, and London, Monthly Review Press, 1976.

DOES AFRICAN MARXISM face in the 1980's the same sort of laissez-faire fate that befell the diverse strands of socialism in Black Africa during the 1960's? Are African economies so weak that they automatically tend to drift? Are conditions in Africa still uncongenial for the establishment of vigorous socialist economies? Is the proximity of the Republic of South Africa to Mozambique forcing the ruling Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (Frelimo) to move to the right? Is the social fabric in Ethiopia so disrupted by the overthrow of the imperial system of Haile Selassie I that Marxism does not stand a chance of being truly consolidated there? Is the continuing challenge of the United Front for the Total Liberation of Angola (UNITA) posing a major question mark with regard to the future of Marxist structures in Angola? Is the new liberation of the government of Guinea (Conakry) the beginning of a move to the right in that country as well?.

The situation is indeed evocative of the decade of the 1960's, when laissez-faire socialism was a distinguishing feature of Black Africa. In that decade, one African leader after another proclaimed himself a socialist—but then let economic forces and class formation take their own courses. Black African leaders who claimed the label of socialist ranged in the ideological spectrum from Ahmed Sékou Touré in Guinea to Leopold Senghor of Senegal, from Kwame Nkrumah in Ghana to Tom Mboya in Kenya. Some of the works by Nkrumah and the speeches of Sékou Touré were in the *Marxist* tradition, while Senghor, Mboya, and Julius Nyerere of Tanzania tended to romanticize about *African* socialism.

By contrast with the 1960's, the 1970's witnessed both a rising adherence to Marxism among African intellectuals and the establishment of significant Marxist and neo-Marxist regimes in Southern Africa and the Horn. The overthrow of Emperor Haile Selassie I in Ethiopia in 1974, the triumph of the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) in 1975–76, and the ending of colonialism in Mozambique in 1975 were all major steps in the apparent penetration of Marxism into important parts of Black Africa.

If, despite these advances, one can realistically speak of the possibility of African Marxism's going "laissez-faire"—of a repetition of the failure of Africa's socialists in

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the 1960's to realize in performance what they paid lip service to in theory—it raises serious analytic questions. Is this pattern due to some lack of seriousness in African leadership? Are we—paraphrasing Hamlet—to say: "Frailty, thy name is Africa!"? Should we say of Africa what Virgil said of woman: *"Varium et mutabile semper"* (Always fickle and changing)?

Such judgments are unjust, whether applied to woman or to Africa. The truth of the matter is that there are factors in the African situation which make socialism appear attractive as a solution to African problems, while at the same time there are other factors which militate against the realization of socialism in practice. Africa's interest in socialism has outstripped Africa's capacity for realizing it.

Throughout the world of underdevelopment the groping for socialism is fitful, as demonstrated in the collection of essays edited by Helen Desfosses and Jacques Levesque, to which we shall return below. But there are distinctive elements to Africa's experience.

What, in fact, are the elements in the African condition that appear to favor the pursuit of socialist goals, and what elements militate against realization of those goals? In the ensuing pages, we shall examine this set of issues and a second pair of questions: To what extent does the African condition vindicate Marxist interpretations of reality, and to what extent do African realities contradict Marxist theory? While the latter questions seem more esoteric—of interest primarily to students of Marxism as a system of thought—the answers do bear on the success or failure of Marxism in Africa. Our exploration of these complex and interrelated issues will draw in part on insights in the volumes discussed here, which focus on various aspects of African politics and of the role of socialism on the continent and elsewhere in the Third World.

THE LURE of socialism for Africans has many explanations. In one sense, we might say that Africa's infatuation with socialism is partly a case of "courtship on the rebound"—a reflection of a deep-seated ambivalence toward Western culture. Sometimes Africans are attracted to socialism as a way of rebelling against the West. At other times, African experimentation with radical socialism can be a method of awakening Western concern and greater attentiveness to Africa—a strategy itself rooted in an ambivalent dependency.

More important, however, are underlying alignments of historical and social forces. Africans know for a fact that Western imperialism and Western capitalism came simultaneously to the African continent. Originally, Africans tended to be relatively neutral toward capitalism while opposing Western imperialism—the external domination of their own societies by Western powers. And yet, as many African leaders and thinkers came to view the alliance between capitalism and imperialism as a basic historical phenomenon rather than a result of the specific context, there developed a predisposition to distrust capitalism almost as much as

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they did imperialism. The forces of anti-imperialism began to merge with the forces of anticapitalism.

If on one side of the coin there was the design of fused opposition to both imperialism and capitalism, on the other there was the shape of an alliance between nationalism and socialism. From an African perspective, the strongest enemy of imperialism is the nationalism of the colonized peoples. The strongest enemies of capitalism are the forces of socialism and class solidarity. If capitalism and imperialism in their historical role in Africa had been aligned so closely, did it not now make sense that their enemies (nationalism and socialism) should similarly fuse with each other?

Yet another set of conditions favorably disposing Africans to socialism is the frustrations which have accompanied independence. While standards of living have improved in many African societies, the gains have not sufficed to narrow the gap between reality and expectations. A number of African countries which used to export food before independence are now net importers of food and experience severe shortages of basic products. Corruption is rampant in the majority of African countries, and political institutions remain fragile and vulnerable to perversion, subversion, or total collapse. In an effort to save their societies from the overwhelming insecurities and failures of independence, many Africans scan the horizon for possible models of development and change. Inevitably, among the major contenders as a model of social transformation is the socialist paradigm. Can it be translated into practice? Could things under "genuine" socialism really be worse than under the laissez-faire ideologies that have prevailed since independence?

At the very least, socialism has attracted Africans because of its presumed effectiveness in centralizing and mobilizing societies. Many African societies are deeply fragmented, and the political fabric is often fragile. Consequently, one school of thought in Africa has emphasized the need for an ideology capable of involving the masses and giving them a sense of political engagement and participation. From this perspective, the ideology also needs to be centralizing as well. Socialism has appeared to be a strong candidate for this kind of role, especially when it has been interpreted as an ideology of state intervention in the economy and of mass mobilization in politics.

Edmund Clark's *Socialist Development and Public Investment in Tanzania* is a technically useful study of how the frustrations of independence in Tanzania, particularly before 1967, contributed to a search for socialist solutions. Other African countries, too, have flirted with socialist or neosocialist policies partly because of a similar sense of desperation.

Elements of cultural continuity have also worked to alienate Africans from capitalism and predispose them favorably to socialism. In many parts of Africa, individualism—so highly valued in liberal capitalism—is culturally alien to indigenous communities. This distrust of individualism translates into a negative attitude toward capitalism, with the latter acquiring the image of an ideology predicated on the selfishness of man in the rugged pursuit of profit.

At the same time, there tends to be a normative link between collectivist socialism and the "tribal" collectivism which formed the core of many African cultures. Thus, Kenya's Tom Mboya could argue in the euphoric days of the first decade of independence:

In Africa the belief that "we are all sons and daughters of the soil" has always exercised a tremendous influence on our social, economic and political relationships. From this belief springs the logic and the practise of equality, and the acceptance of communal ownership of the vital means of life—the land. . . . The acquisitive instinct, which is largely responsible for the vicious excesses and exploitation under the capitalist system, was tempered by a sense of togetherness and a rejection of graft and meanness. There was loyalty to the society, and the society gave its members much in return: a sense of security and universal hospitality.[1]

Given this premise, it made sense for Julius Nyerere across the border from Mboya to reaffirm:

We, in Africa, have no more need of being "converted" to socialism than we have of being "taught" democracy. Both are rooted in our past—in the traditional society which produced us.[2]

What African leaders like Mboya and Nyerere were asserting was that traditional societies in their countries were based on a kind of socialist way of life within each "tribe." The question which arose on attainment of independence, however, was whether 20 welfare "tribes" added together in Kenya or Tanzania could ever produce one welfare state. This seemed to be the ultimate test for the idea of a cultural continuity from African collectivism to modern socialism.

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[1] Mboya, *Freedom and After*, London, André Deutsch, 1963, p. 163.

[2] Julius K. Nyerere, "Ujamaa" speech at the Conference on Socialism of the Tanganyika African National Union, Dar es Salaam, April 1962. See *Africa Report* (New York, NY), May 1963.

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Marxist socialism has appeal in Africa, as a result of certain cultural contradictions, too. The most important source of Marxist ideas in Africa, for example, is Western culture itself. Indeed, it is a sociolinguistic impossibility for an African to be a sophisticated Marxist without at the same time being substantiallly Westernized, for access to Marxism is overwhelmingly through works written in European languages. To become a sophisticated Marxist requires substantial exposure both to the primary literature by the founding fathers of Marxism (Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels) and subsequent innovators such as V.I. Lenin, Leon Trotsky, and Mao Zedong, and secondly to the secondary literature on Marxism, consisting of commentaries across the generations. Very little of either is as yet available in such African languages as Yoruba, Amharic, Hausa, or Kiswahili—let alone in less widespread African languages such as Kidigo and Lunyoro-Lutoro. For Africans to enter the universe of Marxism, substantial command of a European language is therefore indispensable.

And how do Africans normally acquire their first European language? Not simply by learning a new medium of communication, as would happen if an American were learning Japanese or Kiswahili. The acquisition of the first European language by an African is in fact a whole process of socialization and acculturation. Africans in Anglophone countries go to schools which are modeled on British or American systems of education. Africans in French-speaking countries pass through the acculturation process based on the culture of France or Francophone Belgium. Such institutions Anglicize (or Gallicize as the case may be) Africans before they begin to have direct access to the works of Marx and his successors.

It is, of course, possible for some Africans to learn their Marxism after going to a university in Beijing, Moscow, or some East European capital. But none of these universities recruit their African students directly from the villages of Africa without the mediating role of West European languages. Rather, the African students selected are drawn from a pool of young Africans already partly or substantially Westernized.

In effect, Africans can arrive at a sophisticated understanding of Marxism only after or in tandem with Westernization, a process in contradiction to their traditional social and linguistic backgrounds. Such a contradiction is heightened by the fact that Marxism itself is a child of the West in rebellion against the West.

But this is not the only cultural contradiction that has tended to favor socialism in parts of Africa. There is also the strange phenomenon of African feudalism's serving as a breeding ground for African radicalism.

The most striking illustration of this phenomenon was in Ethiopia. Until the 1970's, Ethiopia was an elaborate African feudal system, in some ways reminiscent of the Russia of the Tsars. Classical Marxist theory would not have predicted the occurrence of a Marxist revolution in such conditions. Yet it was precisely in Ethiopia, and through the mediation of soldiers rather than workers, that a radical revolution got under way in 1974. Extreme backwardness had resulted in rapid radicalization. Marina and David Ottaway's book *Ethiopia: Empire in Revolution* echoes this paradox of feudalism radicalized. Ancient institutions have collapsed in Ethiopia under the weight of centuries of dust and decay. The collapse has meant both chaos and purposeful reform.

A form of radicalization through soldiers also occurred in Libya. The regime of King Idris I was swept aside in 1969, to be replaced by a regime which has kept on struggling to fuse Islamic fundamentalism with socialist fervor.

Farther south, the Sultanate of Zanzibar, earlier in the 1960's, had illustrated how a neofeudal system could rapidly give way to angry radicalism. Moreover, William Tordoff and the reviewer have presented the argument elsewhere that the revolution in Zanzibar in 1964 was itself a contributory factor in the radicalization of the mainland of Tanzania and the emergence of Julius Nyerere as a relatively radical innovator.[3]

Theorists of *African* socialism had assumed that what made Africa an ideal laboratory for socialism were the egalitarian and collectivist values of those African societies which were decentralized, often stateless, and frequently in an important sense classless. Thus, African thinkers in the 1960's sometimes sounded like romantic Russian socialists of the second half of the 19th century. In 1874, for instance, P.N. Tkachëv wrote and published an "Open Letter to Mr. Friedrich Engels in Zurich," disputing a statement which Engels had once made about the chances of a social revolution in Russia. Tkachëv said:

Our people are permeated in the large majority . . . with the principle of communal property; they are, if I may say so, instinctively, traditionally communist . . . . From this it follows that our people, despite

[3] See Tordoff and Mazrui, "The Left and the Super-Left in Tanzania," *The Journal of Modern African Studies* (Cambridge, England, and New York, NY), No. 3, 1972, pp. 427–55.

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their ignorance, are much nearer to a socialist society than the peoples of Western Europe with their higher [level of] education.[4]

Engels dismissed this as a "childish conception" and emphasized that

communal ownership of land is a form of property which was predominant in pre-historic times among the Germans, Celts, Indians—in short in all Indo-Germanic peoples—still exists in India, has only recently been forcibly suppressed in Ireland and Scotland, and occurs even here and there in Germany but is now dying out. In fact, it is an institution common to all peoples at a certain state of development.

* * * * *

In some primitive and pre-literate societies class distinctions are frequently absent, and every people has gone through such a stage of development. To reestablish this phase cannot be our aim. . . .[5]

African Marxists more recently have had similar reservations about romantic schools of *African* socialism which aspire to build modern socialism on the collectivist values of traditional Africa. This traditionalist approach is seen in Julius Nyerere's own principle of *ujamaa*—a Swahili word meaning "familyhood"—which is itself in the tradition of Tkachëv. Both Issa Shivji and Okwudiba Nnoli, whose works are reviewed here, are skeptical about theories of *African* socialism. The late Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana—especially after he was overthrown in 1966—also regarded such theories as dangerous to the African struggle because of their "naïveté" about the role of class struggle and imperialism. There is a growing consensus among radical African intellectuals that socialism is "universal" and not culturally relative. Nyerere, like Tkachëv, used to argue that Africans did not need to be "converted" to socialism or "taught" democracy. Yet the examples of Zanzibar in Nyerere's own country, and the later examples of Libya and Ethiopia, revealed that it is not necessarily those African societies of an egalitarian nature which become socialist. Elaborate feudalism can provide the breeding ground of rapid radicalization.

The behavior of the Soviet Union and to a much lesser extent other non-African socialist countries has also helped to foster a positive predisposition toward socialism in Africa. In particular, the USSR, despite its role as an imperialist force in Europe, has been a liberating force in Africa (its record in Asia has been mixed).

In Europe, the Soviet Union has constituted an imperialist force by permitting itself to become heir to both the Tsarist empire and the Nazi empire. What the Tsars had annexed, the Communist regime after 1917 retained—and sometimes augmented. And after World War II, Moscow maintained hegemony over what the Nazis had occupied in the 1930's and 1940's and Soviet troops had ostensibly liberated.

The impact of the Soviet Union on Africa's fortunes, in contrast, has been liberating. This is because the Soviet Union has provided a challenge to preexisting Western hegemony. Even the West's inclination to give independence to African countries has at times been a response to the Soviet challenge. Moreover, in Southern Africa, the West moved rapidly to liberalize the racial situation there only when the Soviet threat became particularly acute after the collapse of the Portuguese empire and the arrival of Soviet-backed Cuban troops in support of the Marxists of Angola. Lastly, there has been a substantial flow of Soviet arms to liberation movements in Southern Africa. It seems improbable that Western sources could have brought themselves to provide the level of military hardware that found its way into the liberation armies of Robert Mugabe and Joshua Nkomo in the struggle for Zimbabwe. In sum, it appears quite likely that if the Soviet Unon had not existed, the liberation of Southern Africa would have been delayed by at least a generation.

John Marcum's masterly work on the Angolan revolution captures the remarkable interaction between ideology, ethnicity, and foreign policy formation in situations of struggle. The final outcome in Angola was Angola's independence—under the rule of the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola, with its Soviet backing.

To be sure, the motives of the Soviet Union are quite often cynical. As a superpower, the Soviet Union engages in rivalry with the United States for hegemony. On this issue, the Peoples' Republic of China is quite right. The superpowers always think in terms of "a power vacuum"—and tend to regard themselves as the proper "vacuum fillers." But regardless of

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[4] Engels quotes Tkachëv in "Russia and the Social Revolution," an article first published on Apr. 21, 1875, in the Leipzig *Volksstaat*, organ of the German Social Democratic Workers' Party. For a translation of this article, see Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, *The Russian Menace to Europe*, a collection of articles, speeches, letters, and news dispatches, selected and edited by Paul W. Blackstock and Bert F. Hoselitz, Glencoe, IL, The Free Press, 1952, pp. 203–18.

[5] Engels, "Russia and the Social Revolution," loc. cit., p. 205, and "Russia and the Social Revolution Reconsidered," an essay written in 1894. The latter is translated in Marx and Engels, op. cit., pp. 229–41.

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the motives behind the Soviet role in Africa, the USSR's actual effect on the continent has indeed been emancipatory. And this diplomatic and political alignment between African liberation and Soviet foreign policy has itself been an additional factor predisposing Africans to look favorably upon socialism, even though the most powerful socialist country (the Soviet Union) and the most populous socialist country (China) have been heavily at odds with each other. Both states, after all, have adopted a basic posture against colonialism and racism.

DESPITE these formidable factors which, especially in the first decade of independence, seemed to incline so much of the African continent toward socialism, the ideology has in fact had difficulties in taking political root in Africa. Many African voices that used to sing socialist songs have now gone silent. Many African leaders who attempted a socialist path of development have been relegated to the limbo of history. Is the African soil inhospitable to the seeds of socialism?

There are, indeed, a number of factors which tend to militate against the successful introduction of socialism into Africa. Admittedly, some of those factors militate against other forms of social, economic, and political organization as well, since Africa's problems are sometimes due more to general conditions of instability than merely to lack of congeniality to particular ideologies. Nevertheless, certain ideologies do stand a better chance than others. And socialism is one of the most difficult to transplant to Africa. The question therefore arises: Why?

One reason concerns historical continuities between the imperial past and the postcolonial period. Links between some African countries and the former colonial powers, and links between African economies and international capitalism, have at times turned out to be too strong to be severed abruptly. Those African states that have attempted such precipitate breaks have not infrequently experienced the agonies of serious economic hemorrhage.

For a while such hemorrhage hit Sékou Touré's Guinea—for reasons which are to some extent argued out in Ladipo Adamolekun's book. The severance of all links between France and Guinea after the colony's vote for independence in 1958 was partly a case of voluntary political disengagement by Guinea and partly a case of economic ostracism imposed by the bigger power. A period of partial isolation ensued for Guinea. But then capitalism (even the French version), with an interest in Guinea's mineral resources, began to lure the country back to its embrace. The temptations are great for a small country rich in resources but poor in living standards.

The ties may sometimes be with a country other than the former colonial power as such. This is particularly true of Mozambique, with its historical connections with the Republic of South Africa. Mozambicans still hire out by the thousands to firms in South Africa in return for gold and related contributions to Maputo's foreign-exchange reserves. Still other economic links between the two countries, severed upon Mozambique's attainment of independence, may in fact be restored in the years ahead. The possibility of encouraging South African investment in Mozambique and certainly the probability of increasing trade with South Africa are all part of the picture of historical continuities in Mozambique's predicament.

The experience of Mozambique's neighbor, Tanzania, is the subject of a stimulating study by Okwudiba Nnoli. Though sometimes naïve in the faith it places in self-reliance, *Self-Reliance and Foreign Policy in Tanzania* illustrates the tensions between political ambitions and economic limitations in a country struggling to transcend dependency.

Then there is the problem that African countries encounter when they assume that to go socialist domestically is a way of disengaging from the international capitalist system. Many soon discover that they are as heavily dependent on international capitalism as ever—despite having adopted socialist or neosocialist policies in their own countries.

In this regard, global capitalism is proving much more obstinate and resilient than its critics have assumed. Even the largest of the Communist countries—the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China—are sensing a growing dependence on the world market, which is in turn dominated by capitalism and its methods. International trade is substantially conducted by the rules of capitalist interaction. The major currencies of world exchange are currencies of capitalist powers. Capitalist economies account for a disproportionate share of production technology. The nerves of the world economy are at the same time the nerves of world capitalism.

Consequently, small countries in Africa that decide to go socialist domestically may find that they are still prisoners of the international monetary system, of the international markets for copper and cocoa, of the international rules of credit, and of the international fluctuations of supply and demand. Indeed, going socialist has not turned out to be an exit visa from world capitalism for countries like

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Nkrumah's Ghana or Nyerere's Tanzania. Moreover, because African economies are particularly fragile, this global dominance of capitalism makes even domestic socialism shaky. That is one major reason why there has not been a single really successful socialist experiment in Africa—not even the equivalent of the success story, as *capitalist* models, of either Kenya or the Ivory Coast.

A related difficulty—of both theoretical and practical significance—confronting socialism in Africa is the nature of domestic capitalism. One can distinguish in the African context between *dependent* capitalism and *indigenous* capitalism, although the distinction is more a matter of degree than a sharp dichotomy. With dependent capitalism, there is a disproportionate role for foreign capital, personnel, and expertise. Thus, the French economic role in the Ivory Coast is much greater than seems necessary to most impartial observers. Certainly, capitalism in the Ivory Coast is more dependent than, say, capitalism in Nigeria. Kenya lies somewhere in between. Radical African analysts of the Kenyan economy in the past tended to draw no distinction between it and the model of the Ivory Coast. But there has been a growing realization that the local entrepreneurial class in Kenya is more assertive, aggressive, and autonomous than its equivalent in the Ivory Coast.[6]

On the theoretical plane, there is a classic debate among Africanist Marxists over whether indigenous capitalism of the Kenyan or Nigerian sort or dependent capitalism of the Ivorian variety is the more effective prelude to socialism. In more concrete terms, Western history would seem to teach us that when capitalism reaches a certain level of maturity it becomes difficult to dislodge. Marxists have been expecting a socialist revolution in places like Great Britain since the 19th century—but Marxists are still waiting. On the other hand, situations where capitalism has only just begun and is still very dependent have turned out historically to be precisely the appropriate breeding grounds for effective radicalism. The history of countries as diverse as the Soviet Union, North Korea, Cuba, and South Yemen would seem to imply that *dependent* capitalism is a surer way toward socialism than indigenized (and more deeply entrenched) capitalism.

The collection edited by Desfosses and Levesque indirectly raises a related theoretical puzzle. Marx and Engels expected socialism to be a child of *overdevelopment*. As capitalism got more and more efficient technologically, it seemed to be raising the level of social costs. Marx expected an increasing impoverishment of the workers to occur in proportion to the increasing efficacy of the industrial machines. Capitalism was doomed to dig its own grave as it permitted itself to drift toward superefficiency and overdevelopment.

But essays like those in the Desfosses/Levesque collection, and much of the literature on dependency, often discuss prospects for socialism in conditions of *underdevelopment*. Marx may have thought that the lure of overdevelopment was the death wish of capitalism, but many 20th-century social analysts see the curse of underdevelopment as the potential life-giving sperm for socialism.

History notwithstanding, doctrinal conceptions die slowly. Marxist theory in its classical formulation assumed that a bourgeois stage of development was a necessary and inevitable precondition for a socialist revolution. As Engels put it in 1873:

A bourgeoisie is . . . as necessary a precondition of the socialist revolution as the proletariat itself. A person who says that this revolution can be carried out easier in a country which has no proletariat or bourgeoisie proves by his statement that he has still to learn the ABC of socialism.[7]

By this argument, Kenya must surely be closer to socialism than Tanzania is, since Kenya has more of a bourgeoisie and more of a proletariat than Tanzania has evolved so far. By the same reasoning, the Republic of South Africa is closer to a genuine socialist revolution than Mozambique is, since South Africa is at a higher stage of capitalist development and has evolved a much larger African proletariat class, proportionately as well as absolutely, than Mozambique can claim to have developed.

Although framed somewhat differently, debates of this kind have been known to create sharp divisions among leftists at ideologically active campuses like the University of Dar es Salaam. For example, competing groups have argued over whether autonomous processes of class formation are taking

[6] Some five years ago, a major British political economist, Colin Leys, wrote an influential book about "neocolonialism" in Kenya. The main thrust of the book was that Kenyan capitalism was of the "compradore," i.e., dependent, variety. See Leys, *Underdevelopment in Kenya: The Political Economy of Neo-Colonialism*, London, Heinemann Educational Books, 1975.

However, during a research trip to Nairobi in 1976, Leys confided to the author that he was coming to the conclusion that capitalism in Kenya was less dependent and more autonomous than he had at first assumed.

[7] Engels, "Russia and the Social Revolution," loc. cit., p. 205.

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place in Africa, or whether developments there merely reflect the wider forces of imperialism.

The Dar es Salaam campus itself is on the whole to the left of and critical of Julius Nyerere and his government. It is of note that until recently, the ideological fervor on the campus was to a disproportionate degree led by non-Tanzanians. The most eloquent voices of the extreme Left were quite often white expatriate radicals or Africans from other countries. There were occasions when these ideological leaders were themselves disaffected Westerners—such as John Saul from Canada or Lionel Cliffe from the United Kingdom. Nnoli of Nigeria was a presence on campus in the period before he returned to his country. Walter Rodney, from Guyana, was also a very visible and eloquent leader of the Left when he was at the Univesity of Dar es Salaam. Rodney was tragically killed in Georgetown, Guyana, by a bomb explosion in his own car in June 1980. He is now widely regarded as a martyr to the cause of social justice. Students in Tanzania, in Kenya, and elsewhere demonstrated solidarity with Rodney's cause when news of his death reached them. He may become even more of a legend at the University of Dar es Salaam than he already was. In the 1970's, some exiles from Idi Amin's Uganda also loomed large on the Dar es Salaam ideological scene. Especially prominent were Dan Nabudere, who became a government minister in Uganda after Amin's fall, and Yash Tandon, who became a member of the interim parliament (called the National Consultative Council) formed in Kampala when Amin fell.

One theory links this prominence of non-Tanzanians with the sociological theory of marginality. In this view, the same considerations which made Jews visible in certain areas of Western life have made non-Tanzanians ideologically conspicuous on the campus of the University of Dar es Salaam. The marginality is not merely in terms of citizenship but also in terms of race. The most extensively discussed theoretical works in the late 1960's and much of the 1970's on campus in Dar es Salaam were not the works of Julius K. Nyerere but the essays of Issa Shivji. Like Nyerere, Shiviji was a Tanzanian, but of Indian extraction. His book, presenting the thesis that there was a silent class struggle going on in Tanzania, that it had a dynamism of its own, and that it included a dialectical struggle between the bureaucratic bourgeoisie and the commercial bourgeoisie, provoked considerable debate and controversy, much of it genuinely sophisticated and intellectually exciting. Another eloquent figure at the University of Dar es Salaam was Mahmood Mamdani, also an East African of Indian extraction but a British citizen by force of circumstances. Mamdani—who received a distinction in his Harvard Ph.D. defense—was a superb orator. He was also an eloquent theoretician, as is demonstrated here in his study of class formation in Uganda.

By the middle of the 1970's, the battle lines were basically drawn between anti-imperialists like Nabudere and Tandon, on one side, and anticapitalists like Shivji and Mamdani, on the other. The anti-imperialists defined the enemy as being basically external — the forces of world capitalism penetrating into Africa; the anticapitalists allowed the African continent the dignity of producing its own indigenous capitalist devils not necessarily subject to the machinations of external imperialist forces.

IF THERE HAS BEEN a good deal of sophisticated debate in Africa as to who are the main carriers of *capitalism* into Africa, there has been relatively limited discussion about the main carriers of *revolution*. Who, in fact, are the great instruments of change in Africa at this radical level?

One line of analysis has favorably contrasted the revolutionary credentials of the peasants to those of the urban workers. This is a debate that has been quite important in the history of Marxism. It led to heated theoretical controversies in Russia before and after the October Revolution and in China before and after the revolution of 1949. Inevitably, the debate had to rear its head on the African radical scene as well. Shivji in Tanzania tends to discount the revolutionary potential of the urban workers of Africa, who—compared with the rural masses—seem to form a privileged labor aristocracy. Frantz Fanon—more prominent than Shivji among radical theorists—had entered the debating arena even earlier, putting not only the peasantry but also the lumpen proletariat before the proletariat as instruments of revolution. Newly arrived and bewildered lumpen elements in the ghettos of African cities could, according to Fanon, be solid recruiting material for revolutionary armies.[8]

Least explored in the African radical debate is the role of the Westernized intelligentsia. Yet, as noted earlier, a Marxist revolutionary in African social conditions is inevitably a *Westernized* revolutionary.

Every revolution has ultimately two sides—the destruction of the old order and the inauguration of

[8] Frantz Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth*, New York, NY, Grove Press, 1963.

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the new. The workers and the peasants, when they have suffered enough and will no longer tolerate the status quo, can rise and pull down the old order in one massive outburst of revolutionary fury. But can the workers and the peasants then proceed to design a new, alternative order? Can the peasants of Ethiopia or Angola shape on their own a sufficiently revolutionary alternative design?

It might turn out to be that the most revolutionary of all social classes is neither the proletariat nor the peasantry, but the bourgeoisie itself. A segment of the bourgeoisie is often at odds with the system as a whole. Lenin was sensitive to this issue. He wrote:

The theory of socialism. . . grew out of the philosophic, historical, and economic theories elaborated by educated representatives of the property classes, by intellectuals. By their social status, the founders of modern scientific socialism, Marx and Engels, themselves belonged to the bourgeois intelligentsia.[9]

The Shivjis and Nyereres, the Nkrumahs, Tourés, and Fanons, belong to the African equivalent of the bourgeois intelligentsia. Thus, the architects and designers of revolutions in Africa are not drawn from the toiling masses in the countryside but from the more privileged sectors of African societies.

But the revolutionary intelligentsia in Black Africa is disproportionately Westernized. A combination of two forces has produced the sophisticated African Marxists or revolutionaries—domestic class formation and cultural imperialism. The former has given birth to a black bourgeoisie and petite bourgeoisie. Cultural imperialism has assimilated a large segment of this bourgeoisie into Western culture. They are the people that read *Das Kapital,* debate silent class struggle in Tanzania, advise bewildered soldiers like Mengistu Haile-Mariam, and tutor the rulers of Angola and Mozambique ideologically.

Who then are the ultimate carriers of revolution in the modern world? Karl Marx expected them to be the most exploited class in the most advanced societies—the Western proletariat. But in fact Africa's experience demonstrates that it is the most privileged class in the least advanced societies that is closer to that historic revolutionary role. It is the Westernized bourgeois intellegentsia of the Third World rather than the workers of Birmingham, Detroit, and Marseilles that has been carrying the torch of radicalism in the last third of the 20th century. Once again Africa's experience poses major dilemmas to radical theoreticians—both in Africa itself and in the wider world where revolution and reflection touch, recoil, and reconcile.

THUS, WE HAVE SEEN that while Africa has a favorable climate for socialism, the soil is infertile. The favorable climate is intellectual and normative. Many Africans who are politically conscious find socialist doctrines intellectually satisfying. On the other hand, the infertile soil is political and economic. The actual material conditions in Africa do not seem to be hospitable to successful socialist experiments. While the continent has indeed witnessed such relatively impressive capitalist experiments as those in the Ivory Coast and Kenya, it has not as yet been able to produce a strikingly successful socialist model.

The favorable climate for socialism in Africa is part of contemporary African political culture; the unfavorable and infertile soil for socialism is part of Africa's contemporary structure. The political culture of anti-imperialism has often evolved into intellectual anticapitalism. African nationalism has at times joined hands with socialist fervor. On the other hand, the structural realities of Africa continue to bind it to the world capitalist system. Those same structural realities reveal domestic patterns of class formation which are not yet ready to sustain a socialist structure.

The cultural climate of Africa also includes a traditional distrust of individualism, and generations of experience in collectivist behavior. This is part of Africa's cultural predisposition toward socialism. On the other hand, the disturbing impact of Western culture and the effects of capitalism have released new forms of self-interest, new patterns of self-fulfiliment, new manifestations of personal greed. Profit is often at its most naked among those who are newly converted to the profit motive.

It is because of this configuration of factors that the cultural climate of Africa appears cool and wet for socialism, but the soil is still too rocky and sandy to enable socialism to take roots. The normative orientation seems right; the material conditions are wrong. Conversion to socialism seems to have disastrously preceded class consciousness.

But in addition to demonstrating the gap between political culture and structural realities, this essay has also related those issues to some of the wider theoretical concerns posed by Marxism and African radicalism. These have included the classic dilemma of

[9] Lenin, "What Is To Be Done?" *Selected Works,* Moscow, Foreign Languages Press, 1960, Vol. 1, p. 149.

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whether a shortcut to socialism is feasible, avoiding the agonies of capitalism. Since much of Black Africa has produced neither a large proletariat nor a large bourgeoisie, the problem is posed at its most dramatic in African conditions.

Then there is the equally basic question of radicalism concerning revolutionary credentials of different social groups. Do we look for agents of transformation among urban workers, among peasants and the lumpen proletariat, or—in the ultimate analysis—among the bourgeoisie? The African experience once again shows a disproportionate revolutionary role for the bourgeois intelligentsia—the responsibility, if not for destroying the old order, then at least for attempting to design a new one. We have reminded ourselves that Marx and Engels thought it was the least privileged of the most advanced societies that would stage a revolution. Africa's experience seems to indicate that it is the most privileged of the least developed societies that sometimes produce leaders in revolutionary transformation.

In addition, there is in Africa the pervasive presence of Western culture and its dialectical implications for both class consciousness and ideological radicalism. We have sought to demonstrate in this essay that for the time being it is a sociolinguistic impossibility for an African to be a sophisticated Marxist without being at the same time substantially Westernized. The interplay between consciousness and culture is at its most dramatic within this particular dialectic. Bourgeois Africans become socialist not because class consciousness has at last arisen but because class consciousness has been negated. Bourgeois Africans identify with the proletariat and the peasantry in a fit of class amnesia. Shivji and Rodney used to call it "class suicide" in debates at Dar es Salaam. The culture of the imperial power becomes a factor both in individual psychology and in class behavior in the new realities of the African continent.

Finally, we have sought to demonstrate in this essay that while the 1960's were a decade of socialist rhetoric all over the continent and the 1970's were a decade of Marxist models in some parts of Africa and of capitalist paradigms in others, the 1980's are likely to reveal more fully the basic tensions between cultural myths and structural realities in an Africa caught up in the uncertainties of change.

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The Rise of the African State

By Thomas M. Callaghy

ALI A. MAZRUI. *Africa's International Relations: The Diplomacy of Dependency and Change*. Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1977.

TIMOTHY M. SHAW and KENNETH A. HEARD, Eds. *The Politics of Africa: Dependence and Development*. New York, NY, Africana, 1979.

DOUGLAS G. ANGLIN and TIMOTHY M. SHAW. *Zambia's Foreign Policy: Studies in Diplomacy and Dependence*. Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1979.

COLIN LEGUM, Ed. *Africa Contemporary Record: Annual Survey and Documents, 1977–1978*. New York, NY, Africana, 1979.

COLIN LEGUM, Ed. *Africa Contemporary Record: Annual Survey and Documents, 1978–1979*. New York, NY, Africana, 1980.

ZDENEK CERVENKA. *The Unfinished Quest: Africa and the OAU*. New York, NY, Africana, 1977.

AFRICA HAS EMERGED from the 1970's with much of its vaunted uniqueness destroyed and its earlier hopes and illusions shattered. Pan-Africanism and its principal organizational manifestation, the Organization of African Unity (OAU), have proved feeble. Interstate conflict has grown rapidly, in some instances with the active participation of non-African states. Military expenditures have risen markedly. Afro-Arab and other forms of Third World solidarity have been unproductive. Efforts toward a "new international economic order" (NIEO) have been conspicuously barren. The continent has been badly battered by international economic forces, with a number of deep fiscal and economic crises the result. Attempts at regional economic and political integration, despite a proliferation of regional organizations, have been quite hollow. Even the East African Community (EAC) died a bitter death. Progress toward significant economic and social development has been minimal. Internal stability and control remain elusive. Meaningful forms of mass political participation have only rarely been achieved. Many observers would surely echo Ali Mazrui, who in his characteristically provocative, wide-ranging, and well-written book notes "the gap between the depths of its [Africa's] longings and the fragility of its achievements" (p. 301).

In the course of this drama—which Mazrui describes as the "anguish and the ambitions of an Africa in the process of moving from modern nationalism to modern nationhood" (p. 300)—the individual African state has increasingly become the focus of action, of the calculation and articulation of interests, and of identity. Both internally and externally, African social-political life is now state-centered. *Realpolitik* has taken firm root on the continent, and older notions of statecraft have gained a new ascendancy—in practice if not in rhetoric.

Although the books under review here cover a wide range of material and share no common perspective, they leave no doubt as to the nature, importance, and implications of these trends. In discussing these books, and, indeed, in attempting to make sense of the complexity of African reality today, it is essential to focus on the individual African state. To do so most easily, we shall look in turn at the two battlegrounds on which the state simultaneously contends—first the internal front, then the external front—all the while recognizing that the outcome of the struggle in one affects the outcome of the struggle in the other.

ON THE INTERNAL FRONT, instability has been a major concern of African states. Domestic instability stems from various sources, each given a different emphasis by the various authors under review here.

Ethnic particularism has been a persistent source of such instability

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in African politics. According to Mazrui, who continues to assert the uniqueness of things African, domestic instability can in part be ascribed to the resilience of tradition, to "the tensions between the blessing of cultural diversity in Africa and the curse of deep ethnic cleavages" (p. 36). Moreover, Mazrui predicts that civil wars rooted in ethnic differences will continue to be a threat for the rest of the century and that, in consequence, military spending will increase and pan-Africanism will suffer greater setbacks.

Clearly, most African countries are not nation-states; rather, they are states in search of unity, power, and, eventually, nationhood.[1] But, as Mazrui wisely indicates, rising class conflict will also be a source of internal instability.

Class formation is an increasingly important aspect of African politics today. Emerging patterns of class stratification are directly affected by *both* the state and the external environment, particularly the world capitalist economy. Of special interest in this regard, though, is the increasingly cohesive, but still faction-ridden ruling group that controls the state. This political class, contrary to classical Marxist analysis, acquires its power from the state, not from any autonomous position in the economy. It thus strives to increase state power (and thereby its own power) and to advance the interests of the state in dealing with emerging classes internally and powerful actors and forces externally. Such efforts highlight the state's centrality, its partial autonomy vis-à-vis emerging classes and external actors.

Class factors are given a clear, balanced, and perceptive treatment in Henry Cooperstock's chapter in *The Politics of Africa,* edited by Timothy Shaw and Kenneth Heard. For Cooperstock, the crucial characteristic of African stratification patterns is their great fluidity. Thus, he terms them "emerging contours." Mazrui agrees, pointing out that Africa's internal stratification patterns are in much greater flux than is the rigid international system of stratification, which "is for the time being more like a caste than a class structure" (p. 17). But, as Cooperstock wisely stresses, it would be a serious error to assert that the developing patterns of stratification in African countries merely reflect international forces and patterns.

The interplay of ethnic and class inputs to instability in a particular case is skillfully detailed in the fine volume by Douglas Anglin and Timothy Shaw on Zambia. The authors demonstrate that "beneath the veneer of unity" (p. 3) in Zambia lie *increasing* regional, ethnic, linguistic, political, and class divisions, which not only divert energies from other crucial concerns but also can be exploited by both internal and external actors. As complicating external factors, the authors list attempts at subversion by the South Africans and the Portuguese, the spillover effects of the Shaba events of 1977 and 1978 in Zaire, and, of course, the impact of the Zimbabwe liberation struggle.

The highly personalized nature of African politics is yet another source of instability, one that is often overlooked or underestimated. African governments are mixed partrimonial-bureaucratic organizations of rule, in which personal factors—the ideals, material interests, and idiosyncrasies of powerful individuals—can be as important as structural factors such as ethnic particularism and class formation. Anglin and Shaw, for example, constantly underscore Zambian President Kenneth Kaunda's heavily moral and psychological approach to foreign policy, an approach that has repeatedly frustrated the firm belief of South African leaders that "in the final analysis, economic self-interest would prevail over political ideology" (p. 300). Richard Hodder-Williams, in his uneven but useful piece in *The Politics of Africa,* makes a useful plea "to value more highly some African variation of Kremlinology and to reinstate private motives as significant forces in political developments. . ." (p. 175).

It should be pointed out that the patterns of internal conflict so far mentioned help to account for the generally authoritarian character of African politics. That is, African elites have sought to cope with the variety of internal cleavages by turning to authoritarianism. To be sure, there are signs of a fragile countertrend toward multiparty civilian regimes. In 1979, for example, both Nigeria and Ghana returned to civilian rule. All the same, the durability of this countertrend is open to question.

The continuing problems of internal instability and the internationalization of domestic conflict are underlined in the 1977-1978 and 1978-1979 volumes of Colin Legum's *Africa Contemporary Record (ACR),* since 1969 one of the most valuable research tools available to students and analysts alike and a work consistently distinguished by high quality, comprehensiveness, accuracy, and sophisticated analysis. The two

[1] Several new studies stress this sequence for Europe as well. See, for example, Michael Hechter, *Internal Colonialism: The Celtic Fringe in British National Development,* Berkeley, CA, University of California Press, 1975; and Eugen Weber, *Peasants into Frenchmen: The Modernization of Rural France, 1870-1914,* Stanford, CA, Stanford University Press, 1976.

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volumes under review well illustrate the increasingly conflictual nature of African reality. In addition, the evidence they present tends to lessen the importance of the concept of legitimacy so central to the theories of modernization and nation-building developed in the 1960's. This concept pictured legitimacy in diffuse terms, as granted by the mass of "citizens." But, after the events of the 1970's, it is clear that specific internal and external support groups—militaries, students, administrative elites, foreign states, multinational corporations, international organizations—are of more significance and that all these groups find their focus in the state. Hodder-Williams appears to be groping toward a reconceptualization of legitimacy in these terms.

ON THE EXTERNAL FRONT, the emergence of an increasingly competitive continental state system was one of the clearest and most important developments in Africa in the 1970's. Shaw and Heard, for example, note that the "trend in post-colonial Africa is towards a comprehensive continental system" (p. 267), characterized by a growing *Realpolitik* and an emerging stratification, or hierarchy, among states.

Moreover, the rise of the African state system has had far-reaching consequences. As Mazrui points out:

The problems of a decentralized state system without an overarching government, of which modern Europe has had so painful an experience since the sixteenth century—namely, interstate suspicion, conflict, war and hence the necessity for military establishments—have as a result begun to appear unavoidable in the similar state system of Africa. (p. 237)

In fact, Africa experienced all these problems in the 1970's.

First, interstate conflicts have increased greatly in number, intensity, and type. Decolonization and liberation struggles, after the most recent success in Zimbabwe, persist in a few areas, notably Namibia and South Africa. Border disputes and civil wars with external repercussions, by contrast, have sprung up with increasing frequency. In Chad, Angola, and Ethiopia, the sporadic guerrilla fighting of the 1960's grew in the 1970's to become full-scale civil wars with outside involvement. For example, the conflict between Ethiopia and Somali rebels in the disputed Ogaden region drew Somalia into the fighting in 1977, and the two countries are still engaged in an undeclared war. Recently, too, a growing number of African states have resorted to subversion or outright invasion. Angola-based Katangan rebels have twice mounted incursions into Zaire's Shaba (formerly Katanga) Province, once in 1977 only to be repelled by Moroccan troops airlifted in by France, and again in 1978 only to be repulsed by French and Belgian paratroopers. Tanzanian forces invaded Uganda in late 1978 and succeeded in overthrowing Idi Amin within several weeks. In Western Sahara, Algeria-backed rebels of the Polisario Front still contend with Moroccan troops for control of the area, although the rebels have now managed to push Mauritania to the sidelines. Legum and his collaborators have rendered excellent service in analyzing these conflicts.

Moreover, as interstate conflicts have spread, African leaders have increasingly shown an open concern about the nature of other African regimes, and, more recently, an express willingness to intervene in the internal affairs of those regimes. Even before President Julius Nyerere of Tanzania began his campaign in Uganda, he publicly "had begun to voice concern about the failure of African leaders to denounce tyrannies perpetrated by Blacks on Blacks" (Legum, in *ACR 1978–1979,* p. xxiii). Now he is using the presence of his troops in Uganda as a political tool to affect the outcome of internal Ugandan political struggles. Similarly, the two invasions of Shaba were justified as efforts to overthrow a tyrannical regime.

Increased militarization of the African states, as Mazrui points out in his chapter "Arms and Nationhood," has been one of the main consequences of interstate and intrastate conflict. Again, the case of Nyerere, as related by Mazrui, makes this point in telling fashion: "On the eve of independence Julius Nyerere had, in fact, wondered whether a country like Tanganyika, as it then was, needed an army of its own at all. Nyerere had been concerned that African countries would just be turned against other Africans" (p. 125). It is ironic that Nyerere, a leading pan-Africanist, has now become the first African leader to invade a neighboring country with a regular army for the express purpose of overthrowing a regime.

In connection with the growing militarization of African states, much has been written about emerging regional powers in Africa. The key word here is "emerging," for at present there is only one real black African "middle power"—Nigeria. In *The Politics of Africa,* Timothy Shaw correctly focuses on the "growth of local hegemonies" and notes that "Africa's rediscovery of *Realpolitik* is a function of its developing continental inequalities" (pp. 383–84). He foresees a possible "second scramble" for Africa, "not so much by the multinational

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corporations as between a small group of important African states with their international advocates" (p. 387), perhaps among states such as Nigeria, Kenya, Ivory Coast, Zambia, Zaire, and Senegal, all of which have been mentioned as aspiring or emerging black African regional powers. This eventuality is by no means unthinkable; indeed, the chances of its happening are doubtless greater than many observers believe.

Given Africa's record in the 1970's, it seems safe to predict—Mazrui does so—that interstate conflicts will continue to proliferate in the future. If they do, however, it will be not simply because of the African state system itself. As we shall see, it will also be because that system is deeply embedded in the world state system, which, especially with the decline of détente, has aggravated African tensions and intensified the emergence of Africa's competitive state system.

GREATLY INCREASED outside involvement in African conflicts and the decline of African nonalignment were other major developments of the 1970's. In actual practice, as opposed to rhetoric, the major shift came in 1974 with the conflicts in Angola and on the Horn. Speaking of Angola, Mazrui notes: "Of all the major liberation forces in Africa's experience since the Second World War, only MPLA [People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola] went to the extent of importing up to twelve thousand fighters to wage its war against fellow Angolans . . . . by African standards this constituted the importation of a whole army" (pp. 190–91). Herewith expired the principle of "continental jurisdiction."

In terms of rhetoric, however, the shift came only after the Shaba upheavals of 1977 and 1978—specifically, during the debate at the 1978 OAU summit meeting in Khartoum. Despite the massive increase in Soviet, Cuban, and East German activity on the continent since 1975, it was Western intervention in the Shaba invasions that touched off the debate. Like the regimes in Angola and Ethiopia, President Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire had requested and received outside assistance. In other respects, too, the situation was no different. But African leaders found it difficult to face this reality squarely. The more conservative states railed against Communist penetration and subversion while calling for more Western aid. The more radical states termed Soviet and Cuban activities "internationalist aid" and everything else "imperialism." A larger middle group claimed that "both East and West were guilty of intervening in domestic conflicts in Africa" (Legum, *ACR 1978–1979*, p. xxi). But "guilty" of what? President Ahmed Sékou Touré of Guinea, at least, underscored that African states were themselves responsible for most of the foreign intervention. As the debate at Khartoum indicates, the need for external help has made ideological differences between African states much more salient than in the past.

Much of the debate at Khartoum revolved around the proposal by France and certain Francophone African states for the creation of an Inter-African Security Force. Nyerere maintained that such a force should be created only by the OAU but was pessimistic about the chances of doing so—and with reason. When the committee formed to consider such a move submitted its report a year later, the proposal was shelved as impractical, in large part because of "inter-African suspicions about the kinds of situations in which it might or might not be used" (Legum, *ACR 1978–1979*, p. xxi). Originally proposed as a pan-Africanist concept at the founding of the OAU in 1963, the notion of an African peacekeeping force thus fell victim in 1979 to an increasingly conflictual African state system.

Whom have the African states to blame for the involvement of outside powers in African affairs? Most of the authors in the six books under review leave little doubt. Legum notes that the "Africans themselves had to accept full responsibility" for the externalization of conflict (*ACR 1977–1978*, p. xx). Shaw asserts that "continued inter-state disagreements in Africa make strategic alliances with external actors still attractive" (p. 372). Hence, African states of all ideological persuasions have invited outside assistance. All actors, African and non-African alike, thus pursue their interests as they see fit—Ethiopians and Somalis, Angolans and Zairians, Cubans and Moroccans, East Germans and French, Soviets and Americans.

African nonalignment has died in fact, if not in the pronouncements of the African regimes themselves. Originally, Mazrui maintains, a major objective of African nonalignment was to keep foreign military bases out of Africa. Now several African countries have sizable contingents of French military personnel, and others have Soviets, Cubans, and East Germans.[2]

[2] Mazrui and the contributors to *Africa Contemporary Record* agree that Soviet and Cuban interests in Africa are not identical but basically complementary and that the Soviets and the Cubans are mutually interdependent. On the Cubans, see Mazrui, pp. 188–93; Zdenek Cervenka and Colin Legum, "Cuba: The New Communist Power in Africa," *ACR 1977–1978*, pp. A103–16; and idem, "Cuba in Africa in 1978: How Non-Aligned?" *ACR 1978–1979*, pp. A58–71. On the Soviets in (continued on page 58)

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Somalia and Kenya are now offering "facilities" to the United States. As will be seen, African states no longer see their interests in the broader communites envisaged in such notions as pan-Africanism, regional cooperation, and Third World solidarity.

PAN-AFRICAN IDEALS and hopes have been among the principal casualties of the rise of the African state system. Mazrui notes that "pan-Africanism has had greater success as a liberating force than as an integrative quest" (p. 78), and he usefully traces the roots of pan-Africanism to a shared blackness, humiliation, and colonial domination. During the struggles for independence, that is, the common enemy represented by the colonial powers helped foster pan-Africanist doctrines of unity, solidarity, and nonalignment. But none of the factors Mazrui lists now acts as a strong impediment to conflict; he fairly points out that even in the early independence period, pan-African ideas led President Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana to encourage subversion against other African states (p. 53). The unifying threat of the colonial enemy is rapidly receding into the background, especially with the collapse of white domination in Angola, Mozambique, Guinea-Bissau, and now in Zimbabwe. After Zimbabwe, the only remaining common enemy is South Africa—which may encourage *partial* African unity on liberation issues but will not mitigate trends toward conflict elsewhere on the continent.

After independence, pan-Africanist hopes declined, and doctrines of "neocolonialism" demonstrated little unifying potential. For example, Nyerere, like Nkrumah a leading pan-Africanist, observed in 1967 that "as each of us develops his own state, we raise more and more barriers between ourselves" and that "it is not impossible to achieve African unity through nationalism . . . [but] it is difficult" (cited in Anglin and Shaw, p. 174). Nyerere's key role in the collapse of the EAC underlined the truth of his earlier statement.

The OAU, the principal incarnation of pan-Africanist ideals and hopes, has failed miserably. Zdenek Cervenka, in his book *The Unfinished Quest* and in his chapters in both the *Africa Contemporary Record*s under review, performs a useful if not particularly exciting autopsy. He concludes that "so far the priority of national interests over those of Africa as a whole has been the main African weakness both in the relations between African States and in their relations with the industrialized countries" (p. 190).

In his introduction to Cervenka's book, a leading African journalist, Raph Uwechue, observes that African leaders have settled for a superficial unity and that, as a result, "the list of the OAU's achievements is much shorter than its failures" (p. x). After noting the OAU's dismal failures with regard to interstate and intrastate disputes, collective security, economic cooperation, and organizational reform (Cervenka dissects all these failures in the succeeding chapters), Uwechue proclaims that "it is thus increasingly obvious that if the OAU is to survive as a truly continental organization, it has to accommodate the concept of a politico-economic union somewhat along the lines advocated by Kwame Nkrumah" (p. xii). Illusions do indeed die slowly! Nkrumah's dream is much less likely to succeed now than it was even in 1963.

Attempts at regional cooperation, despite much showy effort, have likewise come to little—a point on which the authors here reviewed are in substantial agreement. As Reginald Green observes, "the late 1970's have not been a happy period for regionalism in Africa" (*ACR 1978–1979*, p. A40). In a rather pedestrian chapter in *The Politics of Africa*, John Clark similarly argues that "despite the growing number of organizational efforts . . . African IGOs [intergovernmental organizations] seem to have made little progress in solving the economic, social and political problems confronting African states" (p. 319). He points to a vicious cycle of weak support from member states, weak results, collapse, possible reformulation, and so on.

Green attributes the weakness of regional cooperation primarily to a fragility of trust. In a lucid, subtle, and well-organized piece in the 1977–1978 volume of *Africa Contemporary Record*, he notes that in the EAC, despite previous tensions, "the final breakup came suddenly, brutally, and in a manner minimizing what could be salvaged, maximizing dislocations, creating lasting bitterness and exacerbating problems of sorting out former Community assets, liabilities and institutions" (p. A125). He stresses both economic and political factors in the breakup and notes the miscalculation of interests and rewards on the part of the leaders of Kenya and Tanzania. The EAC, he predicts, "will not rise from its ashes

Africa, see *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), January–February 1978. For general discussions of the internationalization of African conflicts, see James Mayall, "Africa in the International System: The Great Powers in Search of a Perspective," *Government and Opposition* (London), Summer 1979, pp. 349–72; and Raymond W. Copson, "African International Politics: Underdevelopment and Conflict in the Seventies." *Orbis* (Philadelphia, PA), Spring 1978, pp. 227–45. On the role of the East Germans in Africa, see Z. Cervenka and Mario R. Dedrichs, "The Two Germanies in Africa," *ACR 1978–1979*, pp. A92–107.

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like the phoenix in the foreseeable future" (p. A134).

Anglin and Shaw devote a good deal of attention to Zambia's efforts to disengage itself from the white-controlled economic structure of Southern Africa (see Chap. 6). One of their major conclusions is that "nationalism reinforces the drive for disengagement, but inhibits enthusiasm for integration" (p. 174). For example, Zambia had but weak ties with the EAC and was ambivalent about strengthening even those. Clearly, the primary consideration was the state's own interests, not those of some broader African community, even a regional community. Recent efforts at regional cooperation announced by several Southern African states in the wake of Zimbabwe's independence may prove more fruitful.

AFRICAN SOLIDARITY with other Third World states has yielded results generally as meager as those achieved by pan-Africanism. A crucial aspect of this question is Afro-Arab solidarity, once much heralded. Mazrui points out that "the developing countries generally have a good case against the oil-producers" (p. 148). Africa, in particular, has given political support to the Arabs but has received very little economic help in return; most Arab aid has gone to other Muslim states. For Mazrui, "the critical question for the future is whether the Arabs will also become true *partners in development*" (p. 131). At minimum, he asserts, there should be a two-tier pricing system for oil—not just for African states, but for all Third World states. Mazrui also warns about "the serious risk of Arab paternalism towards black Africa" and "the possibility of Arab neo-colonialism" (p. 153). To date, the Arab states show little inclination to join with black Africa in a true partnership.[3]

Africa's struggle for a new international economic order has been even less rewarding. Mazrui maintains that the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) has been a "failure in practical terms, but important in a pioneering sense" (p. 212). Anglin and Shaw describe Zambia's active participation in a wide range of NIEO efforts, especially in the Intergovernmental Council of Copper Exporting Countries. Such efforts have been "for Zambia, particularly unrewarding . . . . Zambia has so far reaped few immediate benefits from Third World collaboration; the diversity of interests within the developing world has been too great, the agenda too long, and the changes too distant" (p. 29).

The Lomé Convention, a five-year treaty first signed in February 1975 and intended to strengthen economic cooperation between the European Economic Community (EEC) and 46 developing nations of Africa, the Caribbean, and the Pacific, has proved to be one fruitful joint effort. In a perceptive and subtle piece in *The Politics of Africa,* James Mayall carefully describes how the African states developed a common negotiating stand and agreed on a common front on Lomé. Such agreement was possible, he argues, only because of an intriguing conjuncture of circumstances and interests: an earlier ideological debate over cooperation and dependence had helped to shape a coherent African position, the Francophone states perceived that their position vis-à-vis the EEC was weakening and that they should search for broader African support, and Nigeria, a powerful regional actor, was committed to gaining concessions from the EEC. Although Lomé has demonstrated that African states can work together for common objectives, circumstances since it was first signed have not been conducive to continued overwhelming enthusiasm for it.

On the world scene, Africa is confronted with increasingly unfavorable economic trends. In his survey of 1978, Legum lists two such trends—rampant world inflation (especially higher oil prices), and rapidly accumulating problems with debt repayment and balance of payments. Since Africa is generally dependent on the world economy and has been unable to increase food production significantly, world inflation and debt repayment mean that most African states have experienced little or even negative economic growth. New OPEC oil price increases in 1979–80 are making matters worse.

If, as Mazrui avers, "the international economic system will remain rigid but not unchallenged" (p. 293), then what can African states do? What strategies have they adopted? What strategies can they adopt?

African attempts at socialism have left a bleak record.[4] Tanzania and Guinea, the two countries that have not abandoned early attempts at socialism, are in serious difficulty economically. Mozambique has just announced a major opening to the international capitalist economy.[5]

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[3] See Victor T. LeVine and Timothy W. Luke, *The Arab-African Connection: Political and Economic Realities,* Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1979.

[4] See Carl G. Rosberg and Thomas M. Callaghy, Eds., *Socialism in Sub-Saharan Africa: A New Assessment,* Berkeley, CA, University of California, Institute of International Studies, 1979; and Ali A. Mazrui's essay in the present issue of *Problems of Communism.*

[5] On the recent moves by Mozambique, see Allen Isaacman and Barbara Isaacman, "Socialist Mozambique Woos Western Capital for Revival," *The Christian Science Monitor,* (Boston, MA), Apr. 9, 1980. On Angolan interest in Western investment, see "U.S./Africa—Where the Twain Meet," *Africa News* (Durham, NC), July 28, 1980, pp. 2, 11.

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Does the bleak record of African socialism leave the African states completely at the mercy of international economic forces? Not at all. As Mayall states in *The Politics of Africa*, "it is simply not true that African states have no power to reorient their economies . . ." (p. 311). *Within limits*, African states generally have some room for maneuver.

Most African states have chosen a state-centered approach—commonly called "state capitalism." Zambia is a classic case in point, of particular interest because it combines the rhetoric of socialism with the substance of state capitalism. Anglin and Shaw, although ambivalent about the nature of Zambia's external linkages, do an admirable job of describing its "reorganizationalist" strategy. In its approach to its economy, Zambia "has been neither permissive nor resistant in an unequivocal way, but rather has adopted a pragmatic bargaining position" (p. 411). The state interacts with the internal and external environments primarily through economic regulation and the economic sector that has grown up around the state (the parastatal sector). The power of the state is thus reinforced, and the interests of those who control the state are furthered. State capitalism is not a full-fledged economic doctrine. Rather, it is a tendency, a thrust, full of contradictions and limitations. Its impact will most likely be modest but identifiable.

THE OUTLOOK for Africa in the decade of the 1980's is by no means promising. For the foreseeable future, most of the African states will achieve little economic and social development. Intrastate and interstate conflicts will most likely continue to proliferate, and non-African states will persist in playing crucial roles in some disputes. Ideological differences between African states will become more salient as the continental state system comes to maturity. Although past hopes and illusions will not soon fade from the rhetoric of African regimes, a fundamental *Realpolitik* will become more manifest in practice as older notions of statecraft gain a new importance. In the longer term, however, a greater realism may have salutary effects.

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Marxism on the Horn of Africa

By Richard F. Sherman

COLIN LEGUM and BILL LEE. *Conflict in the Horn of Africa*. New York, NY, Africana Publishing Co., 1977.

COLIN LEGUM and BILL LEE. *The Horn of Africa in Continuing Crisis*. New York, NY, Africana Publishing Co., 1979.

TOM J. FARER. *War Clouds on the Horn of Africa: The Widening Storm*. Second, revised ed. New York, NY, and Washington, DC, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1979.

JOHN MARKAKIS and NEGA AYELE. *Class and Revolution in Ethiopia*. Nottingham, Spokesman, 1978.

RAÚL VALDÉS VIVÓ. *Ethiopia's Revolution*. New York, NY, International Publishers, 1978.

THE HORN of Africa has been in a state of constant upheaval since Haile Selassie was deposed as Emperor of Ethiopia in 1974. In addition to tremendous internal change, each of the countries of the Horn — Ethiopia, Somalia, and Djibouti — has undergone realignment in its international position as well. During the quarter century before 1974, Haile Selassie's Ethiopian empire had received more aid from the United States than any other African country. Somalia, which signed a treaty of friendship and cooperation with Moscow in 1974, was one of the Soviet Union's best friends in Africa. The French Territory of the Afars and the Issas (TFAI) was a sleepy French colonial outpost. And the Eritrean insurgent groups fighting for independence from Ethiopia were racked by such internal dissension that they posed little threat to the stability of the empire.

By 1977, all this had changed. Somalia had abrogated its friendship treaty with the USSR. The Ethiopian government, now in the hands of the Provisional Military Administrative Council, or Dergue, had expelled numerous US agencies from the country and had become a staunch ally of the Soviet Union. The TFAI became the independent Republic of Djibouti in June, and the new ministate's long-term course remained a matter of debate. Finally, amid the internal disarray in Ethiopia following the ouster of the Emperor, the Eritrean liberation movement had taken control of 95 percent of the territory of Eritrea.

This process of international realignment on the Horn culminated in early 1978 with the defeat of the Somalis in Ethiopia's Ogaden region. Though both Ethiopia and Somalia claimed an allegiance to Marxist rhetoric, if not principles, the ethnic Somalis living in Ethiopia's Ogaden region and represented by the Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF) were attempting to make good their long-standing claim that the Ogaden constituted an integral part of the Somali nation. The July–September 1977 military successes of the WSLF acting in conjunction with the Somali army had led to de facto Somali control of nearly one third of Ethiopia's territory. It took the combined efforts of the freshly equipped Ethiopian army and militia backed by Soviet and Cuban forces to drive the Somali forces from the Ogaden in March 1978. This put an end to the Soviet-Somali flirtation that had been an essentially uninterrupted part of politics on the Horn of Africa since the 1960's.

THE RELEVANCE of this realignment and the strategic significance of the entire Horn area are discussed in the volumes by Colin Legum and Bill Lee and by Tom Farer. In *Conflict in the Horn of Africa* and its sequel published two years later, Legum and Lee have done a very thorough job of demonstrating that both the United States and the USSR perceive that they have substantial national interests in the region. Farer, for his part, argues that the Horn area does not rank very highly on

any rational list of geopolitical priorities. . . . It deserves a modest measure of Western attention and

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resources, but nothing on the scale of Soviet involvement. (p. 161)

Whatever one's precise assessment of the strategic significance of the Horn, it is clear that the superpowers' roles there continue to impose on the area styles, ideologies, and weaponries very different from those that would be present in the absence of superpower involvement. The superimposition of Soviet Marxist ideology, in particular, deserves more detailed investigation.

For our purposes, two major themes emerge from the five books under consideration here. The two converge at more than one point. The first is that some of the Marxist ideology, modes, and means injected into the Horn by the Soviet Union and Cuba are at odds with more indigenous modes of thought and behavior. The second theme concerns the gap between the rhetoric and the reality of the so-called Marxist regimes and movements that have emerged on the Horn over the last decade, especially as they have tried to cope with the problems of nationalism and subnationalism in the region.

Of course, the perspectives of the authors differ. Colin Legum, who edits the widely respected *Africa Contemporary Record,* and Bill Lee, who serves as editor of the *Jordan Times* (Amman), for the most part provide factual and well-documented recapitulations of the events on the Horn which have drawn attention to these themes. Tom Farer, who teaches international law at Rutgers University and is Vice President of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights of the Organization of American States, takes a less chronological, more issue-oriented approach. The last two books reviewed are more ideological in nature. John Markakis and Nega Ayele have written an indictment of Ethiopia's rulers, past and present. (Ayele was summarily executed in Ethiopia in 1977, before the book appeared in print.) Raúl Valdés Vivó, a member of the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Cuba, on the other hand, provides an unabashed defense of everything that has taken place in Ethiopia since 1974. Valdés is in charge of foreign affairs for his party, but his lack of knowledge of Ethiopian history, his attempts at crude psychohistory, and the simple clichés and generalizations that permeate his book leave many of his judgments open to serious question.

THE RAMIFICATIONS of nationalism and subnationalism on the Horn dominate any discussion of the mix of imported and indigenous elements in the Marxism of the region. Legum, Lee, and Farer cite numerous examples of the Soviet and Cuban tendency to underestimate the complex and seemingly incompatible nationalistic leanings of the Marxist movements in Ethiopia, Somalia, and Eritrea. The Soviets especially have followed a general course of action based on the notion that a measure of "socialist brotherhood" existed that could help overcome essential national differences. In 1977, for example, when Moscow wanted and believed it could have both Somalia and Ethiopia as allies, the Soviets encouraged Fidel Castro to attempt to negotiate a "socialist federation" between Addis Ababa and Mogadishu. Moscow even envisioned the expansion of this federation to include the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY) and Djibouti. In light of the Soviet Union's own internal subnational tensions and concrete historical factors militating against Somali-Ethiopian cooperation, the "solution" proposed by the Soviets was viewed as naive by outside observers and well-nigh insulting by the Soviet Union's erstwhile allies in Somalia. President Mohamed Siad Barre, feeling betrayed by Cuba and the Soviet Union, broke diplomatic relations with both countries later in the year.

Similar Soviet-Cuban attempts were made to bring together the Ethiopian government and the Eritrean rebel/revolutionaries. However, as Legum and Lee state in *The Horn of Africa in Continuing Crisis:*

Prospects for . . . a Federation of Marxist-Leninist Ethiopian and Eritrean States faded away against the intractability of centuries-old irreconcilable nationalisms. Expectations that the "Marxist" Dergue and the "Marxist" Eritrean fronts might "resolve their contradictions" in the name of Marxism alone were shattered as the Dergue set out to liquidate all those whom the Eritrean leaders regarded as the true Ethiopian Marxists. (p. xi)

Here, as in Ethiopia's conflict with Somalia, the USSR has ultimately thrown its weight behind Addis Ababa; in the process it has nearly abandoned an old ally which can credibly claim to be more authentically Marxist than the Soviets' new friends in the Dergue.

The fact is that the Soviets have gotten bogged down in a quagmire in Eritrea just as they seem to have done more recently on the other side of the Arabian Peninsula, in Afghanistan. Unless they can produce some form of peaceful solution to the Ethiopian-Eritrean conflict — which seems unlikely in mid-1980—they will find themselves in a no-win situation. They have made a tremendous commitment to the Ethiopian regime and

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have lost their excellent naval facilities at Berbera, Somalia, as a result. Yet the military forces of Dergue Chairman Mengistu Haile-Mariam cannot defeat the sophisticated and dedicated guerrillas of the Eritrean liberation movement. Mengistu may have to destroy Eritrea to save it, and Fidel Castro, whose forces played a critical role in driving the Somalis from the Ogaden in 1978, has already indicated he will not allow Cuban forces to attack the Eritreans. An Ethiopia with only tenuous control of Eritrean towns and seaports is not the prize the Soviets had envisioned when they began to favor Ethiopia over Somalia. The underlying truth, which the Soviets may only now be learning, is that on the Horn of Africa at least, questions of nationalism, subnationalism, and colonialism cannot be resolved on the basis of proletarian internationalism.

THE SECOND major issue with which we are concerned—i.e., the actual nature of the various "Marxist" movements on the Horn—goes a long way toward explaining why this is so. The central question is: When we dig beneath the rhetoric of the various competing "Marxists" on the Horn, what elements of Marxist-Leninist reality do we find? The volumes by Markakis and Ayele and by Legum and Lee are the most helpful in addressing this question, although they devote far less space to analyzing the nature of the Somali regime than they do to that of Ethiopia.

Somali President Siad Barre has been described as "a nationalist first, a Muslim second, and a Marxist third."[1] Legum and Lee characterized him in their 1977 volume as "a man of old-fashioned virtues and a staunch Muslim," who "had become 'converted' to Marxism because of his disillusionment with the West, mainly over its 'hostility' to Somalia's national aspirations" (p. 32). Today, with the Soviets gone, the Siad Barre regime can be portrayed more accurately as African socialist than as Marxist-Leninist.

The Ethiopian situation is far more complex. With the exception of Raúl Valdés Vivó, all of the authors whose work is represented here raise serious questions as to the Marxist content of the Mengistu regime, and even Valdés lends inadvertent support to the others by the title he chooses for his second chapter, "A Revolution Seeking Its Ideology."

Briefly, the arguments which can be used to demonstrate that the Dergue regime is not Marxist-Leninist are four in number. First, the Ethiopian revolution, unlike the October Revolution of 1917 in Russia, has been conducted without the presence of any sort of political vanguard party. Second, while the Dergue has invoked the use of Marxist rhetoric to justify developments in Ethiopia and while Mengistu has found it convenient to use Marxist slogans in his attempts to consolidate state power, the Dergue in fact has little understanding of Marxism-Leninism either in theory or in practice. Third, the Dergue is a military council (the literal translation of the Amharic word is "committee") and has injected into the Ethiopian revolution an overt military flavor that was absent in Russia in 1917 and that has made nationalism rather than internationalism a main focal point of the revolution ("Ethiopia First" was the Dergue's rallying cry.) Finally, although the Dergue has created selected mass organizations of the sort which normally accompany a Communist revolution, it does not have the firm ideological grip required to control them. Democratic centralism is not even close to being operative in Ethiopia today.

Markakis and Ayele maintain, in the harshest terms used by any of our authors, that Ethiopia has undergone radical changes, but not a Marxist restructuring of society. Mass organizations such as peasant committees and urban associations function with virtually no cadres and lack any real substance. And the descriptions provided by these authors of the Dergue's hostility and ultimate repression of Ethiopia's labor movement (pp. 142–45), recruitment of the cities' "lumpen population" to control the urban associations (p. 151), and terror campaign waged against rival political groups, particularly the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Party (pp. 162–64), make the reader wonder whether the process of change taking place in Ethiopia is based on the principles of Marxism-Leninism or of national socialism.

TO FIND THE political movement on the Horn that most closely approximates the Marxist-Leninist model, one would have to look toward the Eritrean liberation movement, particularly the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF). The EPLF is an efficient, well-disciplined political movement struggling not only for independence from Ethiopia, but for a basic social redefinition of Eritrean society. It is run on the basis of democratic centralism, stresses the concept of a national democratic revolution, and has been characterized by Gérard Chaliand, a leading student of Third World Marxism, as "by far the most impressive revolutionary movement

[1] David Lamb, "Russ Isolated in a Somalia They Helped to Develop," *Los Angeles Times* (Los Angeles, CA), Oct. 3, 1977, p. 6.

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produced in Africa in the last two decades."[2]

Although the EPLF does seem to approximate other Marxist movements in their earlier stages, as of this writing it continues to consider itself a liberation movement rather than a Marxist party, and has no particular ideological or tactical allegiance either to the Soviets or to the Chinese. Still, it is quite aware of the need for and committed to the idea of a Leninist-style vanguard party. Unlike the Dergue, it promotes the proletariat as the "vanguard of the revolution," even though only 20 percent of the Eritrean population is urban.

In addition, the EPLF emphasizes the importance of the participation of large numbers of Eritreans in the expanding political process and has created a network of mass organizations to this end. EPLF mass organizations—of workers, peasants, women, students, and young people—are permitted to play a far more significant role in the mobilization and socialization processes taking place throughout Eritrea than the Dergue's equivalent organizations play in the rest of Ethiopia. The growing emphasis on health care, education, and the role of women in Eritrean society all attest to expanded political participation.

In effect, the theory and reality of the Eritrean blend of Marxism and nationalism appear to be far more consistent than the theory and practice propagated by the Dergue. While Ethiopia's Mengistu has attempted since the late 1970's to crudely fit Marxist ideology to Ethiopian realities, the EPLF has had a decade in which to develop practical programs based upon a much more systematic commitment to socialist doctrine.

IN LIGHT OF the tremendous number of conflicting forces, both domestic and foreign, at work on the Horn of Africa, what can be expected there in the future? In Ethiopia, Mengistu has consolidated a considerable amount of power in his own hands. He is moving toward the establishment of an Ethiopian political party, but it remains to be seen how independent of the military such a party will be.

The Soviet Union seems prepared to remain in Ethiopia for some time, and is now building naval facilities on the Dahlak Islands, just off Massawa. To counter the expanding Soviet presence in the region, the United States and Somalia have discussed the possibility of America's obtaining access to Somali air and naval facilities at Berbera in return for arms shipments to be used for defensive purposes by the Somali military. It is too early to tell what effect all of these developments will have on the continuing struggle between Ethiopia and Somalia in the Ogaden. But however the situation develops in the south, it is already clear that the Eritreans are not willing to accept the political-geographical status quo in the north and will continue to be a major thorn in Mengistu's side.

With many questions unanswerable at the present time, one can only be certain that the future of Marxism on the Horn will remain inexorably tied to the unfolding drama of national development and international realignment taking place in the region. Whether the drama brings stability or instability remains to be seen.

[2] Gérard Chaliand, "The Horn of Africa's Dilemma," *Foreign Policy* (Washington, DC), Spring 1978, p. 126.

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Political Forces in Latin America

By Lynn-Darrell Bender

BRIAN LOVEMAN and THOMAS M. DAVIES, JR., Eds. *The Politics of Antipolitics: The Military in Latin America.* Lincoln, NE, University of Nebraska Press, 1978.

LUIS E. AGUILAR, Ed. *Marxism in Latin America.* Rev. ed. Philadelphia, PA, Temple University Press, 1978.

ROBERT D. BOND, Ed. *Contemporary Venezuela and Its Role in International Affairs.* New York, NY, New York University Press for the Council on Foreign Relations, 1977.

JOHN A. BOOTH and MITCHELL A. SELIGSON, Eds. *Political Participation in Latin America.* Vols. 1 and 2. New York, NY, Holmes and Meier Publishers, 1978 and 1979.

LATIN AMERICA is frequently described as an immobile society controlled by a few oligarchs who manage to contain the forces of socioeconomic change. How the oligarchs are presumed to have accomplished this feat has been the subject of considerable speculation, but there is little question that the theory is supported by two observable Latin American social traits: the deep-seated, almost fatalistic sense of social accommodation prevalent in Latin America, and the easy proclivity of potential counterelites to give up their ideals in exchange for assimilation into the establishment. Indeed, the attraction of power and prestige, particularly through appointment in government, has historically thwarted even the noblest revolutionary élan. Whatever the explanation, the end result remains marginal social change as the prevailing norm.

Yet the forces of the status quo have not gone unchallenged. On the contrary, Latin American political life, with its history of multiplicity, has never been short of rebels. To be sure, revolutionary change, while extolled everywhere, has taken place only in Cuba. Even so, the presence of social protesters has prodded traditional elites to make adjustments to hasten economic and social development. Today, industrialization, modern labor legislation, new social welfare programs, and greater educational opportunities are striking realities, particularly in the more developed nations of the region—Argentina, Venezuela, Chile, Mexico, and Brazil. These advances have brought some innovation and modernity to Latin American society. Still, much of the region's political life is as troubled as before, as events in Nicaragua, Grenada, and El Salvador clearly demonstrate. Indeed, it is largely in response to the challenge of such destabilizing forces that military-dominated authoritarian government remains prevalent throughout Latin America.

MOST POLITICAL systems in Latin America today are subject to direct military domination. In a few others, there is indirect military rule, in which the military restricts the freedom of action of what is ostensibly a civilian government. Only four or five political systems can be broadly classified as "democratic." Almost gone, however, is the old-style caudillo. Now, the armed forces characteristically seize power as an institution, committed to what Brian Loveman and Thomas Davies call the "politics of antipolitics." The result has often been highly nationalistic, authoritarian military regimes, whose policies stress protection of national interests and emancipation of national economies over traditional military concerns and lip service to democratic values. Such regimes, in fact, represent the basic configuration of militarism in contemporary Latin America.

Accordingly, the term "antipolitics" is used to describe the belief, widely held among the Latin American military, that modernization can be achieved only through a depolitization of politics. As before, the new variants of military government—ranging from progressive to regressive in orientation — take power to ensure the future of national policies and programs. Now, however, they are openly disdainful of what they see as corrupt and inept civilian politics, which they hold responsible for Latin America's instability, poverty, and economic backwardness. They instead advocate an indefinite transi-

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tional period of military rule to reorient values and power relationships on the basis of a technocratic ideology abhorred by liberals and Marxists alike. The liberals are quite naturally disturbed by this ideology's implications for property rights and traditional civil liberties, and the Marxists reject it outright because it attempts to make people believe that social and political problems can be reduced to purely technical and administrative ones, and thus ignores the fundamental issue of class conflict.

Since most Latin American polities are so highly fragmented, the military's disciplined, hierarchical structure and near-monopoly over the means of coercion provide a solidarity and power generally sufficient to impose its will. The problem is, of course, that the exercise of political power is more difficult than its seizure. And when basic problems are not resolved, the military must once again turn to traditional political "actors" for support. As they do so, military rule comes to resemble the civilian regime that was originally deposed. In some instances, a degree of social justice and socioeconomic progress is achieved—but inevitably the result is a debilitated belief in democracy. Thus, the search for alternatives continues.

UNTIL RECENT times, the diverse political movements spawned by Marxist thought were the most prominent proponents of change in Latin America. However, radical nationalism is now judged — implicitly in the varied primary and interpretive documents found in the Aguilar reader—as ideologically the most promising instrument for achieving a new Latin American social order. True, the radical nationalists espouse a revolutionary rhetoric that differs only slightly from that of Marxist groups, but it is precisely their advocacy and active promotion of revolution "here and now" that truly set them apart from the more staid forces within the revolutionary movement. This difference has major practical ramifications. Even though the official Soviet-line Marxist parties have at times supported guerrilla movements, most radical leftists want nothing to do with parties whose overall strategy—to fit comfortably into the existing national political systems—they view as a betrayal of revolutionary principles. As a result, today more than ever the traditional Marxist movement in Latin America lacks the capability of capturing political power, either extralegally or through established political procedures—the experience of Salvador Allende's Chile notwithstanding.

Often driven by frustration, many nationalist groups in Latin America have resorted to radical alternatives — particularly rural and urban guerrilla warfare. However, this kind of revolutionary activism has not flourished. Cuba is the one true "success story" of revolutionary dynamics. Nicaragua offers an uncertain example. It will not be able to count upon the unconditional support of the Soviet Union, because neither the Soviets nor Latin American Communist party leaders have ever shown much enthusiasm for the risks attendant on another Castro-like revolution. Nicaragua's revolutionary future is therefore still in doubt. El Salvador likewise faces an uncertain future; only time will tell whether current developments in that country favor the success of revolution. Isolated groups in Guatemala, Mexico, Colombia, and Argentina can on occasion stun with a spectacular assassination or kidnapping. But these are largely acts of desperation and symbols of social protest whose practical effects are nugatory.

PARADOXICALLY, the one Latin American country historically most closely identified with both militarism and leftist insurrection — Venezuela—is today the southern continent's showcase of electoral democracy. The reasons for this seeming anomaly are only partly explored by the authors in the book edited by Robert D. Bond, who focus fundamentally on Venezuelan foreign policy goals and actions. Nevertheless, the point is made that democracy took root in Venezuela only after civilian leaders realized that the nation's long tradition of harsh military rule stemmed directly from uncontrolled political conflict. They learned, in short, that ideological and programmatic intransigence must give way to the key democratic values of "compromise, conciliation, and negotiation" if they were to prove themselves capable of managing national affairs. Only then could democracy permanently displace military interventionism.

During the 1960's, Venezuela's fledgling democracy became the target of guerrilla warfare and other insurrectionary strategies from the radical Left. But the radical Left's actions had the unintended effect of consolidating rather than destroying the new political order, for the dominant political forces—including the military—came to view democracy as the only alternative to social disintegration. Since 1958, Venezuelan democracy not only has survived but has also succeeded in establishing strong political institutions that endure even when the political leadership of the country passes from one party and one generation to another. In a word, Venezuela has apparently *institutionalized* its democratic political ideology and procedures.

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Underlying these achievements, and really at the core of Venezuela's national life, is the fact of material abundance. Without oil wealth, little progress may have been possible. This is not to say that prosperity is always accompanied by democracy. It just helps. Even so, no other single factor better accounts for the verdure of Venezuelan democracy amid the parched political landscape of Latin American military authoritarianism. Now well beyond mere survival, Venezuelan democracy faces a new challenge: that of using the country's vast oil income to build for the future amid unrelenting clamors from the people for greater social and economic opportunities and more direct benefits now.

In truth, the flood of petrodollars has not been entirely a blessing. Venezuela has chosen a development strategy that relies heavily on using a preponderate share of its petroleum revenues to build a diversified agricultural and industrial base for the future. But whether the policy can be sustained is still uncertain. Easy abundance almost inevitably engenders squandering, inequities, and social injustices. Moreover, furnished with the democratic franchise, the Venezuelan people have quite expectedly made new demands on their rich government. As elsewhere, planning for development by democratic rules is intrinsically more cumbersome than authoritarianism, mainly because force must yield to persuasion, incentives, and other regulatory instruments essentially democratic in character.

Finally, such difficulties are compounded by the fact that Venezuela's major political parties profess democratic socialism, which ideologically commits them to pursue policies designed to redistribute national income as a moral imperative. The state is therefore seen as the agent of both modernization and equality. However, the difficulty with the notion of reliance on the state for national development and the attainment of a more just society through democracy is that it presupposes that the masses will not only share these goals but also put them ahead of their own individual needs and desires. And there is little in the nature of democracy to encourage a voluntary suppression of individual gain, for democracy is essentially the politics of competitive choice. After all, for political survival, even the best-intentioned democratic government must cater to specific constituencies whose preferences are more likely to place means above ends or the immediately useful over the ultimate good.

OBVIOUSLY, the mass publics in Venezuela can bring great influence to bear on ultimate decisions of public policy. But what about the masses in other Latin American countries? Are they, as commonly depicted, merely powerless and passive victims, manipulated by the elites in support of the elites' own initiatives and interests? Do they exercise any meaningful political participation, enough to justify consideration as a credible political force?

These questions are extensively examined by an interdisciplinary group of analysts in the two volumes on political participation in Latin America, edited by John A. Booth and Mitchell A. Seligson. To provide a common focus, the editors begin by defining political participation as "behavior influencing or attempting to influence the distribution of public goods" (Vol. 1, p. 6). The empirically sophisticated studies that follow generally conclude that Latin America's mass publics do genuinely influence political outcomes when—and this is the crucial point—the issue involves the protection or advancement of purely immediate interests. Otherwise, the masses' influence is practically nil. In other words, beyond the local level, the masses exert little effective political power. As Richard Newbold Adams aptly puts it:

Certainly in looking at these Latin American cases, what strikes one is not so much the degree to which individuals have other ways of participating, but rather the degree to which they are subject to decisions premolded by others. (Vol. 2, p. 17)

FOR THE PRESENT, then, it should be expected that Latin America's traditional elites will in general continue to calm social unrest through adroit combinations of palliatives and force. Military dictatorships will most likely alternate with democratic governments in which a military element is prominent. Fragmentation of the body politic, ideological polarization, and even open political violence will probably endure. Moreover, the ambiguities and contradictions that grow naturally out of societal tensions will inevitably bring forth new political forces dedicated to what they see as their countries' development and liberation. Nicaragua is a case in point. But it is not altogether certain that these new forces will be any more successful in dealing with the countless problems that have long bedeviled this truly perplexing region.

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Perspectives on Communist Totalitarianism

By Werner Cohn

VLADIMIR BUKOVSKY. *To Build a Castle—My Life as a Dissenter.* Translated by Michael Scammell. New York, NY, The Viking Press, 1979.

JOHN B. DUNLOP. *The New Russian Revolutionaries.* Belmont, MA, Nordland Publishing Company, 1976.

IVAN VOLGYES, Ed. *Social Deviance in Eastern Europe.* Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1978.

Dissent in Poland: Reports and Documents in Translation, December 1975–July 1977. London, Association of Polish Students and Graduates in Exile, 1977.

GERSON S. SHER. *Praxis: Marxist Criticism and Dissent in Socialist Yugoslavia.* Bloomington, IN, Indiana University Press, 1977.

PETER R. MOODY. *Opposition and Dissent in Contemporary China.* Stanford, CA, Hoover Institution Press, 1977.

AMY AUERBACHER WILSON et al., Eds. *Deviance and Social Control in Chinese Society.* New York, NY, Praeger Publishers, 1977.

THE TITLES of these books speak of deviance, of dissent, of opposition. The books do indeed deal with such themes, but their common subject is, more broadly, communism in power. It is from this larger perspective that I would like to assess them.

There is of course a considerable background to studies of Communist and other totalitarian regimes. No reader of this journal can be unaware of the extraordinary group of thinkers and scholars—Hannah Arendt, Merle Fainsod, Leonard Schapiro, Robert Conquest, Karl Dietrich Bracher, Leszek Kolakowski, and others as well as their various coworkers and students—to whom we owe so much insight into the nature of the Soviet Union and its Nazi congener. There are signs, alas, that the golden age of scholarship created and inspired by this group is coming to an end. But their achievement—a small part of which I shall attempt to sketch presently—is durably with us.

The situation is different in Asian studies. It is surely not unduly invidious to observe that the voluminous Western scholarship on Chinese communism has not as yet produced a comparably illuminating body of literature. This difference is not a reflection on any one sinologist. It is perhaps related to certain advantages enjoyed by Arendt and the others but not available to Asianists: both German and Russian are Indo-European languages, accessible without too much difficulty to speakers of English or French; the ethnic, religious, and cultural ties that bind the West to Germany and Russia are particularly strong in the case of these mostly European-born scholars of totalitarianism; and the generation to which these scholars belong suffered through war and through persecution by the European totalitarian regimes (indeed, many of these men and women were themselves victims of war and persecution). It can readily be seen that none of these conditions holds for Western scholars working with Chinese materials.

I begin this essay by evoking the contribution of Arendt and the others because it seems to me that their work contains not only specific information about totalitarian regimes—information, after all, can get quickly dated—but also important advice on how to ask meaningful research questions when confronted with phenomena that appear to be totalitarian. Some of this body of methodological advice can be summarized as follows:

1. Since the totalitarian regimes in Germany and Russia seem to present us with a *new and different type of domination,* analytic categories developed for other societies tend to be misleading. Traditional tyrannies and dictatorships, for instance, though showing certain similarities to totalitarian regimes, must not be confused with these because the scope of the totalitarian repression—in the arts, reli-

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gion, and academia as well as in politics—is so much more extensive.

2. The nature of totalitarianism is best grasped by paying particular attention to the specialized organs of repression, especially the secret police and the concentration and labor camps.

3. Totalitarian regimes express commitment to certain universal values (even Hitler professed attachment to freedom and equality; the Communists, in addition, profess a belief in democracy) while practicing an unprecedented repression of these very same values. Hence, special care must be taken to test professed aims against deeds and never to take the propagandistic vocabulary of totalitarian movements at face value.

The scholarly tradition that has created such precepts is sometimes criticized for allegedly prejudging, through its analytic categories, the results of scholarly work on a particular regime. But the three propositions I have enumerated (as well as others that could no doubt be derived from the work of these scholars) are meant to be hypotheses and aids to research, not prescriptions of what to find. As is true of any hypothesis in scientific procedure, they exist to be confirmed or refuted, and the research they suggest is that of testing for goodness of fit with the data.

AS ALMOST everyone knows by now, Vladimir Bukovsky is a Russian dissident who in December 1976 was allowed to go to the West in exchange for the Chilean Communist leader Luis Corvalán. These memoirs establish Bukovsky as one of the most perceptive and balanced reporters on Soviet society.[1] They confirm that while the repressive apparatus has lost some of the violence and unpredictability of the Stalin era, the secret police are still dominant over more visible institutions such as the courts. The prisons and criminal camps are still filled with people from all walks of life; Bukovsky estimates that a substantial proportion of the Soviet population has spent at least some time in the camps (p. 318). The details of how one becomes a "dissident" in the Soviet Union, the description of life in the prisons and camps, the testimony about the role of Western publicity in helping to soften conditions in the Soviet Union—all these give this volume extraordinary interest.[2]

There is one issue, however, on which I find Bukovsky confusing and contradictory. On one hand, Bukovsky throughout the book places high value on Soviet law and Soviet legal procedures. Expressing regret that he did not earlier obtain a working knowledge of the Soviet criminal code and that other dissidents and oppositionists neglect this study, he recounts with obvious pleasure how he and some of his friends were able to fence with Soviet authorities through legal appeals and legal maneuvers. On the other hand, Bukovsky reports that the result of all this fine legal work is generally nil. The courts ignore the best legal efforts when they pass sentence; the secret police proceed in blithe disregard of all the niceties of the code of procedure. Bukovsky never fails to complain bitterly about the lawlessness of Soviet authorities.

In defense of Bukovsky, it must be said, of course, that the manipulation of Soviet legal forms has brought some advantages to some dissidents. Moreover, it has occasionally created a certain disarray for the Soviet authorities, and it has almost invariably made foreign news media even more sympathetic to the dissidents' cause. But such tactical benefits should not be confused, in my opinion, with the fundamental capacity for justice which Bukovsky seems to attribute to Soviet law.

The reasons for my demurrer here are of two kinds. The first is technical, and has been well explained in an article by Stephen Weiner in the pages of this journal.[3] Soviet law requires that a case be decided "on the basis of law in conformity with socialist legal consciousness." Since "socialist legal consciousness," in Soviet doctrine, can be interpreted only by the Communist Party (that is to say, by its leadership), we have here an overriding principle which we might call *extra partem nulla salus*, or *no salvation outside the party*. This principle is not only professed but rigorously practiced. It means that dissenters to party doctrine cannot successfully appeal to the courts, and Bukovsky is less than fair to his Soviet judges when he accuses them of lawlessness.

But even if we leave *extra partem nulla salus* aside—and perhaps some experts on Soviet law will find the principle debatable—

[1] Other memoirs by Soviet émigrés are reviewed by Jane P. Shapiro, "Profiles of Political Persecution," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), September–October 1975, pp. 74–78.

[2] Bukovsky has not been served as well as he could have been by his English translator. It would appear that Bukovsky uses very colloquial Russian when describing conditions in the prisons and the camps, and this must have been exceedingly difficult to translate. But the translator's decision to render much of this into current American slang and current American obscenity detracts from the impression of authenticity of the memoirs. It sounds incongruous to hear Russian prisoners sound like Americans. Slang, unfortunately, seems to be very nation-bound. A very straightforward but standard English would have placed fewer barriers between the very Russian subject matter of this book and the English-language reader.

[3] Stephen Weiner, "Socialist Legality on Trial," *Problems of Communism*, July–August 1968, pp. 6–13.

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there is a broader issue. Bukovsky is not alone in suggesting that consistent obedience to any code of law, even Soviet law, promotes human rights. The issue is complex and deserves more consideration than it can be given here. My own inclination is to recall that a totalitarian context gives a radically different meaning to any otherwise familiar aspect of society. It is true that in continental and British-American traditions, legal procedures afford considerable protection to dissenting individuals. But these procedures operate in a context of institutions that support human rights, in particular a free press, free public opinion, and an independent judiciary. It does not seem realistic to expect legal institutions alone to perform a protective function in the absence of a protective surrounding culture.[4]

WHERE BUKOVSKY is moderate, humane, and democratic, the "new Russian revolutionaries" described by John B. Dunlop are extremist, chauvinistic, and authoritarian. These anti-Soviet, right-wing nationalists operated clandestinely in the USSR, mostly in Leningrad, from 1964 until their arrest in 1967. Bukovsky portrays them as follows:

I have met political parties consisting of two, of five, and of twelve members. The biggest of them all, the All-Russian Social-Christian Union for the Liberation of the People, added up to about a hundred. All they had time for was to write a silly program and read Berdyaev (as if half the country wasn't reading Berdyaev anyway, without any parties!). (pp. 119–20)

Bukovsky also remarks that many of the illegal grouplets in the Soviet Union imitate the conspiratorial rites of the early Bolsheviks. The All-Russian Social-Christian Union, for example, had elaborate rituals and grades of membership, and specialized in bombastic pronouncements. It and others of its kind will seem familiar to aficionados of, for example, the different Maoist sects or the varieties of Plymouth Brethren.

But Dunlop's treatment is absolutely matter-of-fact. Those interested in the "new Russian revolutionaries" will wish to supplement it with other sources. For example, the All-Russian Social-Christian Union's former defense lawyer, Yuri Luryi, also now in the West, has expressed himself on the subject, with somewhat more sympathy than Bukovsky evinces but along roughly the same lines.[5] Still another Russian émigré, Alexander Yanov, has written a sharp attack on the anti-Semitism of at least some personalities associated with the Union.[6] Those interested in the broader range of organized opposition in the Soviet Union will wish to consult any of several well-balanced volumes now available in English.[7]

THE UNPRETENTIOUS volume edited by Ivan Volgyes, containing several papers delivered at a meeting of the Western Social Science Association in 1977, discusses crime in the other Communist countries of Eastern Europe. Most of the book's chapters manage to speak sensitively about the relationship between (nonpolitical) "crime" and (political) "dissidence." The chapter by Ivan Volgyes on Hungary and the one by Andrzej Korbonski on Poland highlight the fact that private initiative, encouraged in the West, is with few exceptions a crime in Communist countries (although the Bukovsky memoirs make clear that the repression of private initiative in the Soviet Union is much more crushing than it is in Poland or Hungary). In sum, the Volgyes volume has interesting material to which students of communism may refer, though little in it will startle the reasonably informed reader.

The books by the Association of Polish Students and Graduates in Exile and by Gerson S. Sher deal with political opposition in Poland and Yugoslavia, respectively, but give evidence of great differences between these countries and the Soviet Union.

The volume on Poland is of particular interest in light of the events in the summer of 1980. It is a collection of documents concerning movements and personalities in Poland that have tried—with considerable success—to obtain a measure of elbowroom otherwise unknown in Communist countries.

[4] Having spent so much time in detention, Bukovsky has become something of an expert on criminal groups in the Soviet Union. What he has to say about the organized underworld is informative and interesting, but should be compared to recent, more specialized publications. See, for example, Walter D. Connor, *Deviance in Soviet Society: Crime, Delinquency, and Alcoholism*, New York, NY, Columbia University Press, 1972; Yuri Glazov, "Thieves as a Social Phenomenon," *Survey* (London), No. 1, 1976, pp. 141–56; and Valery Chalidze, *Criminal Russia: Essays on Crime in the Soviet Union*, New York, NY, Random House, 1977.

[5] Yuri Luryi, "Reminiscences of a Soviet Lawyer," *Survey*, No. 4, 1977–78, pp. 56–63. See also Luryi's "Letter to the Editor," in which he comments on Dunlop's book, in ibid., Winter 1979, pp. 213–15.

[6] Alexander Yanov, *The Russian New Right: Right-Wing Ideologies in the Contemporary USSR*, Berkeley, CA, University of California, Institute of International Studies, 1978.

[7] See, for example, Peter Reddaway, Ed., *Uncensored Russia: The Human Rights Movement in the Soviet Union*, London, Jonathan Cape, 1972; Michael Meerson-Aksenov and Boris Shragin, Eds., *The Political, Social and Religious Thought of Russian "Samizdat"—An Anthology*, Belmont, MA, Nordland Publishing Company, 1977.

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These documents speak about government harassment and about the difficulties of being in opposition, and they invite us to lend this human rights movement our support. Whether because of the exemplary steadfastness of the Catholic hierarchy or other favorable circumstances, it is quite clear that a semilegal opposition has been active in Poland for a number of years now and that it would be misleading to think of the country as totalitarian in the classic sense. For a more complete picture, the reader should supplement this volume with other materials.[8]

Gerson S. Sher's book is an interesting description of the Praxists, a group of Yugoslav Marxist philosophers who, until their dismissal from university positions in 1975, were something of a loyal opposition to the regime. It is a case study of the possibilities and limitations of dissent in contemporary Yugoslavia. The possibilities are immeasurably greater than in the Soviet Union; the limitations seem more pronounced than in Poland.

[8] Adam Bromke, "Catholic Social Thought in Communist Poland," *Problems of Communism*, July-August 1975, pp. 67-72. This is a review of the legal Catholic political group Znak and some of its publications. The same author has written a more general article, "A New Juncture in Poland," ibid., September-October 1976, pp. 1-17. A recent book by Peter Raina, *Political Opposition in Poland 1954-1977*, London, Poets' and Painters' Press, 1978, gives a broader background to oppositional groups and figures than does the collection of documents here reviewed. Unfortunately, Raina manages to blame the Jews themselves for some of the anti-Semitism in Communist Poland. For an account of Polish-Jewish relations, therefore, the Raina book should be supplemented by the Jerusalem edition (not the bowdlerized Polish or German editions) of Emmanuel Ringelblum, *Polish-Jewish Relations During the Second World War*, edited and with additional comments by Joseph Kermish and Shmuel Krakowski, Jerusalem, Yad Vashem, 1974. The postwar situation is treated by Czeslaw Milosz, "Anti-Semitism in Poland," *Problems of Communism*, May-June 1957, pp. 35-40.

WHEN WE TURN from books concerned with communism in Europe to studies of the People's Republic of China (PRC), we enter a different realm. While the former are generally hostile to the European Communist regimes, those on China tend to be favorable. The particular volumes under review here are no exception.

Peter R. Moody's work seeks, in part, to examine the utility of the concept of totalitarianism as a tool for understanding the Chinese political system. "I hope . . . that it could serve in some way as a critique of totalitarianism," he writes (p. 4). But this intention is not realized.

First, Moody shares with most current analysts of China the disconcerting habit of referring to the 1949 Communist seizure of power as the "Liberation." The word "liberation" means one thing in the context of Communist propaganda, another in ordinary English. Which does Moody mean? Similarly, what does he mean by his use of such terms as "people's democracy," "socialist legality," and "capitalist road"? This use of Communist terminology, without a clear indication of how the reader is to interpret it, amounts to equivocation (such equivocation, of course, is usually by no means intended).

Second, Moody gives no coherent or sustained account of the secret police or other instruments of repression.[9] The sinologist's tendency to bracket off—not exactly deny, but simply ignore—the organs of repression goes back at least as far as Franz Schurman:

The public security forces, the political-legal branches of the state administration, the people's militia, and the army itself together constitute a powerful body for maintaining law and order. While not underestimating their power and importance in Communist China, we regard these methods of control as conventional, and hence do not deal with them in this chapter [or anywhere else—W.C.].[10]

If there is no consideration of the organs of repression, however, no test of totalitarianism can be made. Yet Moody's book is described by one of its sinologist reviewers as "an important book because it disproves the oversimplified view of the People's Republic as a totalitarian state . . . ."[11]

Finally, Moody consistently abstracts the printed word from its social context. For example, his sixth chapter, which ostensibly describes "opposition movements" and which takes up a third of the book, turns out to be based almost exclusively on texts published by the Chinese Communist government, either texts that purport to describe deviation or texts that Chinese authorities have subsequently labeled "deviationist." The reader of Bukovsky's book will turn in vain to Moody for any even remotely analogous consideration of real dissident activity in the People's Republic.

WHERE MOODY purports to offer a critique of Chinese totalitarianism

[9] For such an account, see Amnesty International, *Political Imprisonment in the People's Republic of China*, London, Amnesty International Publications, 1978. Several "*samizdat*" publications from China have now been published, in English translation, in *Index on Censorship* (London), September-October 1979, pp. 3-11. This literature is also discussed by Susan L. Shirk, " 'Going Against the Tide': Political Dissent in China," *Survey*, Winter 1979, pp. 82-114.

[10] Franz Schurman, *Ideology and Organization in Communist China*, Berkeley, CA, University of California Press, 1966, p. 310.

[11] Merle Goldman, review of "Opposition and Dissent in Contemporary China," *American Historical Review* (Washington, DC), February 1979, p. 230.

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but actually produces an apologetic account of conditions in China, the collective work edited by Amy Auerbacher Wilson et al. arrives at similar results from a very different starting point. Its avowed stance is rigorously neutral, objective, scientific: Chinese society is to be examined with the techniques of modern social science, and a contribution is to be made to the comparative sociology of deviance. But the editors inexplicably fail to include chapters on the police, on the detention camps, or on censorship of the media. Moreover, with the sole exception of the chapter by Joe C. Huang on Chinese literature, all the chapters in the book suffer from what amounts to a bias toward Communist China as well as from serious methodological defects.

The introductory chapter, by Amy Auerbacher Wilson, is often difficult to follow, for Wilson writes in an idiom associated with the late Talcott Parsons. Nevertheless, if the reader takes the trouble to translate this rather special language into ordinary English, as C. Wright Mills has done in the case of Parsons himself,[12] the predisposition of the author is clearly discernible. Take Wilson's assertion, made without evidence or qualification, that "today in the People's Republic of China (PRC) the high degree of congruence between values and norms from the standpoint of political content is readily apparent" (p. 3). My translation would read: "It is evident that Chinese Communists generally practice what they preach."

The chapter by Donald J. Munro traces the roots of the government's efforts at thought control back to both traditional Chinese philosophy and Marxism. But it does not attempt to test the government's professed commitment to society's interests against the government's actual deeds. It mentions the word "coercion" only in passing.

The chapter by Richard Whittingham Wilson reports a test he administered to children in Hong Kong, Taiwan, New York City (Chinatown), and New Jersey. He interprets his findings to indicate that Chinese have less of a sense of individuality than Americans. But some of his data (as he admits himself) in fact show no difference between these test groups, and those data that do are overinterpreted by him.

The chapter by Alfred H. Bloom interprets the results of a social-psychological study of Chinese, French, and Americans as showing a psychological fit between Chinese Communist rule and the alleged national character of the Chinese people. Even if one accepts the validity of Bloom's interpretation of his findings, the study itself is open to challenge because of the inadequate sample involved. This sample consisted of "336 Hong Kong residents, approximately one-third businessmen and professionals, one-third workers, and one-third students .... seventy-six students at the Université de Dijon, Dijon, France .... fifty-two college students in the New England area" (p. 70).

The chapter by Sidney Leonard Greenblatt adopts the promising approach of comparing the "recruitment of deviants"—i.e., the labeling of certain individuals as enemies—during the Great Purge in the Soviet Union and the various "campaigns" in China. In his analysis, however, Greenblatt leaves the impression that the Chinese victims were less "innocent" than the Soviet ones (p. 97). He also mentions the work of the Soviet secret police but plays down the role of the Chinese police (pp. 93–94).

The contribution by Victor H. Li on Communist Chinese law and penology speaks of ". . . the shambles of the American penal system and the relatively healthy state of the Chinese system (at least in its ideal form) . . ." (p. 149). Leaving aside one's reservations about the first half of the phrase, one cannot but note that things of different kinds are juxtaposed here. One is as the Communist Chinese would have it ideally; the other is Li's view of what things are in actuality. Here, too, a profession of aims should be treated with considerably more scholarly discrimination.

Lynn T. White III's chapter contains much information of interest on controls connected with rationing and identification documents. But it too is marred by a failure to consider professed government goals against actual coercive practices. It speaks, for instance, of alleged government aims to "direct individual energies toward community purposes" (p. 169), although a study of similar Nazi and Soviet practices might have led the author to consider the possible sinister implications of such social controls in China.[13]

The final essay, by Charles Hoffmann, provides a good illustration of a problem frequently encountered in the writings of sinologists, though in this volume his work affords the only example of it. In seeking to describe Communist practices designed to increase

[12] C. Wright Mills, *The Sociological Imagination*, New York, NY, Oxford University Press, 1959, Ch. 2.

[13] See, for example, Aryeh L. Unger, *The Totalitarian Party: Party and People in Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia*, London, Cambridge University Press, 1974, p. 80 and passim. I found this book particularly instructive because it shows the Nazi and Soviet origins of a great many institutions in the People's Republic of China.

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production, Hoffmann proceeds to tell us how work and production committees function in making decisions (p. 191 and passim). But it turns out that the reports he cites as evidence come from official Communist sources. Surely, here as elsewhere, propaganda materials should not be presented as social science reporting.

IN SUMMARY of my criticisms of the two China books just reviewed —which in certain relevant respects I take to be typical of current English-language sinology—I offer an incomplete and tentative catalog of problems.[14] Many of these criticisms, of course, also apply to fields other than sinology. In my opinion, however, they do not apply as generally to scholarship relating to the Soviet Union.

1. *Ambiguity.* Much of current English-language sinology employs a mixture of Communist and social science terminology. Not only can a reader be misled about the meaning of terms like "liberation"; one often wonders whether the writer himself distinguishes between observation and acceptance of Communist propaganda.

2. *Inappropriate abstraction.* Two related types are common in many recent works on the PRC. One is the failure to evaluate professed aims in light of actual practice—or, even worse, the use of professed aims to infer actual practice. Had we done the same in the case of Nazism, we might have concluded that Hitler's concentration camps existed to provide human freedom through self-fulfilling labor (after all, "Arbeit macht frei"). The other type is the bracketing off of repression from other aspects of Communist society. Just as context in language supplies the meaning of single words, so does social context supply the meaning of individual features in a society. As noted above, for example, it is inappropriate to study Communist legal theory without considering the administrative practices in which this theory functions. Western sinology has been particularly prone to ignore the organs of repression (police, prisons, camps) in descriptions of China.

3. *Inappropriate interpretation of inadequate samples.* No comparable field of scholarship, alas, is free of this problem. But it seems more common in sinology. Instead of pointing out that the totalitarian conditions of China do not allow for anything like scientific random sampling, many sinologists have inappropriately and unjustifiably employed statistical language. They thereby obscure the totalitarian nature of the society they purport to describe.

4. *Uncritical use of official sources.* Like any other official sources, the documents and declarations issued by a Communist authority may well yield information and understanding if subjected to scholarly scrutiny, analysis, and independent verification. But no official sources can be taken simply at face value, and this is especially true of those of Communist countries. Nonetheless, sinologists frequently fall into this trap. The result is often an unduly favorable picture of conditions in China.

THE BOOKS reviewed here differ greatly not only in subject matter but also in genre and quality. This diversity makes it hazardous to use this little batch of seven volumes to draw conclusions about Communist governments or the state of Communist studies. But perusal of these books, along with other readings, leaves some impressions and leads to some reflections.

The English-language reader, if he chooses widely from among the books available to him, will probably gain an image of the Soviet Union today as but a moderately relaxed version of Stalinist totalitarianism. He will see the other Communist countries of Eastern Europe as ruled by regimes that, with all the worst will in the world, cannot equal the repressiveness of the Soviets.

However, he will get a confusing picture of China. On the one hand, he has information from Amnesty International and other sources about a vast system of forced labor, about political executions, about brainwashings, and about control of the media. On the other hand, a veritable flood of books and articles, by experts and others, suggests that China may indeed have certain problems but that it is, on the whole, a land of exciting and benevolent social experiment.

What should the reader make of this confusion?

Insofar as one can get "truth" about China at all, the sinologist who knows the language and culture of the country should be in a good position to instruct us. But China specialists, like the rest of us, are not immune from intellectual and political fashions. Sometimes such fashions are salutary. Sometimes they are crippling. At present, the literature produced by many sinologists in the West seems so flawed that the public would be well advised to withhold any very firm reliance on it.

[14] See the author's more detailed discussion of such problems, forthcoming in *Survey*.

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West-East Technology Transfer

By Gary K. Bertsch

JOHN R. THOMAS and URSULA M. KRUSE-VAUCIENNE, Eds. *Soviet Science and Technology: Domestic and Foreign Perspectives.* Washington, DC, George Washington University, 1977.

CHRISTOPHER E. STOWELL. *Soviet Industrial Import Priorities.* New York, NY, Praeger, 1975.

GEORGE D. HOLLIDAY. *Technology Transfer to the U.S.S.R., 1928–1937 and 1966–1975: The Role of Western Technology in Soviet Economic Development.* Boulder, CO, Westview, 1979.

ERIC W. HAYDEN. *Technology Transfer to Eastern Europe.* New York, NY, Praeger, 1976.

FRIEDRICH LEVCIK and JAN STANKOVSKY. *Industrial Cooperation Between East and West.* White Plains, NY, M.E. Sharpe, 1979. (German ed.: *Industrielle Kooperation zwischen Ost und West.* Wien, Springer-Verlag, 1977.)

C.T. SAUNDERS, Ed. *Industrial Policies and Technology Transfers Between East and West.* Wien, Springer-Verlag, 1977.

NATO DIRECTORATE OF ECONOMIC AFFAIRS. *East-West Technological Cooperation.* Brussels, NATO Information Service, 1976.

R.J. CARRICK. *East-West Technology Transfer in Perspective.* Berkeley, CA, University of California, Institute for International Studies, 1978.

THIS WOULD appear to be an appropriate time, in light of recent reductions in the transfer of technology from West to East, to examine some of the central issues related to that transfer. Drawing upon a number of recent books on the subject, the present essay will explore the following questions: What is the present level of scientific-technological development and sophistication in the Soviet Union and in other Eastern countries? Given the technological levels of these states, what import priorities have they set? What has been the nature of East-West technological cooperation and transfer over the last decade or so? Finally, what have been the processes, channels, levels, and impacts characterizing the flow of Western technology to the East?

AN APPROPRIATE starting point for any discussion of West-East technology transfer is an appraisal of the present level of scientific-technological development in the Eastern countries. In this light, the workshop that gave rise to the volume edited by John Thomas and Ursula Kruse-Vaucienne sought to expand and deepen Western knowledge of the policies and organization of Soviet science and technology as key components of the Soviet system, to identify and assess domestic and foreign factors which have shaped current, and can influence future, interactions of the USSR with the West in scientific and technical areas, and to identify gaps in Western understanding of Soviet science and technology for possible further research and analysis (p. i). The 19 papers and supporting materials published in the volume make a substantial contribution in these spheres.

This book demonstrates what John Kiser has emphasized — namely, that what you find depends on where you look.[1] Editors Thomas and Kruse-Vaucienne draw attention to several popular Western misperceptions about Soviet science and technology, which derive from factors ranging from ideological stereotypes to incomplete and distorted data. They indi-

[1] See, for example, John Kiser, "Soviet Technology: The Perception Gap," *Mechanical Engineering* (New York, NY), April 1979, pp. 22–29; and his *Report on the Potential for Technology Transfer from the Soviet Union to the United States,* prepared for the US Department of State and the National Science Foundation, October 1977.

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cate, for example, that we often tend to judge the quality of Soviet science in terms of inappropriate or incomplete measures, such as the number of Nobel prizes received (p. xii). At the same time, this volume correctly identifies the obvious deficiencies in Soviet technology and the USSR's considerable and continuing lag behind the West in most fields. As the contributions of Herbert Fusfeld, Ronald Amann, Philip Hanson, and David Holloway indicate, however, these shortcomings may not reflect the level of Soviet science per se. These authors argue that the principal deficiency of Soviet science and technology lies in inadequate transfer of the results of applied research to commercial production on a broad scale. In other words, while the Soviets have done reasonably well in developing scientific capabilities, technological applications of the results leave much to be desired.

Although the Thomas and Kruse-Vaucienne volume contributes a lot to our knowledge of science and technology in the Soviet Union, we need more research and writing of this kind, on a continuing basis, in order to fulfill the three goals that the editors identified. Perhaps even more important, we require similar in-depth research on science and technology in the countries of Eastern Europe and in the People's Republic of China (PRC). While some significant contributions exist,[2] there are major gaps in what we know about these other countries.

THE USSR'S technological shortcomings and needs help explain its import priorities. Soviet decision-makers have apparently placed high priority on importing advanced technologies from and on scientific and technological cooperation with the West. Research has shown that the Soviet leadership's commitment to economic-technical cooperation with Western countries increased substantially during the 1970's.[3] Aleksey Kosygin, Andrey Gromyko, and particularly Leonid Brezhnev were found to be the main advocates within the Politburo of East-West trade and technological exchange, but even those who showed relatively less interest in cooperation with the West recognized the importance of scientific-technological development. The Soviet leaders' commitment to East-West cooperation in science and technology has also been proved in practice. The 1970's witnessed growing interaction between the USSR and all Western countries, on all fronts. The same was true for the East European states and has also become true for China in the post-Mao era.

But are the Soviets, Chinese, and East Europeans going to get the substantial assistance they need and want from the West to promote their scientific-technological revolutions? A definitive answer cannot be given because uncertainties and imponderables abound in both the East and West. On the Western side, there is considerable uncertainty about export controls, credit, and import restrictions. In the USSR and the PRC, uncertainties exist concerning the development, production, and sale of energy resources and how these and other exports will affect the two countries' financial situation and ability to buy. In Eastern Europe, there are pressing economic and financial problems as well as the political unknowns related to domestic conditions and the murky future of détente. Under all scenarios, however, it is clear that the Eastern countries cannot possibly get all of the assistance they need and would like from the West. This simple fact suggests the importance of a careful examination of their precise import priorities.

In the foreword to Christopher Stowell's study of Soviet priorities regarding imports of industrial goods and technologies, Robert McLellan maintains: "The Soviets have great natural resources; they have great human resources; they do some fine scientific research; but they need the West's applied technology" (p. viii). To evaluate specific Soviet needs in this regard, Stowell addresses the process of Soviet economic development, looks at the 1971–75 Five-Year Plan, and examines what it suggests about import priorities for the recent past. In delineating Soviet needs and Western responses during this period, the book includes case studies of five high-priority import industries—oil and gas, machine tools, chemical-petrochemicals, pollution control, and computers. Such a case-study approach continues to be the most effective research method for probing the real meaning of Eastern needs and priorities. The last part of the book deals with the problems and issues facing US exporters, not only technical matters but also the overall political and economic context of US-Soviet trade. Written during the euphoria of détente, the book did not anticipate the severity of the problems of the early 1980's.

George Holliday's recent case study of the Soviet automotive in-

[2] For recent examples, see John W. Kiser, *Commercial Technology Transfer from Eastern Europe to the United States and Western Europe*, prepared for the US Department of State, Washington, DC, 1980; and Jon Sigurdson, *Technology and Science in the People's Republic of China: An Introduction*, New York, NY, Pergamon Press, 1980.

[3] Rensselaer W. Lee, *Soviet Perceptions of Western Technology*, Bethesda, MD, MATHTECH, Inc., September 1978.

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dustry identifies some specific technologies imported from the West and describes the institutions involved in the process of technology transfer. Concentrating on the Gor'kiy Automobile Plant project (built with the assistance of Ford Motor Company in the late 1920's and early 1930's), the Volga Automobile Plant project (built with the primary assistance of the Italian firm Fiat in the late 1960's), and the Kama River Truck Plant (built during the 1970's with considerable assistance from a variety of Western firms), Holliday asserts:

. . . changing Soviet institutional arrangements and attitudes are evidence of a gradual but fundamental change in Soviet policy toward economic and technological ties with the West[,] . . . and . . . a new Soviet growth strategy requires an enhanced role for technological progress in general and for Western technology in particular. One of the implications of the new growth strategy is that Soviet technological ties to the West are likely to endure. (p. 171)[4]

However, one has to wonder if Soviet leaders had any inkling of the possible consequences in this connection of their invasion of Afghanistan. Although the full Western responses to the invasion and their impacts are still unclear, it is obvious that the nature and endurance of technological ties will be problematic during a period of heightened East-West tension.

Eric Hayden's eight case studies[5] indicate that, like the USSR, the East European states place high priority on Western technology. In contrast with technology transfer to the USSR, however, technology transfer to Eastern Europe (especially Poland, Hungary, and Romania) has typically involved complex and disembodied forms, including coproduction, subcontracting, joint design of new products, joint marketing, and joint ventures. One crucial payoff of such transfers is managerial know-how, a vital need of all Eastern countries. Hayden's study argues that US corporations are significant instruments for transmitting industrial technology to Eastern Europe (p. 105) and that industrial cooperation—whether of an equity or nonequity nature—is a feasible and attractive long-term arrangement for both sides (p. 113).

FRIEDRICH LEVCIK and Jan Stankovsky have written a book that examines the various forms of East-West industrial cooperation. Although the volume is largely descriptive, it contains a considerable mass of tabular data which help identify the trends, types, and motives for industrial cooperation between the countries of West and East. It also provides a number of case studies as well as discussions of the impact of legal and institutional regulations, economic policy, and business cycles on East-West industrial cooperation. The authors' analysis and supporting data often move their inquiry close to the levels of explanation and prediction. In Chapter 9 (pp. 158–65), for example, they use empirical evidence to describe the sensitivity of cooperative agreements to business trends. However, adequate methods still have not been developed to assess the scope of cooperative undertakings quantitatively, and these forms of industrial cooperation have been in effect for too short a period to permit longitudinal analysis. Thus, the authors could not test their hypotheses conclusively. Nevertheless, the descriptive groundwork that they and others discussed below have provided leaves us in a much better position to undertake research necessary for a fuller understanding of the dynamics and consequences of industrial and technological cooperation.

East-West industrial cooperation and technology transfer, with some useful case studies, are likewise treated in Saunders's volume on *Industrial Policies and Technology Transfers Between East and West* and the NATO volume on *East-West Technological Cooperation*. The conferences out of which these compendiums grew were convened under different auspices (the Vienna Institute for Economic Studies and the NATO Directorate of Economic Affairs) and attended by significantly different mixes of participants (from both East and West in Vienna, but strictly from the West for NATO). Hence, it is not exactly surprising that they reflect different and often conflicting perspectives.

The NATO book focuses essentially on the Soviet technological lag, giving considerable attention to issues of East-West transfer patterns, channels and problems of transfer and diffusion, and economic impact. An underlying theme, made fairly explicit in Peter Wiles's interesting essay "On the Prevention of Technology Trans-

[4] While most scholars concur that the Soviet leaders recognize the costs of technological isolationism and thus prefer to expand or at least maintain economic relations with the West, some observers have predicted a Soviet return to autarky once the USSR's short-run needs are met. See, for example, Carl Gershman, "Selling Them the Rope," *Commentary* (New York, NY), April 1979, pp. 35–45. For a more systematic and comprehensive treatment of the issue, see Marshall I. Goldman, "Will the Soviet Union Be an Autarky in 1984," *International Security* (Cambridge, MA), Spring 1979, pp. 18–36.

[5] Covering the experiences of Clark Equipment, International Harvester, Honeywell, Westinghouse Electric, Singer, Control Data, General Tire, and Instrument Systems.

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fer," is how better to understand the nature of Soviet technological deficiencies in order to make sure they are maintained. For the most part, the contributors to the NATO volume show little interest in the possibilities or potential for profitable West-to-East transfers and tend to view technology as a good to be protected rather than a resource to be shared.

In contrast, the Vienna papers concentrate on "the process of technological innovation . . . [and] adapting economic structures to the rapid advance of science and technology in an increasingly interdependent world" (p. 11). Consequently, they reflect a more cooperative spirit than that in the NATO papers. This is illustrated, for example, by the remark of Dzhermen Gvishiani, the Deputy Chairman of the USSR State Committee for Science and Technology, that "I am convinced that scientific and technical cooperation have tremendous significance not only in promoting economic development but also in creating better understanding among people" (p. 210). (It would be interesting to know, if next to impossible to estimate, how much understanding East-West technical cooperation created in the 1970's. Such cooperation may have facilitated interaction and exchange between management and middle-level officials, but it is indeed problematic how much understanding spilled over to both the masses and the top elite.)

In his evaluation of the Vienna conference, Friedrich Levcik wrote: "In the reports, as well as in discussions, many facts were given proving that East-West technological cooperation benefits both sides" (p. 298). To support his argument, Levcik maintained that the participants (although we might assume not all participants) thought that the different patterns of technological development in the East and in the West create opportunities and possibilities for mutually advantageous specialization and cooperation. This contention is based on the premise that the East possesses scientific expertise, while the West has the capacities to apply scientific know-how in productive technologies.

Because of the deficiencies of the Eastern countries with regard to marketing and because of the general lack of Western interest in Eastern scientific capabilities, the argument has not yet been fairly tested. Indeed, all available evidence indicates that the transfer of technology has been heavily eastward, with no balancing in sight. Whether or not a balance is practical remains an empirical question, but one unlikely to be answered until the principle of mutual benefits is tested with the passage of time.[6] Given the volatile nature of East-West political relations and their impact on trade and technology transfer, however, there are even grounds to doubt whether the test can be made.

The issue of mutual benefit thus continues to be a controversial one that neither conference made much progress toward answering. But both conferences, and the volumes that grew from them, provide descriptive information that will be useful to anyone who might attempt more definitive assessments.

MANY CONTRIBUTIONS to the NATO volume highlight the priority that the Soviet Union attached to technological imports and the opportunities that the West accorded the USSR as a consequence of détente. Wiles, for instance, quotes the following statement by Kosygin to sustain the proposition that the major Soviet motive behind détente and the Helsinki accords was the acquisition of Western technology: "It is known, for instance, that the Soviet Union lays special stress on the calling of the European Security Conference. For us it is perfectly clear that the conducting of this conference would strengthen confidence, and open the way to a broad economic and scientific-technical cooperation" (p. 27). T.M. Podolski, Hanson, and others call attention to the many channels and dimensions of technology transfer. But important questions remain: How much technology is being transferred, and what are the impacts on those involved?

The flow through many of the key channels of technology transfer —scholarly or commercial contacts and exchanges, the screening of Western technical literature, technical assistance and joint production agreements, licensing agreements, joint ventures, and so forth—cannot be easily measured. However, the transfer resulting from trade is somewhat more amenable to empirical evaluation. Using a refined list of high-technology exports based on international trade data, analysts at the Bureau of East-West Trade in the US Department of Commerce concluded that the flow of high-technology products from 15 industrialized Western countries was not large in volume, did not dominate imports of the Communist

[6] In this connection, Kiser suggests: "A major effort should be undertaken to determine the potential for technology flow from the Soviet Union. The outcome of such a study is not foreordained, but initial investigation . . . indicates that the Soviets may have much more to offer than is commonly assumed." See his "Technology Is Not a One-Way Street," *Foreign Policy* (Washington, DC), Summer 1976, p. 147. However, there is reason for skepticism about what the Soviets have to offer, for some of the firms Kiser cites as benefiting or profiting from Soviet technology have recently told me that the technology they obtained from the USSR was neither advanced nor economical.

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states during the 1972–76 period, and did not increase markedly in relative importance.[7] Nevertheless, critics of West-East technology transfer may reach different judgments on the basis of the same data. They can cite the fact that while high-technology exports to the East constituted only 12.6 percent of total exports to these areas in 1976, that share was higher than the proportion of the same items in Western exports to the rest of the world (10.9 percent in 1976). Also, they can point out that in 1976 high-technology exports to the East reached US$4.14 billion, a marked rise over the US$1.56 billion total in 1972.

Moreover, it should be remembered that even normal trade statistics are unsatisfactory reflections of the true value of technology transfer. Where new technology breaks bottlenecks, can be easily diffused, and has significant spillover effects with respect to the economic infrastructure, the value is considerably greater than trade data might suggest. Furthermore, as a result of cooperation and specialization arrangements within the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA), there are many indirect effects that go beyond the initial partners. For these and other reasons, the measurement problems concerning technology transfer continue to be significant.

Related to disagreements over the measurement of technology transfers are differences of opinion over their impacts. Those who maintain that Western technology has had a positive and significant impact on Soviet development generally cite three leading studies in support of their position. In perhaps the most comprehensive macroeconomic study available, Donald Green and Herbert Levine contend that in the absence of imports of Western plants, Soviet industrial growth for the 1969–73 period would have been 8 percent lower.[8] Anthony Sutton, in his three-volume study of Western technology and Soviet economic development, argues that the absorption of Western technology and skills has been by far the most significant factor in the development of the Soviet economy.[9] More specifically, Hanson has determined that imports of Western technology have considerably expanded Soviet capacity to produce mineral fertilizers and hence increased agricultural output.[10]

Yet the implications of such research are not always as clear as they may seem. In his excellent monograph on *East-West Technology Transfer in Perspective,* Roger Carrick says that "too little is known for any very comprehensive and detailed statements usefully to be made" (p. 71). However, to indicate that there is reason to dispute some of the more extreme claims of Sutton and others, Carrick cites Hanson's chapter in the NATO volume to the effect that the share of imported Western machinery in total investment in machinery in CMEA countries is very low (4 percent in the early 1970's). Therefore, he suggests that such imports could not be of great significance. He also notes that Hanson "argues that the total impact of Western technology on Soviet economic growth almost certainly comes predominately from noncommercial transfer (e.g., Soviet monitoring of the Western technical press) and from diffusion within the Soviet economy of Western technology already transferred and from other direct means" (p. 72). Finally, Carrick uses Green and Levine's econometric estimates in the NATO volume to contend that the total impact of embodied technology transfer in the USSR is, in its magnitude, not exceptional (p. 72).

* * *

A number of conclusions emerge from a close examination of both the books under review and other work on technology transfers from West to East. First, a good deal remains unclear about the scientific and technological capabilities of Eastern countries. Second, there is much we do not know about how different forms of West-to-East technology transfer affect both the sending and receiving countries. Finally, rational policy responses to the many questions related to West-East technology transfer are difficult to formulate in view of the present low level of understanding.

[7] Hedija Kravalis et al., "Quantification of Western Exports of High Technology Products to Communist Countries," in US Congress, Joint Economic Committee, *Issues in East-West Relations,* Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, Jan. 12, 1979, pp. 34–35.

[8] Donald W. Green and Herbert S. Levine, "Soviet Machinery Imports," *Survey* (London), Spring 1977–78, pp. 112–26. Also see their contributions in the NATO and the Thomas and Kruse-Vaucienne volumes.

[9] Anthony C. Sutton, *Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development,* 3 vols., Stanford, CA, Hoover Institution, 1969–73.

[10] Philip Hanson, "Western Technology in the Soviet Economy," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), November–December 1978, p. 28. See, too, Hanson's chapters in the NATO, Saunders, and Thomas and Kruse-Vaucienne volumes.

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Notes & Views

Correspondence

NOTE: Readers are welcome to comment on matters discussed in this journal. Letters should be addressed to The Editors, Problems of Communism, *International Communication Agency, United States of America, 1776 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW, Washington, DC 20547, USA.*

THE SOVIET REGIME AND JEWISH RIGHTS

TO THE EDITORS: It was a great pleasure for me to read the interesting and informative article by Zvi Gitelman, "Moscow and the Soviet Jews: A Parting of the Ways," in your January–February 1980 issue.

Nevertheless, I would like to call your attention to the fact that Mr. Gitelman at one point repeats in his article, without doubt inadvertently, an "official Soviet lie" found in the last two editions of the *Bol'shaya Sovetskaya entsiklopediya* (The Great Soviet Encyclopedia).

On page 24, he writes: " . . . the Soviet regime removed all the restrictions that its Tsarist predecessor had placed on Jews . . . ."

That is the *Soviet* version, but it is a historical fact that these restrictions were all removed before the Soviet regime came to power after the October 1917 revolution, namely, by the February 1917 revolution, which brought into power the coalition of Democratic Socialists and Liberals. (See G. Ya. Aronson, "The Jewish Community in Russia in 1917-1918," in *Kniga o russkom yevreystve 1917-1967* [The Book on Russian Jewry, 1917-1967], New York, NY, Union of Russian Jews, 1968, p. 2.)

Many Soviet Jews today are ignorant of this fact, because the Soviet leaders have deliberately appropriated the merits of the people who were murdered or sent to exile during 63 years of bloody Communist rule.

JULIA WISHNEVSKY
Munich
West Germany

AGING COMMUNIST LEADERS

TO THE EDITORS: I take the liberty to bring to your attention several factual errors and omissions which appeared in the March–April 1980 issue of *Problems of Communism.*

On page 57 in his essay-review, "How the Obkom Secretary Was Tempered," T.H. Rigby gives the life-span of A.I. Mikoyan as 1905–1978. According to *Bol'shaya Sovetskaya entsiklopediya* (The Great Soviet Encyclopedia), 3rd ed., Moscow, 1974, Vol. 16, p. 222, Anastas Mikoyan was born on November 25, 1895. Professor Rigby also fails to note chairmanship of the USSR Supreme Soviet among Mikoyan's positions in the government and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, although a few lines later he states that L.I. Brezhnev is "President of the USSR."

Second, in Table 1, page 25, of his article, "Growing Tensions in Eastern Europe," Ernst Kux offers 1903 as the year of birth for Enver Hoxha. To the best of my knowledge, all the available sources concur on 1908 as Hoxha's year of birth. Adding another five years to Hoxha's present age may exaggerate the imminence of succession crisis in Albania.

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A WORD OF CAUTION ON SOVIET DECREES

TO THE EDITORS: A study of Soviet decrees on economic and manpower issues reveals major discrepancies between the versions printed in the major newspapers *Pravda* and *Izvestiya* and the texts as reproduced in the official collection of decrees and directives, *Sobraniye postanovleniy Pravitel'stva Soyuza Sovetskikh Sotsialisticheskikh Respublik* (Collected Decrees of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics—hereafter *SP*).

These discrepancies not only involve differences in the date of signing and the date of *Pravda/Izvestiya* publication, but also include sharp abbreviation or even complete omission of whole paragraphs of the official text in the newspaper version.

For example, compare the text of the economic reform decree "On the Improvement of Planning and Strengthening the Economic Mechanism's Impact on Raising Production Efficiency and Quality of Work," as published on July 29, 1979, in *Pravda* and *Izvestiya,* with the version published in *SP,* No. 18, Article 118, 1979, p. 402. The newspaper version totally omits paragraph 23 of the decree, which contains details on planning documents and on measures to be undertaken to regulate the labor market by various levels of authority and which foreshadows a December 1979 decree on labor discipline.

The latter decree, signed on December 13, 1979, and published in *SP,* No. 3, Article 17, 1980, pp. 43–52, contained previously unpublished data on worktime and labor turnover, especially for 1978. In particular, it revealed that there had occurred only a 3-percentage-point drop in the turnover rate (from 21.2 to 18.2 percent) over the decade since 1970. These data were omitted from the text of this decree as published in *Pravda* on January 12, 1980 (with no mention of the date of signing). The *Pravda* version also omitted paragraph 19, which dealt with new and/or expanded surveys and reports by the Central Statistical Administration of the USSR on losses of worktime and on labor turn-

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over. Judging from the brief description offered in *SP*, data from these surveys and reports may well be important information for the Soviet government, and for Western observers (if such data were to be released).

To add to the confusion, *Pravda*'s version of the labor discipline decree contained one paragraph (paragraph 17) *not printed* in the official *SP* version. There was a footnote in *SP* indicating that this paragraph concerned only a "one-time task" *(razovoye zadaniye)*. *Pravda*'s version revealed that this paragraph concerned "concrete action to deal with persons who shirk socially useful work," an item which could have both political and economic implications for potential émigrés and for the population as a whole.

I cannot claim to have made a systematic study of the extent or history of such variations in published texts of official legislation, but the two cases detected in a single year may signal a general practice. What does seem called for is close comparison of newspaper versions with official registers of Soviet legislative acts.

MURRAY FESHBACH
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Washington, DC

MORE MATTERS OF DECREE

TO THE EDITORS: I would like to add my voice to the discussion of the matter that Murray Feshbach has indicated he planned to draw to the attention of *Problems of Communism*'s readers (see above).

When it comes to joint decrees of the CPSU Central Committee and USSR Council of Ministers, the version published in *Pravda* is sometimes the exact text, or at least the most complete version ever published. However, in many cases more detailed versions later appear in the periodical *Sobraniye postanovleniy Pravitel'stva Soyuza Sovetskikh Sotsialisticheskikh Respublik*, in specialized journals, or in collections in book form.

Regarding the July 12, 1979, decree on improving planning, no less an authority than *Pravda*'s deputy chief editor for economic questions, Dmitriy Valovoy, advised those analyzing the decree not to go by the *Pravda* version, but to seek out a more extensive version. Writing in the November 1979 issue of *Zhurnalist* (Moscow), Valovoy said

Before going on to specific questions, I would like to express the hope that journalists and editors, especially those who are directly involved in spreading information about the decree and in preparing material on its practical implementation, would use the full text of the document published in pamphlet form by the Political Literature Publishing House in Issue No. 32 of the CPSU CC weekly Ekonomicheskaya gazeta. *The thing is that in the other newspapers the decree was published in abridged form, and therefore they left out some specific explanations and characterizations of a number of problems. And these are sometimes very important for press workers.*

Actually, the July 12 decree appeared in *three* versions: the relatively short version in the July 29 *Pravda;* a longer—but not clearer—version published in *Ekonomicheskaya gazeta*, No. 32, August 1979 and in the September 1979 issue of *Planovoye khozyaystvo;* and the version published in *Sobraniye postanovleniy. . .* . This last version is similar to the second version, but it also included an appendix *(prilozheniye)* listing projected followup acts and their target dates.

There are also times when joint Central Committee/Council of Ministers decrees appear in *Izvestiya* (the government newspaper) and not in *Pravda*, again in truncated form. For example, the short version of a December 4, 1978, joint decree ordering industrial ministries to create more subsidiary farms that was published in *Izvestiya* on December 23, 1978, omitted key paragraphs ordering ministries to finance new farms and to cover the gap between procurement prices and retail prices. These paragraphs were included in *Sobraniye postanovleniy. . .*, No. 3, 1979.

Hence, to locate more complete versions of decrees published in *Pravda* and *Izvestiya*—not to mention decrees not published in these newspapers—scholars should peruse *Sobraniye postanovleniy. . .;* specialized economic periodicals; party journals such as *Partiynaya zhizn';* and also various published collections such as *Resheniya partii i pravitel'stva po khozyaystvennym voprosam* (Decisions of the Party and Government on Economic Questions—so far 12 volumes have been issued), *Spravochnik partiynogo rabotnika* (Party Worker's Handbook—so far 19 volumes have been issued), and of course various editions of *KPSS v rezolyutsiyakh i resheniyakh s''yezdov, konferentsiy i plenumov TsK* (CPSU in Resolutions and Decisions of Congresses, Conferences, and CC Plenums—the 12th volume of the latest edition was issued in 1978). These latter collections present some decrees in apparently full text, but others are in clearly identified abridged form, labeled "summaries" *(izlozheniya)* or "extracts" *(izvlecheniya)*.

One can sometimes identify omitted sections in these decrees, sections which apparently contain information still considered secret. For example, a decree of September 8, 1972, in *Resheniya. . .*, Vol. 9, pp. 254–55, skips from paragraph 2 to paragraph 6. These books sometimes indicate that there is an "appendix" *(prilozheniye)* to a particular decree but that it is not being published.

On the other hand, these collections sometimes include whole decrees never published, even in short form, in the newspapers. For example, in *Resheniya. . .*, Vol. 9, p. 232, one reads a key (previously unpublished) August 9, 1972, Central Committee/Council of Ministers decree ordering preparation of a 15-year plan and of the 1976–80 five-year plan.

These more specialized sources are also crucial in determining the date of decrees. Except for decrees adopted at party plenums, *Pravda* does not indicate when decrees were actually adopted. Comparison with dates given in other sources indicates that decrees often appear in *Pravda* days or even weeks after they were adopted. In addition to the delayed publication of the July 1979 and December 1978 decrees cited above, one could mention a Central Committee decree on ideological matters published in the May 6, 1979, issue of *Pravda*. When published later in brochure form, the date affixed to the decree was April 26.

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